SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY IN A COMPARATIVE SETTING

by

MALİKE SELÇUK SANCAR

Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Bilkent University

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The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

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

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
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in

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ANKARA

December, 1998

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

(Supervisor) Assistant Professor Ekin Burak Arikan

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

Assoc. Prof. Ümit Cize Sahallioğlu

Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

Ass. Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk Genckaya

Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet Evi

Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

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Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

Director

ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a systematic in-depth analysis of social democracy in Turkey, with particular reference to Western Europe. The research develops a framework for the analysis of social democracy in Western Europe and Turkey in a comparative setting. Whereas the origins and development of the social democratic parties in Western Europe have been explored in the formative phase of the Industrial society in Europe, the birth and the evolution of *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP) have been scrutinised in the First Turkish Republic, as grounding to the structural conjuncture prevailing within the relevant cases.

Accordingly, the analysis of the social democratic parties in these polities have been carried out on the basis of ideology, social basis of support, strategy and organisation respectively. Therefrom, the status of social democracy in Turkey is evaluated while holding the Western European case as the reference. In this context, the extent to which Turkish social democracy diverges from the homeland of social democracy has been elucidated.

ÖZET

Bu tez, Türk sosyal demokrasisinin özellikle Batı Avrupa'yı referans alan derinlemesine sistematik bir analizidir. Bu araştırmada, Batı Avrupa ve Türkiye'deki sosyal demokrasinin karşılaştırmalı bir ortamda incelenebilmesi amacıyla analitik bir çerçeve geliştirilmektedir. Bu kapsamda bir yandan Batı Avrupa'daki sosyal demokrat partilerin kökeni ve gelişimi sanayileşme sürecinde ele alınırken; diğer taraftan, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin (CHP) doğuşu ve gelişimi Birinci Cumhuriyet Dönemi içerisinde incelenmekle, mevcut yapısal konjonktür ortaya konmaktadır.

Öte yandan, Türkiye ve Batı Avrupa'daki sosyal demokrat partiler ideoloji, sosyal taban, strateji ve organizasyon açısından bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutulmaktadır.

Yukarıda değinilen analizlere dayanılarak, Türkiye'deki sosyal demokrasinin durumu Batı Avrupa örneği referans alınarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Türk sosyal demokrasisinin, bu hareketin anavatanı konumunda olan Batı Avrupa'dan ne kadar ayrıştığı da ayrıntılı olarak açıklanmıştır.

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INTRODUCTION

The attempt for the institutionalisation of social democracy in Turkish politics is a relatively novel phenomenon, when the legacy of its sister in Western Europe is borne in mind. At a time of revival of left wing politics in Europe in the 1990s, the status of Turkish social democracy may well be of interest both to students of Turkish politics and to others in the social democratic milieu. Findings of this thesis are hoped to highlight the basic motifs behind the functioning of social democracy in our country; especially in the aftermath of the 1995 elections during which, apparent erosion of the centre-left in Turkish politics has been manifesting itself. In this context, the main target of this research shall be to offer an in-depth systematic analysis of social democracy in Turkey, with particular reference to Western Europe where social democracy originates from. However, any study that has relevance to Western European politics requires at first hand, the clarification of what "Western Europe" actually refers to. With this regard, the concept of "Western Europe" and its implications shall briefly be explained below.

From 1945 onwards, the image of the European continent has been twofold, a "Western" Europe on one hand and an "Eastern" one on the other: the division was not only geographical but political as well. Although sharing an almost common legacy, the individual developmental stage of each state has been different, and the post-war

developments on the Continent have been diverse. To borrow *Dennis Kavanagh*'s paraphrasing, "Western Europe has been the home of many of the formative experiences in human history, including Greek civilisation, Roman law, Christianity, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the emergence of sovereign states, the French Revolution, and the rise of industrialism and liberalism".[1]

Western Europe, as a concept, refers to all those European countries that survived the *Stalinist* expansionism of the Second World War period, thus those that ultimately joined a club of values such as political liberalism, democracy and the rule of law. Actually, the historic decision of dividing Europe into two exclusive zones was taken in the *Teheran* Conference of 27 November to 3 December 1943; in which *W.Churchill, F.Roosevelt* and *J.Stalin* met to decide how to launch the final offensive in Europe. In this respect, the Anglo-American forces were to operate in the West and the Soviet Army in the East, for the defeat of the Nazis. Although it was a military agreement in the minds of the Western Allies, for the Soviet leader, it referred to the beginning of dominance and of an expansionist endeavour. By 1944, *Stalin* was granted predominant positions in Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Bulgaria; through the "Percentages Agreement" signed between him and *Churchill*. The procedure was complemented in *Yalta*, in which the Allies agreed to allow the Soviets to maintain positions in Eastern Europe.

[1] Dennis Kavanagh, "Introduction to European Politics and Policies". In *Politics in Western Europe*, eds. Gerald A. Dorfman and Peter J. Duignan, 1-24. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1991),1.

The immediate post-war conjuncture, therefore, required the European states either to join the *Atlantic Community* which Western Europe was a part of, or to remain in the *cordon sanitaire* granted to *Stalin* by the Allies: the Soviet leader's interests were lying in securing his territory (particularly the vulnerable Russian and Ukrainian heartland through Czechoslovakia and Poland) from further attacks during the war, and consolidating his regime by political and physical expansion through Central and Eastern Europe after the war.

With this regard, there has been hardly any controversy on the fact that the term "Western Europe" is a highly political one, rather than being geographical. The division of Europe into two opposite camps right after had both economic and ideological implications. Western Europe stood for capitalism economically, and for the free world ideologically; whereas the Eastern part of the Continent used to represent the practice of socialism on one hand, and political and economic dependence to the Soviet Union on the other. Post-war institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Council of Europe and the (then) European Economic Community (EEC) have all contributed to the formation of "Western Europe": it was a club whose members were Western not necessarily geographically, but ideologically as well, adhering to some basic values such as liberalism, parliamentarism, supremacy of law and respect for human rights. A south-eastern European country Greece for instance, was accepted to the Western Club only after the fall of the military junta in 1974, and it acceded to the European Communities in 1981.

Western Europe today comprises of states among which many has a rather turbulent political past, particularly in the period before the Second World War: the consolidation of a genuine Western Europe became possible only after 1945. The developmental stage of each country in the formative years of the parliamentary road in Western Europe differ widely across the Continent, and each region or individual country has its own peculiarities or say, characteristics of its own: some group of countries or regions display similarities, as for instance, the Nordic region or the Mediterranean basin. Nevertheless, contemporary Western Europe as a concept, is widely accepted to be the home of parliamentary democracy that bears in itself some political competition around a well established left-right continuum on the one hand, and a series of rather newly forming other political cleavages that cut across this traditional spectrum, on the other.

Western European left-right cleavage can be characterised simply as an antagonism between two different world views on ideology and on political economy, inherent within deep rooted social and economics positions that evolved through a time span of some hundreds of years. In this context, the dominant political preferences of the post-1945 Western Europe have been Christian democracy on the centre-right and social democracy on the left of centre, owing to a tradition of more than a century.

The Industrial revolution that took place in the past century seems to be a decisive factor within the outgrowth of social democracy in Western Europe. At its infant stage, congruous with the industrial boom of the 1800s, it emerged to represent the interests of the working people of Europe; a massive and a non-homogenous array ranging from

proletarians in steel, construction, mining or electro-technical industries, to house-hold workers and small artisans. Steadily growing in number, the working classes of Europe were continuously propelled to improve their lot, as most of them lived almost at subsistence level, even by the mid-nineteenth century. Consequential was that, while on the one hand various communitarian views of society were penetrating into the minds of working masses; on the other hand, the urban proletariat in particular were increasingly getting organised in trade-unions. *Marx and Engels's Manifesto of the Communist Party* appeared in such a conjuncture in 1848, further impelling the already politicised working class movement. From *the Manifesto* onwards, the politics of the working class in Western Europe divulged a gradual, but a painstaking evolution from its revolutionary stand in the mid-1800s, to a rational synthesis of capital and labour firmly anchored in the democratic order following the Second World War.

The Ottoman/Turkish polity remained outside the Industrial Revolution which was among the key factors that contributed to the structuration of modern party systems and the outgrowth of social democratic parties therein. The emergence of social democracy in Turkey can be spotted in the state-party that was born from the national resistance movement. Social democracy in Turkey, therefore, had a role to play only after the ideological and strategic transformation of the state-party towards the centre-left during the Second Republic. In this respect, Turkish social democracy appears to have followed a different trajectory than observed in Western Europe.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this dissertation is to study Turkish social democracy, with reference to Western Europe from where social democracy originated. With this regard, a framework of analysis shall be devised in this research, to offer an in-depth systematic study of the both cases. The study attempts to elucidate the following research questions:

- To what extent social democracy in Turkey and Western Europe followed a similar trajectory, in terms of origins and development?
- Which factors come forth as the most explanatory if there exist essential divergences between the two cases?
- If dissimilar, to what extent internal and external factors have been decisive in that respect?

Accordingly, the following are hypothesised in this research:

- Due to the structural dissimilitude within the formation of main socio-economic cleavages, the outgrowth and development of social democracy in Turkey and Western Europe reveal notable divergences. Whereas social democracy in Western Europe was built upon the functional cleavages in the form of "conflicts over short or long term allocation of resources, products and benefits in the economy, along with their projection into ideological movements" fundamental controversies in Turkish politics remained confined to the territorial-cultural type of cleavage formation as typified in the model set forth by *Seymour Martin Lipset* and *Stein*

Rokkan. Thence, rather than a left/right continuum as in the Western settings, the basic cleavages in Turkish politics appears to be revolving around non-functional issues, among which, the conflict between *Kemalism* and Islamist traditionalism remains salient.

- Social democracy in Turkey seems to represent a dissimilar trajectory insofar as Western Europe is held as the reference.

Methodology

The methodology employed in this study is analytical and comparative. There are a number of facts contributing to the rationale behind the selection of social democratic parties in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden. First, these parties undoubtedly have put their stamp on the project of building a *coherent centre-left* on the Western political spectrum. Second, trade relations particularly with Germany, France and Britain during the constitutional period in the Ottoman Empire, have had significant implications for the formative years of modern Turkish politics. In this respect, cultural and ideological interaction with these countries implied the penetration of Western political ideas into the *Ottoman* society during modernisation. As for Sweden, which lies comfortably remote from the Turkish territory, what exhibits relevance is its impact on Turkey as a *prototype of social democracy*. The Swedish model of the synthesis between capital and labour is widely held to have considerably influenced Turkish social democrats under the leadership of their charismatic leader, *Bülent Ecevit*, in the 1970s.

The framework of analysis in the First Chapter has been devised to cover both external and internal explanations for the study of social democracy in Western Europe and in Turkey. On one hand, ideology and social basis of support shall be employed as the analytical tools for the elaboration of the external variables such as the prevailing dominant ideologies and the inherent cleavage structures. On the other hand, strategic appeals and organisational capacity for intra-party policy formulation shall be substantiated through the analysis of strategy and organisation, as the internal variables contributing to the study of the social democratic parties in Western Europe and Turkey. As such, the Second Chapter shall deal with the case of Western Europe, to be able to reach a main profile in this framework. Likewise, social democracy in Turkey shall be analysed in the Third and the Fourth Chapters, for the eventual framing of its main profile in the scheme suggesed in the First Chapter. Accordingly, the Fifth Chapter is devoted to the comparative setting in this respect. While secondary sources have largely been used in the analysis of the *Ottoman* period; the Republican period has been analysed mostly by reference to primary sources such as party programs, various party publications, speeches, memoirs or interviews given to the press by key party members/leaders.

Contribution of the Study

Western Europe, in particular the countries covered in this study have been, so far, the most important trade partners of Turkey since modernisation. Besides, Westernisation efforts within the formative years of modern Turkish politics have culminated in the

adoption of West European model of political institutions in the Republican Period. Turkey's westernisation vocation has been functioning at full steam which, accelerated further with the commitment to full integration with the Western European institutions. Indeed, Western European politics and especially its left wing are extensively explored subjects. In this context, various comparative studies between the individual countries have been carried out. However, a similar effort for Turkish social democracy and the generic Western European experience has not been put forth so far, at least to the best knowledge of the researcher. There are numerous studies conducted especially on the philosophical origins of the divergences between Western European and Turkish social democracy. Nevertheless, a far-reaching systematic analysis within the relevant structural conjunctures, seems to be lacking. This dissertation, therefore, aims at filling this gap. Its contribution shall be to highlight the essential convergences and divergences of Turkish social democracy with reference to the Western settings.

Limitations of the Study

The main contribution of this research may appear as its fundamental limitation at the same time. As the background and the developmental process of modern politics in Western Europe is notably a challenging task that requires the analysis of a broad range of differing historical, political, sociological or economical aspects within countries; there are, no doubt, enormous difficulties inherent in any study of Western European polities. Although they seem to be built up on common legacies such as Roman Law, the Renaissance or the Reformation; there are indeed, significant divergences. Besides,

it is of no controversy that comparative studies of parties are highly challenging tasks, when the complex diversity of the demarcations even between parties of sister traditions is borne in mind. Therefrom, whilst a comprehensive study of Western Europe should best have covered the Continental Europe, the Mediterranean Region, the Nordic States and the Benelux countries; nevertheless, it is believed that an in-depth structural analysis of the social democratic parties could only be realised with concentration on a number of countries where social democracy has been an integral part of constitutional development and whose bilateral relations with Turkey have had notable implications for the formative years of modern Turkish politics, as mentioned above. Therefore, the rest are excluded from the scope of this research.

CHAPTER I

WESTERN EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY : A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

1.1. The Conceptual Approach

As already noted in the introductory sections of this study, the origins and the developmental patterns of modern politics in Western Europe is a colossal phenomenon that should cover a range of scholarly aspects such as history, sociology or economics; as well as political thought, religion and philosophy. It must also be reiterated that the variety of political models on the Continent poses enormous challenges to the studies in this context. The very fact that even the societies in individual countries reveal significant cultural, religious or ethnic divergences, may further help to highlight the difficulties inherent within the subject. Therefore, any claim of contribution to the cases of political development in Europe remains well beyond the limits of this dissertation. Rather, the social democratic parties in the selected four countries shall be studied, with a view to reach a reference for the analysis of social democracy in Turkey in the forthcoming chapters.

During the analysis of the social democratic parties of Western Europe, the terms such as "social democratic", "centre-left" or "socialist" shall be used, from time to

time, interchangeably in this research. This approach stems from the fact that, many parties on the left of centre have been functioning under labels such as socialist, social democratic, democratic left or labour. These party names are not always determinant in revealing precisely the convergences or divergences in the parties' ideologies, programs or strategies. In this respect, this thesis does neither attempt to conceptualise the various titles that the left parties in Western Europe have been running under; nor claims to hihghlight such differences theoretically. With this regard, any discussion on whether it appears legitimate to label social democracy under the surge of all the political positions stretching from non-revolutionary Marxism to the libertarian new-left, all with their differing sub-versions, has not been included in the research questions of this dissertation.

Nonetheless, the common bond that joined the non-revolutionary left parties of Western Europe in the post-1945 period has been the "distributional problem". The basic structure of their political programs have been closely associated with the quest for the fairer distribution of the economic cake, rather than its ingredents and size. The belief that material and social deprivation in indusrial society is unacceptable, has prompted social democratic party programs to assign a key role to state institutions for the redistribution of resources towards the deprived. As such, social democratic parties placed emphasis on state intervention for assistance to the unemployed and the low paid. In this respect, these parties can be said to have remained prudential towards the abilities of the markets for improving the economic conditions of these groups. Therefrom, establishment of comprehensive taxation systems and their utilisation with regard to the general social interest has become a key policy instrument for social democrats.

Hence, regardless of the different titles such as social democrat, labour, democratic left or socialist; the Western European social democratic parties as publicly understood today, diverge from those advocating the radical socialist proposal that the distributional problem could only be solved by abolishing private property; either through revolutionary or parliamentary means. Indeed, the path that contemporary social democracy evolved from radical socialism towards Keynesian welfare state, commences in the Marxist tradition of the past century.

Political socialism constituted the means by which *Marx* and *Engels* in the mid-1800s, had formulated their most radical vision of the existing order of things. Marxism appeared to be not only highly critical of capitalist system, but aimed at overthrowing it as well, through revolutionary action. Offering a systematic analysis of the established system, Marxism held that economic reality and society at large were inseparable from each other. In this respect, it was postulated that every society in history inherently possessed some form of *relations of production*, a body of social organisation of production; which provided the clue to the understanding of the mechanism of the control that certain groups in that society exercised over others. As such, the basic novelty within Marxism was that, production was not retained as a relationship between the natural environment and human knowledge only; as the Classical School of economics held. Instead, the application of particular technologies to meet the society's demands, the *forces of production*, was the key to comprehending the functioning of the economic and the social; in Marxist terminology, the *mode of production*. The latter was justified through a political and ideological organisation, literally the *superstructure*, which was assigned the task of

watching over the interests of the dominant (or the ruling) groups within that society. In a nutshell, the production process within a given society was placed at the heart of the Marxist analysis of that society; a process that had been preserved by the classical school merely as a technical matter independent from the social.

Having produced an extensive critique of political economy and of capitalism in the three volumes of the "*Capital*", Marx put his stamp on essentials of economics such as the production and circulation processes of capital, the relations of production in capitalist system and the history of political economy. Elaborating, therefore, on a range of issues stretching from "demand" and "production", to "money" and "value"' Marx formulated his theory of *surplus value*, a fundamental novelty in political economy. The latter was derived from the postulate that labour power was itself a commodity within the production process, and that it possessed dual values like any other commodity sold and purchased in the markets. The difference between the "use value" and the "exchange value" of the labour power, made the "surplus value" inherent in this particular commodity. That the exchange value was lower than the use value of labour many times, constituted the individual capitalist's means by which the surplus value was extracted from the worker. One of the basic tenets of Marxist analysis, the concept of "exploitation", was based on this theoretical assumption. Thereupon, political mobilisation of the working masses in Europe was largely prompted on the fundamentals of the Marxist doctrine that constituted the ideological thrust for worker movements in the nineteenth century.

The ideology of the working class in Western Europe gradually evolved from revolutionary Marxism in the mid-1800s to contemporary social democracy firmly

anchored in parliamentary politics from the Second World War onward. It seems worthwhile to note here that social democracy, as a concept, acquired different meanings in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During the turbulent years at the turn of the century, a series of debates continued on the desirable means by which the socialist transformation was to be realised. At that time, the concept of "social democracy" was perceived as democratic socialism, that unequivocally implied the organisation of society on a socialist basis. Fundamental contentions within the socialist tradition, hence, used to be confined to the means, instead of the ends. As *Wilhelm Liebknecht*, a political activist of the German social democrats stated in 1869:

> "Socialism and democracy are not identical, but they are simply different expressions of the same principle; they belong together, supplement each other and one can never be incompatible with the other. Socialism without democracy is pseudo-socialism, just as democracy without socialism is pseudo-democracy. The democratic state is the only feasible form for a society organised on a socialist basis...We call ourselves social democrats, because we have understood that democracy and socialism are inseparable."[1]

Germany, the homeland of Marxism, brought up within the socialist tradition another key figure; namely *Eduard Bernstein*, who fought almost a battle for making of modern social democracy within the upper echelons of the SAD (*Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands*: the former German Social Democratic Party). The implications of *Bernstein*, and later on the British economist *John Maynard Keynes*, for the turbulent history of contemporary social democracy have been invaluable. While the former appeared as the main figure within the debates on revisionism and opened the door eventually for the parliamentary road to socialism; the latter provided the necessary policy prescriptions as regards social democratic macro-economic management.

[1] William A. Pelz, ed, Wilhelm Liebknecht and German Social Democracy: A Documentary History. (London: Greenwood Press, 1994), 38.

Actually, it seems almost impossible to separate the evolution of the social democratic project from the history of the SAD; in that this Party's ideological evolution from orthodox Marxism to modern social democracy has been but the history of rendering the socialist tradition an indispensable element of parliamentary politics; instead of a revolutionary endeavour.

In this context, it may be worthwhile to note the fact that, the 1891 *Erfurt Program* of the SAD was drafted mainly by *Karl Kautsky* and *Eduard Bernstein*, to which *Engels* also contributed. The theoretical assumptions of 1891 Program, indeed, remained loyal to the orthodoxy of Marxism; in that it was still advocating a revolutionary strategy. Controversies over revisionism, nevertheless, remained persistent in the higher reaches of the Party, at the turn of the century. At that conjuncture, *Bernstein* protruded as the forerunner of reformist strategy; with a view to "revise" entirely his Party's ideological stance and strategy. Whilst bitterly opposed at the *Dresden Conference* of 1903, the electoral defeat of SAD in the *Reichstag* elections of 1920 provided the "revisionists" an impetus for the drafting of a new party program, largely to replace the legacy of *Erfurt*.

Bernstein's intrinsic contribution in this context had been to refute the deterministic prediction of historical materialism on the inevitable impoverishing of the proletariat, and on the inescapable downfall of capitalism. *Bernstein* and friends declared that "unless social democracy won over the peasantry, the lower and middle strata of the civil service, as well as a large part of the intelligentsia, the achievement of socialism will be impossible because things had not developed in the direction which *Marx* had

predicted."[2] According to *Bernstein*, the number of the entrepreneurs did not decrease, and class antagonisms did not necessarily focus on between the latter and the proletariat, as orthodox Marxism claimed; and that the SAD had to attract a wider section of people such as small farmers and independent craftsmen. Appearing as representatives of the industrial proletariat only, *Bernstein* held, was neither realistic nor desirable. The SAD, therefore, had to present itself as "the party of the working people".[3]

Bernstein, in fact, had been arguing since 1890s, through empirical evidence, that the expectations of *Marx* and *Engels* did not come true, and that there could be no question of a general proletarianisation of the independent middle class. Socialist strategy, therefore, had to pursue the parliamentary road, covering the wider section of the society.[4] *Bernstein*, accordingly, remained a severe critique of the Russian revolution of 1917, and attempted to warn the party aides against repetition of the Bolshevik attempt, by stating at the Berne International Socialist Congress that "The Bolshevists have combined an amateurishly experimental economic policy with a system of the most brutal violence contemptuous of all civilised development, and by throttling necessary economic drives caused production to decline".[5] Equally important was the fact that, another key SAP figure, namely *Karl Kautsky*, also became an open critique of the Russian regime, and allied with *Bernstein*, following the Bolshevik Revolution. Nevertheless, disputes within the party have been continuing as to whether social democrats should appeal to larger masses, or to remain firmly a class party for the

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[2] Roger Fletcher, *Bernstein to Brandt: A Short History of German Social Democracy*. (London: Edward Arnold, 1987), 168.
[3] ibid., 169
[4] Eduard Bernstein, *The Preconditions of Socialism*. trans. Henry Tudor. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
[5] Fletcher, *Bernstein to Brandt*. 100.

proletariat. That implied, in essence, "an official revision" of the party's ideological stance and strategy, ever since *Marx*'s time.

All in all, revisionist proposals for the parliamentary means for socialism were finally adopted in the 1921 *Görlitz Conference* of the SAD. The *Görlitz* Program, as such, announced a historic break with revolutionary Marxism. Strongly influenced from *Bernstein*, this Program reflected a social democratic stance that was explicitly committed to parliamentary competition; and socialism was accepted as a question of political will and of participation, instead of an inevitable economic development. While the concept of class struggle was retained in the draft due to ideological reaction, it referred to a "class struggle of the working class and social strata in solidarity with it".[6] The SAD, consequently seemed to gravitate towards reformism from the *Görlitz Congress* onward, owing much to the legacy of *Bernstein*.

The non-revolutionary impulse given to socialism by Bernstein was carried further as *John Maynard Keynes* appeared in British political economy with his radical insights. *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* published in 1936, boldly challenged the rationale of the classical school, arguing forcefully that the best measure of value for the economy as a whole was the number of people in employment. The basic novelty within *Keynesianism* was that it provided an alternative to the general equilibrium model of the classical school with the same variables (money and interest), and within the same society (industrial and monetised). Unlike Marxism which was confined basically to the incurable vice and to the inescapable collapse of capitalism, *Keynes* has been well aware of the fact that it was almost impossible to turn the clock of capitalism back. Believing however, that unemployment and social deprivation are

[6] Bernstein, *The Preconditions*. 169.

neither necessary nor excusable in industrial society, *Keynesianism* gave a new twist to *laissez-faire* economics, and prepared the middle way between capital and labour in the form of a historic compromise.

While political economy before *Keynes* aimed at discovering universal and timeless laws as regards the economic problematic, *Keynes* adhered to a contextual and a realistic stand. Though fundamentally different in nature, both Marxism and the Classical School offered recipes for all people all time, to whom *Keynes* showed the way in the already established capitalistic relations of production: He wished to preserve private property, but went on to demonstrate that an unregulated market system was likely to be chronically unstable and incapable of assuring the full utilisation of productive resources[7], as the Great Depression of 1929 showed. The virtues of *laissez-faire*, therefore, could be preserved merely if the social unrest generated by mass unemployment could be eliminated through appropriate measures. The measure was demand management to reach full employment according to Keynes, who argued to the bewilderment of the Classical School that the economy could come to rest in an unequilibrium position.

At that point, he was attacking the classical mentality that full employment was an economy's long run equilibrium position and that deviations from it would be negligible, as the self-adjusting properties of the market would induce the desired solutions. Highly sceptic on the ability of markets to gravitate towards equilibrium at full employment without government action, *Keynes* held that the state had to intervene to achieve equilibrium between goods market and the money market. In this context

[7] William J. Barber. *A History of Economic Thought.* (London: Penguin Books, 1967), 250.

Keynes was also questioning the classical belief that markets were interdependent, in that another radical insight lies.[8]

The *Bernstein* attempt, and the following *Keynesian* underpinnings elaborated briefly above, rendered contemporary social democracy an adherent of the industrialised and monetised capitalist state; albeit the intervensionist version of it. The first two decades following the Second World War can be thought of as the *heydey* of social democracy, during which Keynesian policy prescriptions contributed significantly to the war-stricken economies of the Western part of the Continent.

Although social democratic parties had differing fortunes in Western Europe, they became key political actors in the post-1945 period. While social democrats were less successful in Southern Europe in the 1970s, their counterparts either governed or participated in coalitions in the Northwest. By the 1980s, however, the trend was almost reversed, and social democratic parties in France, Spain, Greece and Italy have scored some considerable electoral performance. The past decade witnessed the decline of social democracy in the Northwestern countries, which seems to be attributable to factors such as shifting class structures, rise of a new political agenda and the incompetence of party programs' responses to societal and economic changes of the last decades. These factors have had significant implications for the traditional left-right continuum in Western Europe.

[8] for a detailed analysis of the subject, see: Barber, *A History,* 223-251, and also: Ken Cole, John Cameron, and Chris Edwards. *Why Economists Disagree: The Political Economy of Economics.* Longman Inc., 1983. 2nd ed. (New York: Longman Inc., 1992), 119-168.

1.2. Structural Analysis

1.2.1. Industrial Revolution as the Keystone

The social democratic parties of Western Europe have, by and large, developed within the industrialisation process in Europe. Whilst the Steam Revolution has given the impetus for fundamental changes in production patterns during the eighteenth century; the collateral societal transformations were further propelled by the Second Industrial Revolution that took place in the 1800s.[9] As the pre-capitalistic relations of production varied widely across the Continent, the dissolution of feudal structures and transition to capitalism were realised in different countries at different time spans. The British experience in early industrialisation, which appears almost inseparable from the road to parliamentary democracy, is often held as a reference in this context, while for instance the cases of France and Germany reveal rather different patterns than that of the former.

Some distinctive factors were at work behind the story of the relatively early industrialisation of the English society, among which was firstly the strong commercial impulse that appeared in the country from the fourteenth century onwards.[10] The decisive role of wool trade in England, the main supplier of fine wool to Europe in the Middle Ages, was to the growth of trading towns and to the

[9] The introduction of electrical energy and the fast developments particularly in the coal, steel and manufacturing industries announced in Europe the "Second Industrial Revolution". Achievements such as the production of the modern automobile in Britain in 1895, the construction of the all-steel Eiffel Tower in Paris in 1889 and the high-voltage electrification of Western Germany in 1891 can be cited as the landmarks of the second industrial revolution.

[10] Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 4.

rise of commercialisation in the countryside. Second, and due largely to the commercial influences penetrating into the pastoral economic structure, was the weakening of the feudal framework by the fifteenth century.[11] Third, and not independent from the former was, unlike the French case, the relatively weaker status of royal absolutism with a less effective central bureaucracy in control of the countryside, that in turn prepared the ground for the landed upper classes to gradually seize power in governmental affairs. These circumstances combined to undermine the feudal relations of production and eventually to bring about the conditions on which capitalism both in the countryside and in the towns was to rise. Equally important was the elimination of peasant problem from British politics as the result of a process which started with the *enclosure* movement and which culminated in the consolidation of the landed classes' positions and in the rise of industry.[12]

The process of industrialisation in France reveals some divergences from that Britain; in the sense that, particularly the continuation of a peasant economy and the salience of feudal relations into modern times are held as the main contrasts between the two cases. As the labour intensive viniculture required large masses of skilled labour-force, the French landed gentry is seen as to have kept the peasants at land and to have maintained firm relations with the monarchy. The relative delay with regard to the commercialisation of agriculture in France, the close ties of the landed

[11] The locus of medieval land system in England had been "custom and tradition", through which peasants were free to cultivate on long, narrow pieces of land with their boundaries set in the open field. They were also allowed to use the open land commonly for the pasture of their cattle and for the collection of wood for fuel.

[12] The enclosure movement is a process that started as a result of rapidly rising land prices in the second half of the sixteenth century and which continued till the 1700s. It refers basically to the deprivation of peasants of their rights on the common use and cultivation in the open fields by the lords of manors, with a view to make profit from the lease of land. Acquisition of open lands by the landed gentry by various means, had been the main drive behind the proletarianisation of the peasants and of the consequential urban overcrowding. For a detailed analysis of the subject, see: Moore, *Social Origins*, 3-39.

aristocracy with the *ancien régime* and the strong royal absolutism with a powerful agrarian bureaucracy are believed to have retarded the momentum in which industrialisation and the accompanying societal changes were to flourish.

In like manner, peasant economy was prolonged also in Germany. The counterpart of the labour-intensive French viniculture had been a continuously expanding export market for grain in feudal Germany, which required, in *Moore*'s terms, "the German Junkers to keep men attached to the land in order to grow the grain which they exported", in sharp contrast to England where the landed upper classes wanted "not men, but land for sheep raising."[13] In a nutshell, though serfdom had disappeared in Britain and parts of Scandinavia in the late middle ages, the residues of feudalism persisted till the Revolution in France, and the 1848 uprising in Germany.

Nevertheless, although peasants still made roughly half of the population in Western Europe by the early twentieth century,[14] political opposition to the established bourgeoisie governments emerged, by and large, among the industrial proletariat. The core of the revolutionary theory, literally Marxism, based its expectations on the urban working class, and socialist theory evolved largely neglecting to organise the peasantry into active politics, with the exception of China and *Leninist* Russia: Thus, as a student of European history has pointed out, "Rural interests throughout Europe were represented in national parliaments by the bourgeoisie of the countryside, not the peasantry".[15]

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[13] Ibid., 460.
[14] Frank B.Tipton and Robert Aldrich. *An Economic and Social History of Europe, 1830-1939.* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 86.
[15] Ibid., 87.

Despite such divergences in the individual countries' experiences, it seems possible to work out a roughly generic picture of the Western European case of transition to industrial society; hence, to constitutional development, and to the accompanying emergence of worker movements. By the turn of the twentieth century, proletarians in some basic industries such as manufacturing, mining and construction dominated the working class of Europe. Seeking to improve their conditions, European workers had already formed the basic institutions through which they attempted to take part in the political machinery. The size of workers in the industrialised Western Europe, therefore, had already constituted a potential for a cohesive political force.

Table 1.

Size of the Urban Working Class in Western Europe in the Early 1900s			
	Manufacturing Industry	**Mining**	**Construction**
Britain	4.000.000	5.000.000	1.200.000
France	3.000.000	250.000	500.000
Germany	6.000.000	1.000.000	2.000.000
Sweden [16] (Total)			440.000

Source: - Frank B.Tipton and Robert Aldrich. *An Economic and Social History of Europe, 1830- 1939.* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 80.
- Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, *Capitalism and Social Democracy.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 34.

Workers of industrialised Europe, as such, progressivelly organised in trade unions. Accordingly, "*Allgemeine Deutsche Arbeitverein:* The German Workers' Association" was founded in 1862; that in turn gave birth to the "*Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei*: Social Democratic Workers' Party" by 1869. In France, trade unions became active in politics during the Third Republic, and the various socialist

[16] Figures for Sweden are drawn from Przeworski and Sprague. According to their data, there were 442 thousand workers and 22 thousand office and technical personnel in 1900.

endeavours of that time merged in "*Parti Socialiste*: The Socialist Party in 1870. In Britain, the Labour Party has its origins in the "Independent Labour Party" founded in 1893; that later on allied with trade unions to form the "the Labour Representation Committee in 1900. That alliance formed a parliamentary group in 1906 with the title of "Labour Party". In Sweden, the worker movements became organised in 1880s, and the "*Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarparti*: Swedish Social Democratic Workers" Party was founded in 1889.

1.2.2. Cleavage Formation as the Backdrop of Party Systems in Europe

The preceding analysis suggests that the Industrial Revolution and its impacts appear as key factors for the structural analysis of social democratic parties in Western Europe. In this respect, the outgrowth of particular socio-economic cleavages within political development in modern Europe has had significant implications for the institutionalisation of the party systems in the West. With that regard, *Barrington Moore* has sketched a general framework for the developmental route towards democratic society in Western Europe, and underlined a number of patterns that contibuted to the formation of modern European politics. Similarly, *Seymour Martin Lipset* and *Stein Rokkan,* in their far-reaching work on the formative phase of European cleavage structures and their translation into party systems, have also identified a number of critical junctures in European history, that corresponded to the emergence of particular social and political cleavages[17]. In this framework, the industrial revolution protrudes forward as a key variable in both analyses.

[17] Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction". In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives,* eds. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 1-64. (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

So far as political development in modernity is concerned, *Barrington Moore* has shown three routes (as he preferred to call them) to the fabrication of the modern world; the routes through (1)the bourgeois revolution, (2)fascism and (3)communism. Combining capitalism and parliamentary democracy in essence, the first of these routes came into existence following the Puritan Revolution, the French Revolution and the American Civil War. This series of critical incidents gave, by and large, the impetus for the outburst of the Bourgeois Revolution that was realised in different societies in different times. Thence, emerging at succeeding historical junctures in England, France and the United States, the Bourgeois revolution has culminated in the Western form of democracy.

The second crucial route was also a capitalistic one, yet without an effective revolutionary drift to circumvent reactionary political faculties. The intrinsic feature of that route was a propensity towards the outbreak of fascism in Germany and in Japan. Indeed, industrial society was achieved through a conservative revolution from above in these polities, according to *Moore*. Communism, the third and the non-capitalist route to the modern world, flourished in the very existence of peasant societies; namely, in Russia and China. Having their origins in different historical and social preconditions, the common denominator of the three major routes has been, in the final analysis, the construction of the industrial society. [18]

In *Lipset* and *Rokkan*'s account, the decisive dimensions of antagonistic formations depended firstly, on religious issues at the historical sequence of "Reformation" attempts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This first critical juncture

[18] Ibid., 413-414

witnessed conflicts over the issues of national and supranational religion wherefrom; contentions on national language and Latin also prevailed. *Lipset* and *Rokkan* have drawn attention, in this context, to the implications of the eventful partition of Europe brought about through Reformation and Counter-Reformation, by stating that the upshot of the strife between State and the Catholic Church settled the fundamentals of modern European politics.

Significant for the purposes of this study is also the fact that Counter-Reformation in Southern and Central Europe had consolidated the status of the Catholic Church, with the privileged strata of the *ancien régime* allying with it. Inasmuch as nation-state builders in Central and Southern Europe had to struggle with the Catholic-traditionalist bloc in their secularisation attempts, the national churches did not impede the nation-builders in Britain and in Scandinavia. Besides, while in Catholic countries the middle-class opposition to the established old order remained at ease with the Church; in North-West Europe, the broad left coalitions against the traditional powers secured resolute support from the Protestant churches, from the periphery and from the rising urban bourgeoisie. Particularly important in this context were the cases of the religiously most divided countries, such as the German *Reich*, Netherlands and Switzerland; in which, conflicts over the nature of the political regime propelled by the confrontation between nation-builders and strong Roman Catholic minorities, set the backdrop of the party system.[19]

The second momentous juncture in the course of the development of cleavages in Europe was 1789 and after, literally the "National Revolution". During the process of centralisation efforts spurred after the French Revolution, the locus of divisions in

[19] Ibid., 38-39

Europe lay, by and large, between central nation-building elites and traditions of the periphery. These disputes, however, appeared in different forms in individual countries; that in turn gave the impetus for enduring territorial and cultural tensions.

For instance, the centre-periphery cleavage in France should by no means be perceived as a geographical phenomenon, but rather as a clash between Revolutionary and Counter-Revolutionary fronts, according to *Lipset* and *Rokkan.* Within this framework, rivalry for the control over the potential centres of political power, conflicts between the capital and the provincial areas, and finally the disparities between the more advanced and the less-favoured regions of a given country have all outfitted the emergence of the centre-periphery cleavage in Europe. Another fundamental issue arising from the territorial-cultural dimension of the cleavage structure was on the control of community morals and norms, as well as on the control of education.[20]

At the wake of the "National Revolution", therefore, local oppositions to the centralisation efforts of the national elites, and reactions of the periphery or of ethnic and linguistic minorities were all incorporated into the general setting of the cleavage structure in the nation state; which accordingly, have underlined the fundamentals of nationwide party organisation during the phase of political enfranchisement.[21]

The third critical juncture in the history of cleavage formation and the consequential generation of party systems is the "Industrial Revolution" of the 1800s. The rise of industry which was propelled in Britain, gave the impulse for the coming into existence of a dichotomy between the landed interests in the countryside and the

[20] ibid., 9-15

rising urban industrial entrepreneurs. A further line of cleavage, therefrom, emerged between capital owning employers and those employed by them; literally the wage labourers. In this respect, *Lipset and Rokkan*'s emphasis on the prominence of the industrial revolution as the main drive behind the emergence of modern political patterns, converges with *Moore*'s assertion that construction of the industrial society was a key variable within the process leading to modernity ,[22] as mentioned above.

Arising from the divisions put forth by the industrialisation process, and significant for the purposes of this study, *Lipset* and *Rokkan* have incorporated the "Russian Revolution" as the fourth historical juncture to their framework of cleavage formation in Europe.[23] Owing to that, and to the former crucial junctures in the course of history, they stressed the relative importance of the "strength" and "solidarity" of the working class movements, to the "timing" of these endeavours. On that account, the capacity of working class movements to "mobilise the underprivileged classes for action" and their "ability to maintain unity in the face of the many forces making for division and fragmentation", was more important than whether they had appeared before or after the extension of the suffrage.[24]

[21] ibid., 40-41
[22] Moore, *Social Origins*, 414.
[23] Lipset and Rokkan, *Cleavage Structures*, 47
[24] ibid., 46

1.3. The Theoretical Framework

1.3.1. Structuring of the Party System

It has been widely accepted by scholars of Western European politics that the emergence of modern political parties has taken place over time, covering the past century as well. The generally held view in this context is that parties in the West have developed within the rise of parliaments and the gradual extension of democratic rights.[25] *Maurice Duverger,* in his classical comparative study of parties and party systems, has also associated the development of parties to the widening of political enfranchisement and the rise of parliaments. Whilst there existed various forms of political currents, popular clubs, intellectual foundations and parliamentary groups by mid-1800s, it would be inaccurate to speak of modern political parties at that time, according to *Duverger.* In that respect, the outgrowth of contemporay political parties has been a process promted within the consolidation of the democratic order in the West since then.

In *Duverger's* view, members of the national assemblies had to adapt to the widening of the parliamentary authority and its functions; hence, had to form alliances in the form of political groups that shared converging beliefs. Besides, as extension of suffrage was being institutionalised, these groups also had to endeavour at organising the electorate through committees that were able to publicise the parliamentary candidates and attract popular support. Therefore, the emergence of modern political

[25] Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, "The Origin of Political Parties". In *The West European Party System,* ed. Peter Mair, 25-30. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 25.

parties was prompted by the outgrowth of the parliamentary groups and the election committees. [26]

Indeed, whereas the main thrust behind the formation of these groups appeared to be a common political doctrine, colloquialism or geographical bonds also seemed to prompt the emergence of such groups, as the 1789 French Constituent Assembly showed. Particularly in the case of the latter, regional solidarity emerged to be the initial amalgamating force that tied the members of the Assembly, who later on united around converging political attitudes in the form of parliamentary factions. Furthermore, personal interests or clientelism also played critical roles in factional propulsion. With this regard, "office seeking" in the form of hope for achieving ministerial positions has been an indispensable element of faction and/or group formation.[27]

Thence, institutionalisation of parliaments and the extension of suffrage have been held as critical variables in the outgrowth and development of political parties. On the other hand, it has been customary among scholars especially from intellectual history, to emphasise the role ideology within the evolutionary path that party politics followed. *Joseph LaPalombara* and *Myron Weiner* have shown in their evaluation of the studies on party politics that the rise of parliaments and the outset of political parties were associated with the gradual development of democratic ideologies. The socialist tradition, for instance, evaluated parties as instruments of classes. *LaPalombara* and *Weiner* have drawn attention also to the fact that some parties, indeed, have served as

[26] Maurice Duverger, *Siyasi Partiler* [Political Parties]. trans. Ergun Özbudun. 4th ed. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1993), 15-16.
[27] Ibid., 17-19.

ideological vehicles for challenging the prevalent political belief systems of their respective countries.[28]

Giovanni Sartori, on the other hand, remained prudential towards employing ideology as a critical variable in the analysis of party politics. Ideologies were to play significant roles in party politics merely if they were backed by firm organisational schemes. Rather, the emergence of the mass party was assumed to be the key factor in the transformation of a party system and its structural consolidation. A mass party, by definition, should have qualified at least the two essential criteria; (1) the development of a stable and extensive organisation throughout the country and, (2) the capacity to present itself to the electorate as an abstract entity that allows stable identification both ideologically and programmatically. It has been asserted in this connection that a political system became structured insofar as mass parties were integral parts of it.[29] With that regard, *Sartori* placed more emphasis on the ability of the party structures and suggested that collective identities became class-structured only when party organisations were able to pursue a manipulative class-appeal strategy.

Furthermore, attention has been drawn to the equivocality of class analysis of party politics, on the grounds that class-voting studies alone could not validate a class-theory approach to party politics. In this respect it has been argued that neither class appeal nor class support alone could show that class interests were represented; as parties might not necessarily function as genuine representatives of class interests. Besides, the notion of "class", according to *Sartori*, appeared as highly insufficient and scientifically obscure; due largely to the fact that often an index of class measures tended to

[28] LaPalombara and Weiner, *The Origin*, 30.
[29] Giovanni Sartori, "Structuring the Party System". In *The West European Party System,* ed. Peter Mair, 75-77. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

correspond with status of self-perception, rather than genuine class identity. Thence, a pure class-analysis, as usually was the case within the "standard approach" to evaluate party politics on a "class-voting" basis, could not constitute the main tool of analysis on which a general theory of party politics were to be built. Indeed, as class used to be an ideology that materialised in the relevant political paradigms in close correspondance with belief systems; it needed to be reinforced by a firm organisational basis, in order to become an important element in politics.[30]

However, the studies focusing on class structure prevail as useful tools for the analysis of social democratic parties, for a number of reasons. First, the conventional view that the size of the blue collar working class remains a key variable for, and directly proportional with left party performance; renders class analysis indispensable within the study of social democracy. Second, is the fact that shifting class structures in advanced capitalism are widely perceived as the reflection of a series of complex socio-economic and technical changes; the implication of which has been a contraction of the blue collar industrial working class. Third, and important for left parties is the argument that class varies as a determinant of voting behaviour across countries in Western Europe.[31]

In this connection, the postulate that the electoral fortune of social democracy is attributable to the changes in the number of its core constituency, literally the working class, constitutes the locus of the "traditional theory of class politics". This position on party politics holds that socialist parties weaken in direct correspondence to the

[30] Giovanni Sartori, "The Sociology of Parties: A Critical Review". In *The West European Party System,* ed. Peter Mair, 150-184. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

[31] Herbert Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 45-47.

contraction of the blue collar industrial strata in advanced capitalism. Yet, this approach has been refuted from time to time; due in large part to the findings that the varying electoral fortunes of left parties across Western Europe are not necessarily related to the size of the working class in their respective countries: For instance, while the German working class peaked in the 1950s and 1960s, the SPD had been electorally weaker than it would be in the following decades, by which the blue collar Germans began to shrink. Likewise, the Swedish working class has contracted considerably since the early 1970s; the SAP's electoral support, yet, remaining intact.[32]

The class analysis of left parties has been challenged also on the grounds that, while in Britain and in Sweden class used to be the traditionally strongest predictor of voting behaviour, its salience has been eroding. In the latter, the predictive value of class fell from 53% of the variance in voting behaviour in 1956 to 34% by 1985.[33] Similarly; in France and in Germany, class has been only a moderately powerful determinant of voter behaviour; and even further lost ground in the 1970s and 1980s.[34]

1.3.2. Class Analysis

One of the best examples within the tradition of class analysis of party politics has been *Political Man*, the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset.[35] Unlike *Sartori, Lipset* has argued in *Political Man* that political parties basically represented a "democratic translation of the class struggle". Although many parties refuted the principle of class conflict or loyalty; in reality, they represented the interests of different classes, as

[32] ibid., 41.
[33] Ibid., 45
[34] ibid., 46.
[35] Seymour Martin Lipset. *Political Man, The Social Bases of Politics.* (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1960. Reprint. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1983).

analyses of their strategic appeals and their electoral support suggested. The basic tenet within *Lipset*'s analysis of parties is such that the social basis of support for political parties on a world scale are by and large structured on either the lower or the middle and upper classes. As such, he has generalised the argument to include the parties of the United States as well, which have traditionally been accepted to diverge from the class-cleavage structure of European politics. In support of this conjecture, it was suggested that the Democrats have been recruiting more support from the lower strata of the American society from the beginning of their history, whereas the Federalist and the Republican parties have been backed by the more privileged groups.[36]

Nonetheless, Lipset has acknowledged the fact that class was indeed only one of the structural divisions in society which was related to party support; as there have been notable deviations from this trend. With this regard, it was assumed that religious, ethnic or nationality divisions within countries have also been reflected in group identification with particular parties. Religious differences, for instance, have helped to shape the patterns of party support in polities where significant differences between religious adherents and secularists have been prevailing. Likewise, ethnic or regional conflicts have also contributed to the formation of loyalties for specific political parties. Yet, religious and ehnic divisions correlated, at the same time, with socio-economic cleavages which, in turn, have culminated in an "admixture of class and ethnic support" for parties. Besides, gender, age or the differences between rural and urban population have also constituted additional dimensions of cleavage formation in many countries.[37]

[36] Lipset, *Political Man*, 230.
[37] Ibid., 231-232.

Thereupon, the locus of the analytical framework for party systems in *Political Man* falls on the assumption that it is generally possible to locate political parties on a left to right continuum at any given time and place; where the issue of equality and social change can often be identified with the left. The rationale behind this general trend is, in *Lipset*'s view, "simple economic self-interest". In this respect, the lower-income groups tend to support leftist parties that represent themselves as instruments of social change towards equality, simply to improve their economic situation. On the other hand, the higher-income groups are more directed at the right for the preservation of their relatively priviledged status. Yet, a crucial inconsistency within this framework, literally the obsrved contradictions in the relationship between class position and political opinion or party preference, have also been recognised by *Lipset*. The very fact that many economically deprived people tend to vote for the right whlist the better-off may sometimes opt for the left, puzzles the general assumptions of the class-analysis works on parties.

The partial explanation of such divergences from the general framework devised in *Political Man* is grounded on the aforementioned additional dimensions of cleavage formation, such as religious or ethnic positions. *Lipset* has also shown that the upwardly mobile strata revealed a propensity towards abandoning the characteristics that they perceive to affiliate them to their former less privileged status; as indicated within studies on social mobility. All in all, the deviations from the pattern of class-voting, which were assumed to be structured on conflicting or overlapping social positions, were suggested in this context, to have undermined the performance of left parties more than those on the right.[38]

[38] Ibid., 239-243.

So far as class analysis of left party performance is concerned, a richer account of class positions as a variable within electoral socialism, has been presented by *Adam Przeworski* and *John Sprague*. The central thesis of their analysis, in their own words, is that: "the voting behaviour of individuals is an effect of the activities of political parties. More precisely, the relative salience of class as a determinant of individual voting behaviour is a cumulative consequence of the strategies pursued by political parties of the left."[39] *Przeworski* and *Sprague*, hence, recognised and incorporated an actor-oriented variable into the class analysis of socialist parties. Party strategy and class structure, accordingly, constituted the key motifs behind their study of electoral socialism, literally the backbone of the "trade-off thesis".

Trade-off was stemming, according to their thesis, from the necessity that with the introduction of universal male suffrage, a choice had to be made between "legal" and "extra-parliamentary" means for achieving the socialist goal. This implied, in turn, that any party opting for the parliamentary means for attaining political office had to compromise from pure socialistic appeal; as workers never became a numerical majority in their respective societies.[40] Referring to the revisionists, especially to *Bernstein* who had vigorously argued for the search of support beyond the industrial working class for broadening the socialist appeal; *Przeworski* and *Sprague* believed that socialist parties have "diluted the general ideological salience of class, and consequently weakened the motivational force of class among workers." As they put it:

> "To win the votes of people other than workers, particularly the petite bourgeoisie, to form alliances and coalitions, to administer the government in the short-run interest of workers, a party cannot appear irresponsible or give any indication of being less than wholehearted about its commitment

[39] Adam Przeworski, and John Sprague, *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 9.
[40] ibid., 20, 31-35.

> to the rules and the limits of parliamentarism. At times the party must even restrain its own followers from actions that would jeopardise electoral progress."[41]

When briefly sketched, the trade-off thesis seems to have thrown light on a number of key factors that affected socialist performance. Foremost among these is that, the critical choice of participating in parliamentary politics removed, once for all, the option of revolutionary struggle, thus rendered it more difficult for socialist parties to build class unity. Hence, it opened the door for cross-class strategies based on appeals to "the people", "the masses" or "the deprived", and accordingly for an inescapable trade-off between the goal of workers' socialism and the democratic takeover of political power. When, therefore, socialists appealed to non-working class allies, they undermined the support of workers who became less motivated to vote on class identity, thus were more likely to abstain or vote for parties with non-class appeals.

In a nutshell, it becomes possible to suggest that the far-reaching research of *Przeworski* and *Sprague* provided notable findings for the fortune of electoral socialism in Western Europe. First among these is that, trade-offs between workers and allies in the social democratic electorate are exacerbated when workers perceive some alternatives to support other political parties, especially when social democrats engage in cross-class appeals. Second, trade-off becomes stronger if labour unions lack unifying organisation and tight linkages to social democratic parties. Third and collateral is the fact that, in such cases, workers may turn especially to communists or to ethnically and religiously oriented parties; as have been evident particularly in *Weimer* Germany, France and Italy.[42]

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[41] ibid., 21.
[42] ibid., 59-61.

Thereupon, *Paper Stones* can be said to have provided the class analysis of socialist parties with wider theoretical insights; particularly by having incorporated an actor oriented approach to the studies in that tradition. Nevertheless, "class" remains intact as the key variable within this extensive work on socialist parties. It has become evident, on the other hand, that social democratic parties in Western Europe are no longer able to rely solely on the support of the shrinking working class. Besides, it is not taken for granted any more that the working class votes would necessarily go to social democrats. Rather, some complex and subtle changes are being observed in the electoral behaviour of the traditional clientele of social democratic parties in the 1990s. In that respect, the challenging transformation that social democratic parties of Western Europe have been going under, was analysed in a broader perspective by *Herbert Kitschelt.* [43]

Kitschelt has placed more emphasis on the question of "actors" in the study of social democratic parties. Whilst acknowledging the importance of structural factors within social democratic politics; issues such as the outgrowth of new cleavages in advanced industrialised countries, party strategy, policy formulation and the individual party's response to the shifting socio-economic class structures and the relevant programmatic responses have also been addressed in detail in *The Transformation.* Thence, it was suggested that the social democratic decline observed in many countries can not be attributable to only structural factors such as the size of the blue collar industrial working class.

In this context, firstly, the party leaders' and the activists' abilities to cope with the fresh conjuncture in advanced industrialism, protrudes as a key variable within the

[43] Kitschelt, *The Transformation.*

analysis of social democratic parties. Second, is the extent to which strategic appeal to the masses for electoral coalitions other than the core constituency succeed in enhancing social democratic performance. *The Transformation* has put together the role of such dimensions in social democratic party politics, in a detailed fashion. Nonetheless, attention needs to be paid to the structural changes in advanced capitalism on one hand, and to the rise of new social movements on the other; prior to proceeding on to *Kitschelt*'s framework of analysis.

With regard to the former, *Gøsta Esping-Andersen* has questioned the legitimacy of the orthodox assumptions of class theories in the light of the massive social changes within the post-industrial society. In this context, the neo-Marxists remained persistent on the postulate that massive proletarianisation is the inevitable trend that will necessarily include the white-collar strata in broad terms. Differing attitudes, however, tended to place emphasis on the emergence of new drives for social divisions in the industrialised welfare state. In respect of the dominant class theories that defined classes in terms of their relations to the means of production; *Esping-Andersen* has proposed that continued adherence to orthodoxy in this context was largely to undermine the understanding of new axes of social divisions. Rather, we needed to have a novel understanding of class-structure in the light of the fresh dynamics of the welfare state and the emerging new post-industrial proletariat.[44]

The suggestions of *Esping-Andersen* for the structuring of a framework of analysis for class based studies of party politics differs from the traditional conceptions of class analyses in two aspects. First, is the assumption that the "Fordist" and "post-industrial"

[44] Gøsta Esping-Andersen, "Post-Industrial Class Stuctures: An Analytical Framework". In *Changing Classes, Stratification and Mobility in Post-Industrial Societies*, ed. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, 7-31. (London: Sage Publications, 1993), 9.

class formation are fundamentally different.[45] Both empolyment structures and possibilities for social mobility in the post-industrial state reveal quite distinct patterns than those of the Fordist relations of production. In the post-industrial state, whilst the size of the traditional working class is declining, it is gradually beng replaced by upgraded and more skilled workers. Collateral with the decline of Fordism, has been a rapid epansion of professional cadres and lower-end service occupations. Due to the intrinsic qualities of these jobs, life chanes and mobility patterns have become less predictable when compared to the conventional blue-collar working class. Besides, job and career opportunities that require higher levels of education, technical expertise and special personal skills have become increasingly more decisive in the rising service sectors.

Second, the Fordist model of a full-time male breadwinner, with his wife geared to his income and to family service, is being eroded. Instead, the post-industrial model of employment implies more women employed especially in the service sectors, who are independent from the socio-economic status of their companions. In a nutshell, such tendencies inherent within the post-industrial society render the social status and the mobility of all groups open to more variety, hence to less predictability.[46] The significance of such evaluations lies, by and large, in the relevance of these structural changes in advanced industrialism to the rise of new politics and its adherents. With regard to that and to *Kitschelt*'s framework of analysis, therefore, a brief account of new politics shall be provided below. New politics has also been decisive in the sense

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[45] Gøsta Esping-Andersen, "Mobility Regimes and Class Formation". In *Changing Classes, Stratification and Mobility in Post-Industrial Societies*, ed. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, 225-241. (London: Sage Publications, 1993), 228. Here, Esping-Andersen is referring to the concept of Fordism as employed by Michael Piore and Charles Sabel in *The Second Industrial Divide*. (New York: Basic Books, 1984). Main tenets of Fordist type of relations of production, as typified by *Piore* and *Sabel* are based on (1) standardised mass production (2) mass consumption (3) macro arrangement of economic activity in the industrialised countries.

[46] Esping-Andersen, "Mobility", 227-229.

that the electoral challenge it posed to the social democratic parties in Western Europe in the eighties and nineties has had notable implications for the programmatic and strategic shifts observed in social democratic parties; as shall be shown in the following Chapter.

1.3.3. Social Movements and the New Axes of Political Competition

The appearance of new politics in the recent political agenda in Western Europe stretches back to the early 1970s. The new politics covered an array of various social groups, each with different political affiliations or preferences. Support for these new social movements (NSMs) like feminism, ecology, peace and others have emerged quite differently than those of traditional partisanship; and the last two decades in Western Europe have been times of massive politicisation and mobilisation. Referred to by as "surge of collective activity", they seemed to have provided an increasing legitimacy and use of unconventional techniques of political participation.[47] Generally speaking, the NSMs seemed to be arguing basically for quality of life issues, and emphasising individualism together with self-realisation. It has been observed that support for these movements came overwhelmingly from the well-educated, post-war born people; and it was asserted that the NSM proponents were drawn from a particular stratum of the middle-class, literally the non-productive sector including education, arts, health and social work.

While in the early 1980s the NSMs were being treated as single issue movements of a protest and mobilising character, by the American tradition; the European school on NSMs tended to correlate these movements to major societal changes and to

[47] Suzan Berger, "Politics and Anti-Politics in Western Europe in the 1970s". *Daedulus*. 108:1 (1979), 27.

processes of class formation. The European scholars, accordingly, suggested that many of such movements had grown out of the new contradictions in modernising capitalist social formation; and that this new political paradigm could best be understood as "the modern critique of further modernisation".[48]

The European spectacles on NSMs also held that the traditional axis of left and right alone, did no longer suffice to describe the modern patterns of political conflict; and that a further analysis of value priorities, beyond traditional party preferences, was needed. A new axis of political struggle, therefore, was becoming an equally strong predictor of behavioural intentions and actual behaviour, across the (then) twelve nations of the European Community: the materialist/post-materialist (m/pm) cleavage. The m/pm division, thus, cut across the traditional cleavage structure of politics and post-materialist values were characteristically held by people of high education; which, according to a class model, would render them middle class.[49] Geared to this argument was that the traditional left-right continuum had been an approximately adequate model until the mid-1970s, in which all relevant political and societal collective actors could have been located; and which clearly did not suffice to describe the new political paradigm any longer. A new *cross-cutting* dimension challenging the irrationalities of the industrial society, consequently, had to be added to the post-war "political paradigm of security and economic growth".[50]

Implications of the new political paradigm (hereinafter referred to as new politics) for contemporary Western European political parties have been both programmatic

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[48] Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics". *Social Research*. 52:4 (Winter 1985), 817-868.

[49] Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1990), 371-388.

[50] Offe, " Challenging the Boundaries", 857.

and organisational. Programmatic in the sense that, it became almost impossible for the established parties representing the traditional left-right cleavage, to turn a deaf ear to new politics. Both orthodox left and right felt obliged to respond to the new political claims in their party programs, in particular to ecological issues. The left, nevertheless, turned out to be more receptive of demands such as environmentalism and anti-nuclearism. Consequently, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), for instance, had to change its policy on nuclear energy; following a series of intra-party conflicts. While the SPD used to favour the utilisation and expansion of nuclear energy in the 1970s, the pro-nuclear policy was almost reversed by 1987; calling for a gradual phasing out of nuclear energy in the Federal Republic. By the early 1990s, SPD's orthodoxly growth-oriented program on economic policy was rendered an environmentally sustainable one.[51] It was alleged in this context that the growing programmatic responsiveness of the left parties, seemed to raise the possibility that these parties were more capable of attracting new politics proponents than the right.[52]

Whether the case has been such, leaves much room for discussion; as the voters' attitudes on established parties and on new politics in Western Europe still remain highly volatile, as shall be elaborated in due course. Nevertheless, it became perceivable in the last decades that new politics has been operating parallel to the conventional axis of politics, the latter having conservative right on the one extreme, and traditional left on the other. The ideological spectrum in advanced capitalist democracy, hence, has been sketched on a Euclidean space:

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[51] Robert Rohrschneider, "Impact of Social Movements on European Party Systems". *The Annals, AAPSS.* 528 (July 1993), 163.

[52] ibid., 106.

As can be viewed in Figure 1 below, whilst the conventional socialist/capitalist division remains on the horizontal axis, a range of political positions between libertarianism and authoritarianism defines the vertical dimension of the political space. As for the latter dimensional formation, *libertarianism* stands for emphasis on equality and freedom as ultimate values; with *anarchist* communitarians at the extreme, wishing to establish a solidaristic order that inherently possesses liberty and equality. At the other extreme of the vertical axis is the *authortarian* communitarians, refuting individual freedom and equality for the sake of a hierarchical and a normative order. While historically, social democracy had been situated on the horizontal axis of traditional cleavage formation, somewhere comprising between capitalism and socialism; it seems to have moved upper towards the ideological coordinates of new politics, incorporating much of the libertarian values. [53]

[53] For a detailed discussion of the new cleavage formation, see: Kitschelt, *The Transformation*, 254-279; and: 131-206.



Figure 1. The Ideological Axes of Advanced Industrialised Society

Source : Kitschelt, The *Transformation*, 254-279.

1.3.4. An Actor Oriented Approach

The social democratic parties of Western Europe have experienced notable changes in terms of both ideological stances and strategic appeals in the period following the Second World War. Besides, they had some differing electoral performences when compared to each other. Such issues are going to be addressed in detail in the following Chapter; with reference to ideology, strategy, organisation and social basis of support, the four analytical tools employed in this research. The study so far has shown that the conventional class approach to the subject do no longer suffice for a precise analysis of these parties in the recent years. Whilst structural explanations based on cleavage formation seems to hold true to a large extent; it needs to be

enriched with an actor-oriented approach at the wake of the novel socio-political changes inherent in the 1990s.

The essence of the actor-oriented approach, as provided by *Kitschelt,* places emphasis on the parties' capabilities of adaptation to the challenges posed by the fresh conjuncture in advanced capitalism. Although the changes in the socio-economic class structure have been recognised as a determinant of social democratic performance, it is suggested that a party's strategic appeal has also become a key variable for social democratic success or failure. Therefrom, some "internal explanations" such as strategy, organisational capacity for intra-party decision making and policy formulation for electoral alliances, should be incorporated into the prevailing "external explanations" of class structures.[54]

In this context, the direct impact of left parties' strategic appeal on voters' electoral choices have been analysed in the first instance. It has been suggested that the electorate are becoming more sensitive to the explicit strategic appeals by the party leaders and activists; as party identification and class-voting are observed to be in decline. In order to throw light on the formation of strategy, on the other hand, the critical issues of (1) cleavage structures, (2) the existing distribution of popular preferences within the competitive politcal space, and (3) the rise of new politics are held as key variables. Depending on the assertion that parties indeed are "actors"; the ultimate goal at this stage is to see whether social democratic strategy within political competition derives from a rational choice or not.

[54] Kitschelt, *The Transformation.*

As such, the relevance of rational choice approach to social democratic parties has been extensively discussed in *Kitschelt*'s framework of analysis. This analysis is devised upon the basic assumptions of rational choice that parties are vote maximizers which have the incentives to spread out over the competitive political space; and that the extent to which parties act as such, depends on the number of actual and potential competitors (parties) therein. The key variables within simple rational choice approach is, therefore, the number of actual competitors and the entry cost for their potential rivals. The eventual distribution of votes, in that respect, is to be scattered along the main ideological poles.

Nevertheless, attention has been drawn to the contradictory position within this approach that insofar as established parties opt for strategies towards vote maximisation, and as long as electoral distribution remains fixed; then there would be hardly any option for new parties to arrive at that particular political space. Besides, based on the very fact that there appears to be cross-cutting ideological axes other than the conventional let-right continuum; the relevance of simple rational choice runs into difficulties, especially when contemporary social democratic parties are borne in mind. Due to the left-libertarian axis of political competition that has been functioning as complementary to the conventional axis, the essential difficulty inherent in the application of rational choice to the case of contemporary social democratic parties becomes clear.

On that account, *Kitschelt* has hypothesised firstly that, the social democratic electoral fortune is contingent upon the strategic choices in the new voter distribution provided by the left-libertarian challenge. Second, the conventional "distributive"

left-right division, by and large, remains as a decisive factor for social democratic parties.[55] Third, social democratic parties can not be analysed with a reference to their short-run vote-maximization stances only; rather, their particular opportunities for choosing between complex strategic alternatives within multi-party competition must also be incorporated into the analytical approach. In that respect, many social democratic parties in Western Europe, especially in Britain, France and Sweden, have faced a wide range of strategic choices, and accordingly have pursued volatile strategies. Whilst the strategic stances of many social democratic parties around Western Europe are disclosed to be directed at short-term vote maximization between 1970 and the 1980s; nevertheless, a purely rational-choice approach to social democratic parties would remain incomplete, by having neglected the particular ideological legacy of a party and the importance of historical voter identifications with that party. Besides, parties may also opt for long-tem vote maximization as an alternative to short-term office/vote seeking. Yet, such a strategy becomes rational only when structural opportunities are favourable.[56]

Based on the conclusion that rational choice becomes a useful tool only in explaining how party strategies are translated into electoral turnouts in a given competitive political space, and that it remains incompetent in analysing a party's choices of strategy itself; "intra-party decision making process" and "organisation" are put forth as the additional internal factors in the analysis of social democratic parties. Therefrom, it has been suggested that strategic flexibility was undermined more in social democratic parties with relatively more institutionalised organisational schemes, as the fairly traditional economic socialism of British and Swedish social

[55] Ibid., 131-137.
[56] Ibid., 146-198.

democratic parties in the 1970s and 1980s indicated. On the other hand, the relative strength of left-libertarian cleavage mobilisation was to constitute the critical external factor that affected the rational strategic choice of a social democratic party, as has been the case in Germany.[57] Besides, the prevalence of dominant ideologies have also contributed to the extent to which parties adapted to the electoral competition around new axis of politics.

In this respect, Britain and Sweden had more difficulty in incorporating left-libertarian themes, as the notion of class and conventional views of liberalism and socialism had been the hegemonic ideologies in these polities. In Germany, however, liberalism did not constitute the sole antagonistic discourse that social democracy had to compete with. Rather, social democrats had to challenge also the traditional Catholic views of the society or ethnic and regional divisions. Nonetheless, the very existence of such particularisms helped, at the same time, for the easier adaptation by social democrats to libertarian themes. In France, on the other hand, etatist and communist visions of society seemed to have posed further difficulties to the social democrats. In that polity, left-libertarianism was largely perceived to be an adversary of traditional socialism. All in all, these have shaped popular demands for political alternatives in social democracy, from a conventional distributional strategy towards forming alliances around a more complex continuum of "left-libertarianism versus right-authoritarianism".

Thenceforward, it became possible for social democratic parties of Western Europe to devise strategies directed at electoral alliances for covering the newly emerging cleavages of advanced capitalism. To the extent that social democrats have been able

[57] Ibid., 207-253.

to converge their strategic appeals with political demands such as individual self-realisation or direct political participation; their electoral performance came out to be more successful. The electoral target in that case has been the voters drawn especially from the intellectually more demanding jobs in the service sector. Social democratic fortune in advanced industrial society, therefore, was contingent upon both structural elements and intrinsic capabilities of parties for strategic formulation. On the other hand, it has been reiterated that strategy was the outcome of intra-party coalitions within the organisational framework; hence a function of voluntarist change by political actors.[58]

In a nutshell, the framework of analysis devised by *Kitschelt* recognises the more complex patterns of political competition that the traditional class analysis falls short of explaining. The substantive changes in popular preferences put forth by the modern professional and sectoral structures within advanced industrial society, as such, have been incorporated into the conventional structural analysis of cleavage formation and their translation into party systems. Therefrom, it has been shown that the fortune of social democracy is not necessarily dependent upon prevailing social structures; rather we need to be mindful of also the internal explanations, in order to be able to account for the variences observed in that respect. Emphasis is placed on, therefore, to the importance of actors within strategy and organisation; as well as the existing patterns of party competition and the relevant ideological legacy, as the critical variables in the analytical framework.

[58] Ibid., 280-281.

CHAPTER II

POST-1945 SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE

In view of the theoretical account given in the preceding Chapter, the social democratic parties in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden shall be examined for the post-1945 period in this Chapter. The framework of analysis shall cover both the external and internal explanations put forth in the actor-oriented approach provided by *Herbert Kitschelt.* On one hand, both ideology and social basis of support are going to be among the tools of the analysis, for the elaboration of the prevailing dominant ideologies and the inherent cleavage structures respectively, as the critical external variables. On the other hand, strategic appeals and organisational capacity for intra-party policy formulation shall be scrutinised, as the internal variables, on the basis of strategy and organisation; the two other analytical tools employed in this study. Before running into the analysis, however, the developmental path of the electoral performance of these parties shall be briefly explained below; as grounding to the analysis.

2.1. The Electoral Trajectory of Social Democracy

As endowed by the Marxist theory, socialism around 1850s was to conquer political power by means of a revolution. The historic agent of the revolution would be the working class. At the wake of constitutional development on the other hand, political enfranchisement in Europe was continually expanding. Hence, "the crucial choice" for the

proletariat at that time was "whether or not to participate".[1] While the First (1864) and the Second International (1889) had adopted genuinely Marxist stands, debates on the parliamentary ways and means for achieving socialism continued. Almost a battle had been fought between the reformist and revolutionary wings within the socialist milieu, before the parliamentary option for achieving the socialist ends was adopted.

Contemporaneous was the fact that socialists were steadily growing from election to election. Left votes in Germany increased from 125000 in 1871, to 312000, 1427300 and to 4250000 in 1881, 1890 and in 1912 respectively. The German social democratic party had already, by 1890, become the largest party scoring 19.7 %; and the respective figure reached 34.8 % by 1912. Similarly, the Swedish social democrats received 3.5, 9.5, 14.6, 28.5, and 36.4 % of the votes cast in the years 1902, 1905, 1908, 1911 and 1914 respectively. By 1917, social democratic support in the latter climbed up to 39.1 %.[2] Likewise, the British Labour Party increased its share of votes from 29.5 % in 1922 to 30.5 % the following year.[3]

The rapid increase in socialist vote in Western Europe tended to slow down and stabilise following the First World War. Of the four countries within the scope of this study, Sweden had the strongest left of the inter-war period.[4] Communist factions in this period, clearly separated their ways and broke away from the social democratic movement; most of them organising in their own parties. In that respect, France is an outstanding example

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[1] Adam Przeworski and John Sprague. *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 13

[2] ibid., 27-28

[3] Malcolm B. Hamilton, *Democratic Socialism in Britain and Sweden.* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1989), 65.

[4] Stefano Bartolini, "The European Left Since World War I: Size, Composition and Patterns of Electoral Development". In *Western European Party Systems, Continuity and Change*, eds., Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, 139-175. (London: Sage Publications, 1983), 156.

in which the communists used to enjoy a weighty position within the country's politics; which, from time to time, undermined the social democratic performance to a considerable extent.

With regard to the electoral performance of left parties, *Stefano Bartolini* has suggested that since the First World War, the variance in the size of different communist parties was, by and large, the outgrowth of the variance in the size of the socialist parties from which they originated. Whereas the size of communist parties in Sweden and in Britain have stabilised during the inter-war period; larger alterations have taken place for the cases of Germany and France, after 1945.[5] It was also emphasised in this context that, before the Second World War, Germany could be included in the array of countries in which a rather balanced electoral strength between Communists and Socialists used to prevail. That rendered the KPD (German Communist Party), by and large, a strong Communist party among its sisters in Europe. From 1945 onward however, the fortune of the KPD was reversed; and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), joined the post-war group of polities with social democratic dominance of the left, with a weak communist party. On the other hand, social democratic growth hardly recovered its *Weimar* electorate in the aftermath of 1945. Among the drives of this outline, both the legacy of the Nazi Regime and neighbourhood with the Communist East (DDR)[6] as a result of the division, were held to be of significance. The latter implied, at the same time, the political repression of the Communist Party in the FRG in the post-1945 period.[7]

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[5] Ibid., 151.
[6] DDR: *Deutsche Demokratische Republik*
[7] Bartolini, "The European Left", 115.

The general trend has been such that the size of total left during the period between the two world wars appeared to grow in Europe, with the exception of Belgium only. In *Bartolini's* view, post-1945 stabilisation of the total left in Europe revealed a negative correlation between the electoral supports of social democracy and of communism; due largely to the direct competition between the two[8]. Besides, data covering the period from 1917 to 1978 have indicated that inasmuch as the increase in communist support was more linked to the decline in socialist votes; social democrats were observed to grow at the expense of the right, or decline in favour of the latter. France constituted a particular case that confirmed these findings.[9] *Bartolini*'s data denoted, at the same time, that the level of support won by a communist party determined not only the nature of communist/socialist competition, but also the competition in the party system as a whole. [10]

By the end of the Second World War, social democrats throughout Europe had already become mass parties immovably committed to the democratic order. From then on, social democratic parties of the four countries within the scope of this study either governed or participated in coalitions; hence became parties of governmental responsibility. The average shares of social democratic vote between 1917 and 1943 came out to be 24.5 % for Germany; 19.7 % for France; 31.4 % for Britain and 40.8 % for Sweden. This general framework, with the exception of France, continued with considerable increases in the post-Second World War period; and the respective figures till 1978 have been 37.0 %; 18.3 %; 44.5 % and 46.0%. [11]

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[8] Ibid., 156.
[9] Ibid, 154-155.
[10] Ibid., 156
[11] Przeworski and Sprague, *Paper Stones*, 30

The political programmes of social democrats in the early post-war period, had to be concerned basically with the problems stemming largely from the interwar depression of 1929 and the heavy burden of the Second World War years. In this respect, social democratic programmes focused on economic and social issues which were inspired largely by Keynesian macro-economic management. Retaining full employment as their essential target, social democratic governments especially in Britain and in Sweden embarked on interventionist economic programs directed at regulating the uncontrolled market, with the ultimate goal of steering resources into selected profitable sectors. As such, the leitmotif of macro-economic management in North-Western Europe in the period after the War has been the creation of a sizeable public sector and a consequential challenge to *laissez-faire*. State-led economic reconstruction was complemented by socialisation of welfare measures, and by entrusting the state with the task of establishing a comprehensive social security system. In Germany, on the other hand, social democrats came to power in 1969. In France, PS had taken active roles during the Fourth Republic, and established a comprehensive social security system. In the Fifth Republic, however, socialists declined until *Mitterand's* leadership in 1971.

The ascent of social democratic values in the 1950s and the 1960s was challenged in the following decade; due largely to the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 1971 and to the relative stagnation of US hegemony in world markets. The emergence of the OPEC oil cartel in this decade and the accompanying crises in international finance, undermined gravely the appropriateness of Keynesian policies in Europe. Governments in the 1970s were no longer in a position to maintain high public expenditures; on the contrary, most of them had to respond with strict measures such as wage cuts and tight fiscal and monetary controls. The following decade in Western Europe witnessed the revival of monetarism

and *laissez-faire* at the expense of Keynesianism, and the congruent rise of globalisation; to all which social democrats gave a painstaking fight to adopt, till the early 1990s.

Complying with the economic conjuncture sketched above, the trend of social democratic rise till the seventies was nearly reversed at the turn of that decade, and social democracy in Germany, Britain and Sweden entered a phase of stagnation. The case of France revealed another divergence in this context, in that a socialistic revival was observed in that polity in the 1980s. The British Labour Party lost office in 1979 and German social democrats, in 1982. Sweden was governed by a non-socialist government between 1976 and 1982, for the first time since 1932; and the Swedish social democrats had to rule through minority cabinets subject to legislative coalitions with the right and the radical left, till 1991. Consonantly, the average level of support for social democrats between 1981 and 1990 decreased from 43.5 % to 36.9 % in Germany and from 37.8 % to 28.9 % in Britain. Remaining stable in Sweden, the respective figures for the same period have been 43.2 % and 44.5 %. In France, however, the decade of 1980s came out to be a significant one, and the Socialist Party's average level of support increased from 27.0 % to 36.5 % between 1981 and 1990.[12]

Accordingly, although the Swedish social democrats, ever since the Second World War, suffered an unusual electoral defeat of 37.6 % in 1991; the successive elections of 1994 returned the SAP back to government, with 45.4 % of support. Likewise, the British and French social democrats returned to office in 1997, with 43 % and 37.4 % of the votes cast, respectively. In 1998, general elections in Germany brought SPD back to power by % 40.9, after 16 years of Christian Democratic rule. Concurrently, despite decreasing to %

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[12] Herbert Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5

36.6, Swedish social democratic government remained in office with the support of the "Greens" and the "Left Party" following the September 1998 elections. As of end 1998, therefore, social democratic governments have returned to office in four of the countries covered in this research.

2.2. Ideology: from Class-Conflict to the Welfare State

Ideologically, the social democratic parties in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden had flourished on Marxist origins. A common feature of these parties in the post Second World War period has been the evolutionary trend from traditional socialism of the past century to contemporary social democracy. While, for instance, the socialist currents of the early 1900s in Britain seemed to have "no unifying ideology, other than a set of values ranging from Fabians to Marxists"[13], the Labour Party (LP) accepted in 1918 a new programme targeting at the common ownership of the means of production. At the same time, however, LP seemed to adopt a hostile disposition towards orthodox Marxism, and refused the Communist Party's demand to affiliate.

Likewise in Sweden, the SAP also espoused to Marxist affiliations during its formative years, which later on, gradually shifted towards reformism, perhaps earlier than any of its counterparts in Western Europe. It was held in the 1911 Party Conference that the concept of social democracy was *a united force of all small folk*, and the SAP endeavoured to be a catch all party with a broad based appeal ever since the 1911 elections.[14] Early mobilisation of the

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[13] Francis Jacobs, (ed), *Western European Political Parties, A Comprehensive Guide*. (Harlow-Essex: Longman Group UK Ltd., 1989),388.

[14]David Arter, "The War of the Roses: Conflict and Cohesion in the Swedish Social Democratic Party". In *Conflict and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties*, eds. David S. Bell and Eric Shaw, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 71.

large masses of the relatively deprived by the Party has helped the development of a SAP image as the natural ally of these people with the SAP, the implication of which has been a stable support of nearly half a century for the social democrats. By 1930s, the SAP's ideological stance, similar to its counterparts in Germany, Britain or France, was further improved through the contribution of *Keynes* who provided the social democrats with the economic tool that they have been seeking for since the revisionist debates, in the manner mentioned before. Basic Keynesian tenets such as demand management and full employment have thus become the main programatic strategy of Swedish social democrats, whose achievements in the decades following the war have been impressive. Though in the immediate post-war years there has been a short-lived revival of reformist socialism manifesting itself in further nationalisation and more planning, Sweden was already heading towards *Keynesian* welfare state by the 1950s.

In that respect, it might be argued for France that although socialists had adopted a non-revolutionary position as early as the 1890s, the Socialist Party (PS) might have been perceived as a *latecomer* in terms of adopting a reformed social democratic stance. The party suffered from a series of ideological disputes almost till the early 1980s, and hardly abandoned the old fashioned socialistic strategies by then. The communist rivalry also has been influential in PS' ideological and organisational features, in the sense that the Communist Party (PCF) was among the key factors in the decline experienced later on by the socialists, particularly in the Fourth Republic. From this perspective, the PS seems to represent a typical case of the thesis on electoral trade-off from the social democratic fold in the presence of strong communist parties, as provided by *Przeworski* and *Sprague*. The French socialists are found to be among the three Western European left parties that suffered from strong trade-off in the presence of communist competitors, where trade-offs were either

mild or intermediate in the absence of communist rivalry in other countries between 1970 and 1980.[15]

As for Germany in this context, the two-fold legacy of the Second World War in the immediate post-war years has been closely associated with the fortune of social democracy in that polity: On the one hand was the almost disguised feeling of guilt inherited from the National Socialist regime; and the *faits accomplis* that resulted in the division of Germany into two states, on the other. The implications of this post-war conjuncture for the party system in the Federal Republic has been such that, the aversion towards political extremism reached its peak, due largely to the bitter experiences of the *Weimar* regime; and ideology in this connection, was perceived in a rather pejorative sense. Post-war political environment, hence, seemed to require a further "revisionism" than that suggested by *Bernstein.* Such phenomena thoroughly helped the development of a "centrist consensus" to dominate West German politics after 1945. Equally important was the maintenance of a broad catch-all alliance of the German electorate by the Christian Democrats, a prototype of *Kircheimer's Volkspartei*; which in turn, forced the opposition parties to "de-emphasise class politics and overt party ideology". [16]

In Britain, the Labour Party's (LP) philosophy has been anchored in Keynesian welfare state and demand management economy, particularly in the immediate post-war period.[17] Having progressively increased its electoral support, the LP had already become the single largest party in the 1923 elections; and two minority Labour governments were formed in 1924 and

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[15] Przeworski and Sprague, *Paper Stone,* Herbert Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy,*47-66.

[16] Stephen Padgett,"The German Social Democratic Party: between Old and New Left". In *Conflict and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties*, eds. David S. Bell and Eric Shaw, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994) 11.

[17] Stephen Padgett,"Social Democracy in Power". *Parliamentary Affairs.* 46:1,1993, 101-120.

1929. The Labour Party, accordingly, seemed to have acquired proficiency in governmental affairs. *Clement Atlee*'s leadership in 1935 contributed further to the rise of the Party. The LP participated in the wartime coalition of 1940, and finally formed the first Labour majority government following the 1945 elections.

Labour's ideology following the Second World War, appeared as a compromise between liberal capitalism and orthodox Marxism, similar to its counterparts in Germany, Sweden and France. As such, the LP Programme endeavoured to manage the war stricken British economy along *Keynesian* lines with full employment as the first objective. A sizeable public sector including coal, railways, air transport, electricity, gas and broadcasting, as well as the Bank of England was boosted. The Labour Party also attempted to accept responsibility for the establishment of social welfare measures. As such, a comprehensive National Health Service (NHS) for the provision of freely available health care and medicine was created. A range of social security benefits was adopted accordingly. Labour's post-war ideology therefore, has been confined to the maintenance of nationalisation, planning and welfare, as reflected by its programmatic action.

Following the Conservative rule of 1951-64, the Labour Party came to government again in Britain between 1964 and 1970. The LP's ideology and programmatic orientation in this period did not seem to reflect any major deviations from those of the previous governmental years, and traditional social democratic affiliations continued till late 1970s. However, as social democratic ideology entered a period of decline in Northwestern Europe; LP ideology, as well as the other social democrats around Europe had to be revised for adaptation to the rise of monetarism and the downfall of the interventionist trend in the 1980s.

In that respect, intra-party struggles for ideological reformation continued within Labour Party throughout the eighties. The fourth successive election defeat of the LP in 1992 impelled significant shifts in ideological position. The years from 1992 to 1997 opened Labour the door to government with a highly novel discourse, under the leadership of *Tony Blair*. The new Labour philosophy, expressed by its charismatic leader, is confined basically to a recoil from hard-headed interventionism towards a re-alignment with markets. Furthermore, Labour's Election Manifesto of 1997 seems to be clearly committed to cutting on high public expenditures, and reveals a prudential approach to social welfare measures; in sharp contrast to its ideological position of the post-1945 period.

In Germany, the 1949 *Bundestag* elections and the three successive ones till 1969 resulted in Christian Democrat governments during which the SPD underwent an ideological reformation of what seemed to be the most radical since what we shall call *the Bernstein turn*: In 1959, the *Bad Godesberger Program* had announced the Party's acceptance of the fundamentals of a market economy and a political orientation with the West. The 1959 programme, therefore, represented the shift of SPD to a more pro-market and pro-NATO stance. The rise of the SPD to power in the historic coalition of 1966 owed much to the social democratisation of the Party after the *Bad Godesberg* programme.

> "Explicitly disavowing the Party's Marxist past, the programme emphasised the eclectic philosophical sources of democratic socialism in the Christian ethic, classical philosophy and the humanist tradition. It went on to endorse the liberal pluralism of the West German state and the market economy, calling for an extension of democratic principles into the social and economic spheres ".[18]

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[18]Ibid., 11.

German social democrats, nevertheless, faced further ideological dilemmas with the rise of ecological issues in the eighties. As left-libertarian cleavage mobilisation became a decisive factor in German politics during these years, the SPD became torn between left-libertarian and distributive/growth oriented conventional social democratic values. In this respect, the electoral challenge posed by the Greens has especially become the main thrust behind the conflicts between the intra-party factions representing old and new left. Nevertheless, due largely to the intra-party capability for decision-making directed at new strategies; SPD has been able to incorporate new-left themes into its ideological stance. As such, the Party's "Program for 100 Days" declared before the September 1998 elections appeared to be a compromise between green values and SPD's traditional committments.[19]

Unlike the German SPD, the French socialists were suffering from difficulties in defining their role on the left of the political spectrum and particularly in consolidating a contemporary social democratic image for their Party, even in the 1970s. When the socialists came to government in 1981 under *Francois Mitterand*'s leadership, the only program that they were committed to was the "Common Programme" signed in 1972 with the Communists. The basic tenets of that Programme were largely confined to extensive nationalisation and state intervention in the economy.[20] Socialists in France, therefore, did not seem to be able to produce a radical programmatic return as the SPD had done in the *Bad Godesberg* Conference in 1959. The PS U-turn in rendering a socialist origin a catch-all model was announced only after *Francois Mitterand*'s leadership in 1971.

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[19] Die Welt, "New and renewable energy resources are wind, solar, biomass and geothermal energy resources which the environmentalists tend to prefer at the expense of traditional resources such as nuclear and fossil-fuels, (September 20,1998).

[20] John Gaffney, "The Emergence of a Presidential Party: The Socialist Party". In *French Political Parties in Transition*, ed. Alistair Cole, 61-90.(Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990), 67.

In this connection, it must also be noted that the constitutional change that rendered the Fifth Republic a presidentialised one has had significant implications on the fortune of the French socialists, in the sense that the PS has had to bear the weight and the responsibility of being the presidential Party of the Republic with the election of *Mitterand* as president in 1981, Governmental responsibility, in fact, was not a new phenomenon for the PS; as the Party had already supported several government in the 1920s and finally coming to power in 1936 under the leadership of *Leon Blum* in the Popular Front. The Party had also taken active roles in the Fourth Republic, however as the rise of the Communists continued after 1945, the PS suffered a decline till the 1960s, as mentioned before. All in all, the scholarly comment on French politics that "the history of the PS was a painful transition from socialist tradition to a catch-all party model, with Mitterand suppressing centrifugal forces of factionalism with the cohesive power of presidency"[21], seems helpful for a better understanding of the French portrait of socialism till the 1980s. With centre-right *Chirac* as president in 1995, the left in France is still widely alleged to remain discourseless and fragmented; despite polling a clear majority in the form of an alliance in 1997 elections.

Swedish social democracy, on the other hand, protruded in Europe almost as a prototype; due largely to continuous renovation of policy, hence, timely adaptation to conjunctural changes. Perpetual programmatic renewal is a key to understanding social democracy in Sweden, and its ideological transformation. Ever since its foundation in the past century, SAP has been confronting intra-party policy improvement struggles. The Party's programmatic considerations included not only ideological values and principles but concrete policy recommendations as well, welfare society being *sine qua non* of all policy revisions.

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[21] David S. Bell and Byron Criddle, "The French Socialist Party: Presidentialised Factionalism". In *Conflict and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties*, eds. David S. Bell and Eric Shaw, 112-132. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994).

Ideological transformation between the 1930s and 1950s thus, revealed a break with radicalism and a comprehensive reformation aiming at the dissolution of the distributional problem for the well being of all. As a student of Swedish politics has observed, the social democrats "have worked steadily to create a guaranteed basic minimum income for the individual Swede (cradle to grave), and introduced free child care and old age pension schemes."[22]

The SAP tradition of continuous reform manifested itself in the 1980s as a response to the rise of two different ideological currents; the neo-liberal discourse and environmentalism. As elaborated elsewhere, the unfavourable global conjuncture and deteriorating economic indicators in the 1970s had discredited Keynesian economic management in Western Europe, the results of which have been revival of monetarism and recoil from further public expenditures and from social democratic values *per se*. The challenge proved even more pressing for the Swedish social democrats, who were busy combating a continued expansion of tax base for the management of a huge public commitment. As 1991 *Riksdag* elections showed, the SAP suffered its most severe electoral defeat with 37.6 % of the votes, unusual in its history ever since the Second World War. The perceived challenge of liberal values had in fact motivated the Party management before the elections, to prepare for the coming decade; and SAP's "The 1990s Programme" was already underway by the late eighties.

The "1990s Programme" was, in essence, a response to the neo-conservative claims of the last decade. Endeavouring to formulate the necessary alternatives, the Programme put forward a third way, putting emphasis on ecological issues and on individual freedom, without comprising from the *raison d'etre* of social democracy. A normative manuscript on

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[22] Jacobs , "*Western European Political Parties*", 625.

how the good social democratic society should work and a set of policy prescriptions together constituted the two integral parts of the Programme. The former focused on a good living environment and an enriched working life as the essentials of the *modus operandi* of a classless society. Policy recommendations referred basically to the renewal of the public sector and to the achievement of a strong economy.

Renewal of the public sector aimed at the stabilisation of government expenditures and at the provision of higher quality services through a compromise solution between public and market solutions. While, for instance, technical services and subsidiary branches such as catering, laundry and cleaning were included in the privatisation goal, the Party remained committed to the provision by government of some essential public services such as health, education and public transportation. Privatisation of state economic enterprises were generally to be realised through issuing new shares, with government keeping control over them.

Policy recommendations on a stronger economy involved traditional social democratic objectives such as full employment, expanded collective savings, lower inflation and increased international competitiveness, with the role of planning and state controls as policy instruments retained, albeit in a lower tone.[23] A comprehensive tax reform for the financing of public expenditures is also foreseen in SAP's program. All together, the SAP's ideological stance in the 1990s turned out to be a further step in its long history of logical compromise between capital and labour, including this time the incorporation of green and post-materialist values. The Election Manifesto of 1998 clearly places emphasis on investment in

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[23] Richard Gillespie and William E. Paterson, "*Rethinking Social Democracy in Western Europe,* (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1993), 55.

"ecologically sustainable development" and in "environmental values".[24] While "quality of life" issues are also highlighted; on the other hand, traditional social democratic values such as full employment, enhancement of the labour market, sound public finances and comprehensive social security have been meticulously preserved in the Manifesto.[25] In this respect, further improvement of educational, health and social welfare services have been vigorously supported.[26]

All in all, it can be suggested with regard to ideology that, whilst the outset of the social democratic parties in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden had been revolutionary socialism of the past century; that gradually shifted towards the adoption of reformist means for achieving that end. The ideological evolution from orthodox Marxism to contemporary social democratic thought has been a laborious endeavour; within which communist fractions clearly separated their ways into splinter parties. In the post-1945 period, Keynesian political economy has given fresh insights to the developmental path of the social democratic ideology. Whereas social democratic ascent was challenged by the rising new politics in the 1980s; the social democratic parties in the aforementioned polities are observed to have adapted to the implications of the new agenda largely through the incorporation of the fresh left-libertarian themes of the 1990s.

2.3. Social Base: Working Class as Father of Social Democracy

Working class has traditionally been accepted as the core constituency of social democratic movement in Europe. As *Przeworski* and *Sprague* have indicated, historically, the number of

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[24] Swedish Social Democratic Party. "Election Manifesto". *Socialdemokraterna.* 1998: 4
[25] ibid., 1998: 3
[26] ibid., 1998: 4-5

workers voting left has increased gradually from the early 1900s onward. Their data on various West European socialist parties revealed that while the proportion of manual workers supporting social democrats in 1900 was 12 % in France; for Germany, in which socialists had been competing in elections already for thirty years at that time, the corresponding figure came out to be 44 %. Table 9 may be helpful in indicate the progressive integration of the workers to the social democratic cause in years till the 1970s.

Table 2.

Proportion of Workers Voting Left in Selected Countries (%) [27]

	1900	1914	1924	1936	1945	1960	1975
Germany	44	63	58		51	63	70
France	12	20	37	50	65	50	67
Sweden		48	48	81	81	88	92

Source: Przeworski & Sprague, *Paper Stones,* 1986: 160

In Germany, the party system tended to preserve the centrist consensus that developed in the immediate post-war years till the 1980s, as noted before. The three decades following the war have favoured the relatively well functioning of the traditional left-right continuum, with conservatives and liberals representing business circles, and social democrats remaining tied to their social base of blue-collar electorate. Nonetheless, the 1980s have also witnessed the indications of some radical change in Western European politics and, German politics in particular; the coming into agenda of a new axis of politics that has started to operate parallel to the traditional one, as shown before.

[27] Figures for Britain in the respective years have not been available.

A brief glance at the social base of the SPD in the last two decades therefore, reveals some considerable and rather complex shifts in the Party's electoral support. Between 1981 and 1990, the average level of support for the SPD fell from 43.5% to 36.9%, ranking as the eight among nine West European social democratic parties.[28] SPD lost some 750000 votes to the Greens, and more than 2 million to CDU in 1983 elections.[29] The social democrats did no better in the first national elections held following unification in 1990. While the SPD was supported by 35.7 % in the West (former Federal Republic), the corresponding figure for the East (former Democratic Republic) turned out to be 24.3 %, leading to an overall electoral gain of 33.5 % for the Party at national level.[30] By October 1994 elections however, the social democrats increased their voter support by 2.9 %, ranking as second behind the Greens, and reached an overall electoral turnout of 36.4 % at national level.[31]

With regard to SPD's electoral performance in the post-war period, it must be noted firstly that the core constituency of social democratic politics in Germany has shrank in size. Second, is the change in support granted by the blue collar workers to the SPD in the same period: While the working class support for the Party remained almost unchanged (around 54 %) between 1976 and 1987 [32]; the corresponding figure declined to 45.3 % nationwide by 1994, and the SPD performance in the East has been significantly lower (35.1 %) than in the West (49.5) [33]. A third factor that seems to influence the blue collar voting behaviour in Germany is trade-union membership. The SPD remains much stronger among unionised blue-collar workers (54.8 % in the samples) than among the non-unionised section (39.3

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[28] Kitschelt , *The Transformation* ,5.
[29] Stephen Padgett, "Social Democracy in Power". Parliamentary Affairs. 46:1, (1993), 101-120., 171.
[30] American Institute For Contemporary German Studies. "Wahlergebnis 1990", November 1994
[31] 36.4 % corresponds to overall result at national level; SPD support in the West came out to be 37.5 %, while in the East it remained as 24.3 %. (American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, "Super Election Year 1994 Reports No: X (2)", November 1994)
[32] Kitschelt , *The Transformation,* 44.
[33] American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, "Super Election Year 1994 Reports No: X (1)", 5.

%).[34] With regard to the support from social groups other than its core constituency, the SPD appears as strong among employees and civil servants, as can be seen in the table below:

Table 3.

Nationwide Support for SPD from Different Social Groups in 1994 (%)	
Blue collar	45.3
Employees	36.4
Civil servants	32.4
Self-employed	17.5
Farmers	14.0

Source: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, "Super Election Year 1994 Reports No: X(I)": 10

The address for the new political issues demanding programmatic changes in the established order has become the Green Party in Germany in the late 1980s, which started to attract the voters who previously supported established parties. Recruiting support particularly from the under 24 year-olds in major urban centres; the Greens made a breakthrough to the *Bundestag* with 27 and 42 seats in 1983 and 1987 respectively, thence posing a considerable electoral threat to the social democrats in these years.[35] As the Ecologists established their status as the "viable third party"[36] in German politics in 1994; social democrats' efforts for the incorporation of green values to their agenda were prompted further, with a view to compensate their electoral trade-offs especially within the younger and the relatively well-educated middle-classes.

Unlike its German and British counterparts, the French Socialist Party emerged to be an *electoral winner* in the 1970s and 1980s, which seemed to owe a lot to *Mitterand's*

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[34] Ibid.,10.
[35] Ibid., 11.
[36] Ibid., 11. The Greens received 49 and 47 seats in 1994 and 1998 respectively.

charismatic leadership and to his cohesive role in the Party. During this period, the PS scored as the second best social democratic party in Western Europe, in terms of electoral success, following the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)[37]. The average level of support for the PS between 1981-1990 has increased by 9.5 % despite the facts of weak party-union linkages and the presence of a communist competitor[38] and, the PS votes in the legislative elections rose from 20.8 % in 1973 to 35.8 % in 1988, becoming more homogenous throughout the country than any of its rivals.[39]

The PS had been able to maintain its traditional areas of influence except in the regions where the extreme right evolved. While the size of the working class revealed a slight decrease from 26 % between 1976-79 to 24.8 % between 1984-87, worker support for the PS accordingly fell from 44.1 % to 38.8 % in the respective periods.[40] The Socialists were able to gain support not only from the white-collar electorate but also from the self-employed and the retired as well. The younger cohort and female voters have also supported the PS increasingly in the 1980s. That the Party's blue collar support remained firm in the past decade, did not limit its support among the middle-level executives and voters in the education sector.

The early 1990s however, marked the beginning of a different phase in French politics, in which the party system tended to reveal volatility in terms of the nature and of the limits of each party's electoral support. While the 1970s and the 1980s were celebrated as the rise of social democratic forces as elaborated above, legislative elections of 1993 and the presidential suffrage in 1995 rendered quite reverse the socialist weight that used to dominate French politics in the past two decades. The break-up of the alliance between the Socialists

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[37] PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol
[38] Kitschelt , *The Transformation,65.*
[39] Francis Jacobs, *Western European Political Parties, A Comprehensive Guide.* (Harlow-Essex: Longman Group UK Ltd., 1989), 104.
[40] Kitschelt , *The Transformation,44.*

and the Communists and the accompanying rise of the Extreme Right in 1984 had already left the PS alone in Government. 1986 legislative elections gave the PS a narrow majority, and a period of a *cohabitation* between a socialist president and a rightist prime minister started for the first time in the Fifth Republic. Re-election of *Mitterand* as president in 1988 preserved the cohabitation, and the Right came to power finally with a majority of 43 % in the 1993 legislative elections. Although the Socialist decline continued in 1995 presidential elections (centre-right *Chirac* was elected president); fortune of the left seemed to reverse in a couple of years, as the left alliance polled some 37.4% of the total votes cast in 1997 legislative elections. As such, the united left (socialists and allies, communists and ecologists) won 319 seats in the Parliament, where the total right fell to 257.

The electoral decline of the PS in the early 1990s was attributed to some shifts in the French electoral behaviour, first of which was a clearly observed tendency towards the Right. Second was the rise of green politics and the descent of the overall support for the established parties; while in 1988 the traditional *parties of government* received 76.5 % of the votes, the corresponding figure fell to 63.3 % in the 1993 elections. The tendency in electoral behaviour was further confirmed in the European Parliament elections of 1994, in which the traditional parties scored 40.1 % only.[41]

A third change in the electoral fortune of the PS was the changing attitude of its supporters towards *national* and *non-national* issues. Although the PS had lost the 1983 local elections and could score only 20 % in the 1984 European elections, the Socialists were able to receive some 31.6 % in the 1986 legislative elections and *Mitterand* was again elected president in

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[41] Alan Guyomarch,"The European Dynamics of Evolving Party Competition in France". *Parliamentary Affairs*. 48:1 (January 1995), 102-103.

1988. The PS electorate, however, seemed to *"ignore the centripetal logic"*[42] of the election system in 1993 and 1994, and abandoned their traditional clientele accordingly.

As to the electoral behaviour in the second half of the same decade, volatility seems to fit best the attitude of the French people. Backing communist and green votes once more, the left returned to government in 1997, initiating the third phase of *cohabitation* in French politics. Opinion polls in 1997 indicated that unemployment has been the key factor behind the political change in France in the recent years. That the left strikes back in 1997, has been attributed firstly to loss of the French people's confidence in the right; and secondly to the fact that almost no reforming proposals have been observed in the political programmes of both the left and the right. Thus, the main parameters of the 1997 elections have been unemployment, loss of confidence, increased abstention and protest votes.[43]

So far as unemployment is concerned, some 75% of the French people have shown unemployment as the best measure for their electoral behaviour. Loss of confidence has been unveiled through the fact that, while 59% of the electorate in 1978 thought that the politicians did not care for them at all, the corresponding figure for 1997 rose to 72%. For increased abstention, opinion polls indicated that percentage of people who said that they were interested in politics fell from 50% in 1978 to 46% in 1997. In this connection, almost two thirds of the younger voters (35 year olds and under) have either abstained or did not vote. Nevertheless, the left-right cleavage in French politics seems to be alive and kicking; as 90% of the electorate said they could choose between the left and the right; although identification with a party seemed to be much lower than self-placement between the left and the right

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[42] Ibid., 103.
[43] Le Monde,(June 5,1997).

(56%). As such, 56% of the voters expressed that they did not trust the right; while the respective figure for those who did not trust the left was 51%.[44]

As for Britain in this context, Labour's fortune in the last few decades has been highly dependent on two factors in terms of social base; that is, class positions of the electorate and the gradual shrinking of the size of the working class. Although traditional class structures are unequivocally eroding and new alignments are appearing in Western Europe, class consciousness in Britain seems to be alive and kicking. That the Labour has been the ascendant Party in the industrial regions and particularly among the blue-collar electorate till the 1970s, reinforces the fact that main cleavages in British politics have been economic and regional in essence. Labour has been most successful in the industrial parts of the North of England, and of Scotland and Wales, while in the rural areas and in Southern England the Conservatives have been dominant.

Regional alignments however, started to change by the late 1970s. While between 1959 and 1987 prominence of a clear north-south divide characterised a Conservative voting in the economically prosperous southern England and Labour affiliation in the industrial north, this tendency was transformed by 1992 elections. As a student of British politics noted, voting behaviour in terms of class positions revealed some considerable shifts in the past decade and class voting declined: Increasingly less members of the working class voted for Labour, while a shrinking section of the middle class supported Conservatives in the 1983, 1987 and 1992

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[44] Le Monde, (June 5,1997)

general elections.[45] Accordingly, LP support among the working class declined from 54.4 % in the 1976-79 period to 41.5 % between 1984-89.[46]

As Labour support decreased since the 1960s; the LP has become the first among social democratic losers in Western Europe with a 8.6 % average support loss between 1981 and 1990. In addition to the electoral behaviour shifts mentioned above, the LP suffered also from working class contraction severely, whose percentage in samples fell from 47.8 in the 1970s to 39.7 in the 1980s.[47]

Table 4.

Support for LP according to Social Class Between 1983 and 1992 (%)				
Years	**AB**	**C1**	**C2**	**DE**
1983	10	20	32	41
1987	14	21	36	48
1992	20	25	41	50

Source: Bill Jones, *Political Issues in Britain Today.* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 337.

AB: Higher and intermediate managerial, administrative or professional posts
C1: Supervisory, clerical; junior managerial, administrative or professional posts
C2: Skilled manual workers
DE: Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers; state pensioners, casual workers

Another factor associated with the elusive electoral performance of the Labour in the past two decades is the rise of Liberal Democrats as a *third party* from an almost established *two-party system* in the United Kingdom. While Labour and Conservative votes amounted roughly to 90 % of the total vote till 1974, the respective figures hardly reached 75 % in the following

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[45] Dennis Kavanagh, "Changes in Electoral Behaviour and the Party System", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 47:4 (October 1994), 597.
[46] Ibid., 44.
[47] Kitschelt , *The Transformation,* 65.

elections, and both started to lose to the Liberal Democrats since then.[48] Receiving 17% support from the electorate in 1997, the Liberal democrats gained 46 seats in the Parliament; confirming the very fact that, not only class distinctions are becoming blurred, but the established two-party system tends to erode. So far as Labour's fortune in 1997 is concerned, opinion polls reveal that LP's leader has been the key factor behind the Party's impressive performance: While 60% of the electorate thought that Tony Blair was "a strength for his party", the respective figure for John Major turned out to be 13% only.[49]

All in all, there has been a nation-wide swing of 10.5% to Labour in 1997 elections.[50] While Tony Blair ranked second (32%) behind John Major (33%) in terms of "making the best prime minister for Britain"[51], the former still appeared as the most trusted party leader (45.3%).[52] Although the British electorate thought that it would be the Conservative Party (36%), rather than Labour (28%) "to best represent Britain's interests in Europe"; and that Conservatives "had the best policies for dealing with the economy" (30%), when compared to Labour (28%); Labour appeared as the first party (42%) instead of the Conservatives (37%) that they "would vote for".[53]

In Sweden, although it has been noted that the predictive value of class decreased from 53 % of the variance in voting behaviour in 1956 to 34 % by 1985, class concerns have traditionally remained as the strongest predictor of voting behaviour in Sweden.[54] In that respect, whilst degree of class voting in Sweden has followed an international downward trend; class

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[48] Dennis Kavanagh, "Changes in Electoral Behaviour and the Party System ". *Parliamentary Affairs*, 47:4, (October 1994), 597-612, 599.
[49] The Economist/MORI New Government Poll, The Economist, (May 3,1997), 32.
[50] The Daily Telegraph, (May 3,1997)
[51] ICM Research, "Poll Reviews".(June8,1997),www.icmresearch.com.
[52] Poll Archive: The Guardian General Election Site
[53] ICM Research, "Poll Reviews".(June8,1997).
[54] Kitschelt , *The Transformation,45.*

concerns nevertheless remain as highly strong elements of voting behaviour, within an international framework. As such, 56 % of the electorate still voted according to their class in 1994; the implication which was that working classes overwhelmingly voted for social democrats.[55] More precisely, class still appears to be an electorally more important factor than the issue of unemployment in Sweden; wherefrom it becomes clear that public sector employees tend to vote more for the socialist bloc comprising of the Social Democrats and the Left Party.[56] Also, complying with the argument that electoral trade-offs between workers and allies have tended to be less in countries where communist parties are relatively weaker, and where ethnic-religious parties offering collective identity other than class are of incremental influence, trade-offs in Sweden have come out to be intermediate only.[57] Strong trade union linkages also helped the social democratic electoral performance. However, issue voting within the framework of rising left-libertarian values is also becoming an important factor in voting recently[58]; in conformity with the general tendency observed in Western Europe.

The SAP has traditionally been supported by the blue-collar electorate, and has so far been able to receive the support of trade unions. As social democratic affiliation has been perceived for a long time a s a cultural phenomenon in Sweden, workers in the agricultural sector, a large section of civil servants and the white collar strata have also favoured the social democrats. Small and medium sized industrial towns of Northern Sweden and central regions are the core constituencies of social democrats. In fact, SAP's strategy as early as the 1950s was confined to the coverage of a wider electorate beyond the blue-collar workers. The social

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[55] Anders Widfelt,"Electoral Behaviour in Sweden". Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Election Guide 1998.* August 18,1998,3.
[56] Ibid., 3.
[57] Kitschelt , *The Transformation,47-48.*
[58]Widfelt, "Electoral Behaviour in Sweden",4.

democrats in Sweden increasingly attempted to appeal to the masses as the party of not only of the blue-collars, but the party of "all wage earners and the mutual interests linking manual with white-collar workers" as well.[59] Owing to that, while 24 % of the middle-class voted for SAP in 1956, the respective figure rose to 35 % by 1988. However, inasmuch as the traditional electoral base of SAP is concerned, a relative decline of working class votes was being observed from 1950s to 1990s. As for 1990s, volatility within the SAP support, like observed in France, was becoming perceivable.[60]

As of 1998, despite the existence of a relatively successful Green Party, the traditional left/right continuum still tends to dominate the Swedish electorate. However, SAP seems to have lost some of its support to the Left Party and to the Greens recently, due largely to the welfare and public sector cuts since 1994. The Party's traditional support base is still in the industrial working class. The SAP also relies overwhelmingly on public sector employees. In the recent years, social democratic support appears to be increasing within the middle-classes as well. All in all, it became clear that Party identification in Sweden is being gradually declined. While in 1960s almost two-thirds of the electorate had some level of sympathy or identification with a political party; the respective figure for 1994 decreased to less than 50 %; which implies, by and large, that voters in Sweden are also becoming more volatile than ever observed before.[61]

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[59] David Arter, "The War of the Roses: Conflict and Cohesion in the Swedish Social Democratic Party". In *Conflict and Cohesion in Social Democratic Parties*, eds. David S.Bell and Eric Shaw, 70-95. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 75.
[60] Ibid., 75.
[61] Widfelt,"Electoral Behaviour in Sweden", 4.

Table 5.

Working Class Support for SAP in the Post-Second World War Period	
Years	**% of Working Class Voting for SAP**
1956	72
1988	65
1991	50

Source: Arter , "The War Of the Roses", 76.

Thereupon, the basic motifs within the social composition of the electoral support for the social democratic parties in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden have been put together throughout the above analysis. Foremost in this context is an increasing tendency for volatility in the electoral behaviour in these polities. Yet, a relatively stable support for social democrats from the traditional blue-collar workers can still be observed. Despite the fact that there has been numerical erosion in the size of the manual workers; their affiliation to social democratic parties nevertheless, remained almost downright. Besides, the social democratic parties covered within the scope of this research have effectively recruited the support of the middle-classes as well. In that respect, they have been able to broaden their social basis of support, to offset to some extent, the electoral trade-off stemming from the contraction of the size of the blue-collar workers.

2.4. Strategy: Towards *Volkspartei*

Whereas socialism of the 1800s aimed at conquering political power by means of a revolution, institutionalisation of universal suffrage at the turn of the century paved the way for the parliamentary option for achieving that end. Therefrom, the basic tactical dilemma for socialists has been whether or not adopting a purely class-based electoral

appeal. Once commitment to the rules of the electoral game was made, the socialists could no longer confine their strategy to winning the votes of workers only, but the wider masses including in particular the peasantry and the petite bourgeoisie, as well. With this regard, Bernstein had long claimed that the SAD (former SPD) had to be a *Volkspartei.*[62] The small farmers, therefore, had been the first strategic target determined by socialist parties, and the agrarian question lay at the heart of the Western European socialist agenda since then. In that respect, the French socialists had adopted an agricultural program, as early as 1892, for the protection of small farmers, which was followed by other socialist parties around Europe.[63] That implied, however, a further dilemma stemming from the fact that offering protection to small farmers inevitably converged with defending private property; a strategic choice that thoroughly fell into contradiction with perennial socialist aims. For the rest of the society, hardly any elaborate recruitment strategy has been pursued, and most socialist parties referred to the craftsmen, artisans and small merchants as the "oppressed, the poor or the exploited".[64] Indeed, the party strategies since then reflected not only the numerical evolution of the class structure, but also the fluid political cleavages and the collateral voter realignments in Europe.[65] Thence, with the decline of class voting especially in the aftermath of the Second World War, an increasing share of the electorate have become sensitive to the "explicit political messages and appeals issued by parties in the competitive game".[66]

Having come into terms with the democratic order and with the fundamentals of the market economy, the strategies of the social democratic parties covered in this study were confined

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[62]Roger Fletcher, *Bernstein to Brandt: A Short History of German Social Democracy.* (London: Edward Arnold, 1987), 169.
[63]Przeworski and Sprague, *Paper Stones*, 42.
[64] Ibid.,42
[65]ibid.,44; and Kitschelt , *The Transformation,124* .
[66] Kitschelt , *The Transformation,112.*

basically to the maintenance of mass party images with broad-based appeals, in the post-1945 period. These sister parties contributed significantly to the re-structuring of their respective countries' social and economic orders; and resorted to Keynesian measures within the framework of efforts for the establishment of welfare states in the decades following the War. The making of Western Europe, therefore, seems to owe much to the social democratic reign of the 1960s and the following decade. Nevertheless, as the conventional left/right continuum was becoming complemented by the fresh political cleavages arising during the 1980s, the social democratic parties within the scope of this study faced considerable electoral challenges posed by the left-libertarian wing of the new politics. Furthermore, was the rise of global markets within the revival of monetarism at the expense of Keynesian welfare state in the 1980s.

The strategic responses given by social democrats to the political paradigm of the 1980s revealed some divergences, due largely to the differing patterns within the political competition in their respective countries. While, for instance, left-libertarian mobilisation appeared to be relatively unassuming and parties faced a strong centripetal pull toward the pivot of the party system in France and in Britain; the Greens in Germany had already become the rising star of the party system by 1983. Thence, inasmuch as the German Green party constituted the main thrust behind the strategic shift of the SPD towards new-left, the French and British ecologists failed, by and large, to build a genuine libertarian "alternative left" and preferred to adopt single-issue appeals to the environmental question. Outstandingly in France, the PS had to compete with the Communists, instead of the Ecologists. In Britain, the absence of a credible left-libertarian or a communist competitor made such a strategy unnecessary, at least till early 1990s. On the contrary, British Labour Party opted to turn to old-style socialist appeals in the 1983 election program. As for Sweden, the social democrats faced a less-mobilised left-libertarian electorate, hence adopted a more conciliatory strategy

in electoral terms. Yet, the relatively higher number of centrist parties in Sweden, prompted the SAP towards a more new-left position in the late 1980s, for the sake of a vote maximisation strategy.[67]

Germany's case is self-explanatory in this framework. As already noted elsewhere, the centrist tendency observed in West German politics in the aftermath of the Second World War had thoroughly helped to reinforce the status of Christian Democracy as the unchallenged governmental power from 1945 to 1960s. The strategic choice of the SPD in this period, as can be expected, was confined to the consolidation of the Party's image as a centrist *Volkspartei* that aimed to improve the lot of the underprivileged. The 1959 *Bad Godesberger Program,* as touched before, was the clear manifestation of SPD's shift from democratic socialism towards centre-right. The party strategy pursued as such, and the dominance of the right remained almost unchallenged till the 1970s. Intra-party strategy, therefrom, required that the party administration established firm relations with right-wing trade unionists in the *Bundestag* and with other centre-right groups such as the *Godesberger Circle* outside the Parliament, mainly to consolidate the ideological transformation put forth by the *Bad Godesberger Program.*[68]

SPD remained largely prudential towards left-libertarian feminist, ecologist and pacifist issues, till the penetration of the new-left into the party through its youth organisations. While *Brandt*'s leadership opened up new prospects for SPD's grand strategy, in terms of incorporating left-libertarian currents into the party administration, it was only after the fall of *Schmidt* government in 1982 and the concurrent rise of the Green Party that the German

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[67] Ibid., 170-178.

[68] .Stephen Padgett,"The German Social Democratic Party: between Old and New Left". In *Conflict and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties*, eds. David S.Bell and Eric Shaw, 10-30. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 12-13.

social democrats were prompted to resort to the new-left strategies in order to retrieve their electoral trade-offs. In the 1983 election campaign, the party shifted its strategy from security and economic growth to peace and ecology issues. As can be expected, this strategy helped to retrieve in 1983 and 1987 elections some of the electorate that had turned towards the Green Party. Nevertheless, while the West German "Left Alliance" comprising of the Greens and the social democrats continued to strengthen as such, Green votes were observed to increase, indeed, at the expense of the SPD in this period.[69] The SPD, therefrom, ran on a stronger left-libertarian appeal to the electorate between 1987 and 1990, in order to compete especially with the Green challenge. Although the Green Party proved itself as a viable third party casting 7.3 % in unified Germany in 1994 elections; a re-alignment of German voters among established parties such as the SPD and the CDU was observed that year.[70]

Shortly before the elections, the SPD leader *Oscar Lafontaine* declared on 19 September 1998[71], the Party's "Program for the First 100 Days". Similar to the British Labour Party election manifesto of 1997, the SPD Program called for a "Third Way" beyond either left or right. On the one hand, a likely coalition with the Greens, as indicated in the opinion polls,[72] was tried to be secured through vigorous emphasis on environmental protection. Most significant in this framework was a clear recoil from commitment to nuclear energy, by declaring that nuclear technology should but be phased out within 30-35 years; instead of which renewable energy resources should be promoted. On the other hand, the 16 year-long *Kohl* government was severely criticised, by stating that the social rights such as pension

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[69] While the SPD lost some 600000 votes to the Green Party in 1987 elections, the left-libertarian strategy pursued since then helped to regain the almost same amount of votes back from the Greens in 1990. (H. Kitschelt , *The Transformation, 166-167.*

[70] American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, "Super Election Year 1994 Reports No: X(I)" (The Johns Hopkins University),11.

[71] Die Welt, (September 20, 1998)

[72] The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, "Analysis: Election year 1998", (October 13, 1998).

wages and sickness payments that had been cut down during the *Kohl* period would be granted back. With that regard, the social democrats also declared that they would re-arrange the sacking process that had been simplified during the *Kohl* government. The SPD, therefore, strategically appealed both to the trade unions and to the industrial entrepreneurs, and called for a consensus between them. In this respect, the big industrial entrepreneurs were called to invest on technology based renovation to create new employment opportunities; while trade unions were invited to voluntary cut-backs on wage increases. As such, SPD polled 40.9 % of the total votes, winning 298 seats; and the Greens with 6.7 % that granted them 47 seats in September 1998 *Bundestag* elections. [73]



Figure 2.

Source: -Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.v. Mannheim, "Wahlergebnis 1990", November 1994
-American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, "Super Election Year 1994 Reports No: X (I): 5
-Die Zeit, 19.9.1998

Unlike German social democrats, the French Socialist Party, strategically, had to compete with the Communists instead of the ecologists, and has adopted *étatist* policies till recently.

[73] Die Welt(September 29, 1998)

As mentioned elsewhere in this study, the French version of abandoning orthodoxly socialist strategies came later than its counterpart in Germany. Bearing governmental responsibilities during the Fourth Republic, the PS had taken active roles in the nationalisation of some key economic enterprises. Establishment of a comprehensive social security system was among the socialists' achievements. Due largely to the communist competition, on the other hand, the socialists gradually yielded power, till *Mitterand's* leadership in 1971. As the Communists' charismatic role in the resistance movement had thoroughly helped the ascent of this party in the immediate post-war years; and they were invited by De Gaulle to participate in the government. The PCF's popularity stood in sharp contrast to the German Communist Party (KPD) who remained a radical force in German politics in the *Weimar* Republic. In addition, the Socialists had not been able to identify themselves with contemporary social democracy like the SPD of Germany, nor there was any programmatic renewal complying with the post-war conjuncture, such as the one done in *Bad Godesberg* in 1959.



Figure 3.

Source: -VTCOM. Election Presidentielle 95
-Le Monde (June 5, 1997)

The presidential elections of 1981 has been a watershed within this framework; in that *Mitterand* polled nearly 10% more than *Marchais*, the Communist candidate, in the first ballot. Vote transfers from the PCF supporters to *Mitterand* in the second ballot, marked the result in favour of the Socialists in this decisive election.[74] Communist domination of the left in France gradually declined in favour of the PS from then on. The socialists' electoral performance was confirmed in the legislative elections in June the same year, through which the PS obtained an absolute majority within the National Assembly, and Socialist domination remained intact till 1988. During this period, the PS acquired the image of a "*responsible party of government*"[75]. Among the achievements of the socialist government was firstly an extensive nationalisation of key enterprises such as privately owned big banks, *Générale d'Electricité* (The Electricity Board of France), telecommunications, aeronautics, steel and armaments, resulting in relative modernisation and re-structuring of these sectors. As regards achievements in the social sphere, were, decentralisation of power to elected bodies, the introduction of measures pertaining to the improvement of working conditions and of wages, re-distribution wealth in a relatively fairer manner and a re-adjustment of taxation at the expense of the richer. Implication of these attempts, however, has been a substantial increase in public expenditures, which in turn resulted in slower growth rates and in higher unemployment in the second half of the 1980s.[76]

1986 Legislative Elections signalled the beginning of the end for Socialist reign in France. *Personalised factionalism* [77] particularly around leadership, rather than on strategy or ideology, has become a prominent feature of the PS in the post-1986 period, with *Michel*

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[74] Jacobs, *Western European*, 90.
[75] Alistair Cole, "The Evolution of the Party System, 1974-1990". In *French Political Parties in Transition*, ed. Alistair Cole, 3-23.(Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990),10.
[76] John Gaffney, "The Emergence of a Presidential Party: The Socialist Party". In *French Political Parties in Transition*, ed. Alistair Cole, 61-90. (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990), 67-69.
[77] Ibid., 73.

Rocard challenging *Mitterand*'s post in the party. Briefed through opinion polls on the likely success of the right in the coming elections, *Mitterand*, on the other hand, tactically replaced the second ballot majority system with proportional representation, with a view to obstruct in advance, a centre-right victory.[78] All in all, the right alliance polled nearly 41% of the votes (276 seats) in 1986 elections, albeit falling short of a clear majority; whereas there would have been otherwise under the previous system.[79] A period of *cohabitation*, as stated elsewhere, started between the socialist president and a conservative government. *Jacques Chirac* as Prime Minister of the cohabitation, reversed the nationalisation programme and endeavoured to carry out a privatisation process from 1986 onward. *Chirac* also eliminated the proportional representation and returned to the two-ballot majority system.

Backing green and communist votes to a large extent,[80] socialist victory in presidential elections was repeated in 1988, with *Mitterand* elected for a second term. The PS gained 276 seats with an overall score of 37.5% in the legislative elections the same year; however, the socialists still were 12 seats short of an absolute majority. *Mitterand* appointed his rival *Rocard* as Prime Minister, who governed with a relative majority only. Despite the fact that the *Rocard* government has been more or less a stable one, personal factionalism continued within the PS, undermining largely the party's image as a power on the left of centre. Continuing unemployment and public sector deficits further added to the misfortunes of the socialist performance in the post-1988 period. Equally important for the PS was the fact that the party has not been able to develop an alternative discourse to fit the realities of the coming decades; which in turn, resulted in a complete failure in 1993 Legislative Elections and in *Chirac*'s presidency in 1995. While it was confirmed that the PCF remained a small force in

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[78] Cole , "The Evolution of the Party System, 1974-1990", 12.
[79] Jacobs, *Western European*, 93.
[80] Cole , "The Evolution of the Party System, 1974-1990", 15.

French politics, and that the PS was the "Party" of the centre-left, the Socialists entered the 1990s with *"an ideological draining"*, as stated in a scholarly comment.[81]

Equally important for French politics in the 1990s is the fact that the centre-right coalition lead by *Alain Juppé* since 1995 has largely failed to realise its promise of cutting taxes down and of decreasing unemployment. The *Juppé* government has been blamed for the unemployment rate of 12.8%, which is, by and large the highest figure for any leading industrial country. 1997 general elections, however, provided the socialists with another chance for government, in which the left alliance acquired 319 seats in the 577 member Parliament. This score, which is by no means attributable to the PS only, has been achieved through an alliance established among the socialists, the communists, the ecologists and other left. This phenomenon has been interpreted as the French electorate's response particularly to the rising unemployment in the recent years. Nonetheless, a comparison of seats in the 1993 and 1997 parliaments reveals that the left alliance has considerably increased its share of total seats, when compared to the right.

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[81] Gaffney, "The Emergence of a Presidential Party" 81.



Figure 4.
Source: -Gaffney, "The Emergence", 66.
-VTCOM, "Election Présidentielle 95": Retour/Up
-Le Monde, "Legislatives 97"

In Britain, the Labour Party seemed to adhere to its traditional strategy around a set of core social democratic values till the late 1970s. Having participated in the war-time coalition of 1940, and governing with majority from 1945 to 1951; the LP's locus of strategy lay on macro-economic management along Keynesian lines and on commitment to welfare benefits; as noted before in the section on ideology. While nationalisation of key economic sectors and planned growth remained at the heart of Labour strategy, the LP endeavoured to broaden its appeal as a mass party of the wider electorate, covering the other sections of the society , as well as the working class. Labour's strategy, as such, continued till the emergence of the oil syndrome and the accompanying economic recession of the 1970s. Labour governments responded basically with cutting back on public expenditures.

The official break of the LP away from strict *Keynesianism* was declared in 1976 Party Conference by stating that "the option of guaranteeing full employment no longer existed".[82] The implication of the new conjuncture for the LP has been such that the intra-party consensus on basic social democratic values dissolved, and the "post-war common ground was deserted by both left and right" within the LP.[83] The new left, on the other hand, was penetrating into the Party in the same period: the Party's route in the early 1980s was driven by factional forces, and the period between 1979-1983 is called by some as *Labour's civil war*.[84]

By the early 1990s, the LP still did not seem to cope with changing voter alignments and with the needs of the rising market economy competently. Ideologically, the Party hardly achieved anything further than "suboptimal positions ranging from a defence of *Keynesian* welfare state to traditional socialist ideas about workers' empowerment and income distribution"[85] hence, could not successfully incorporate any new left themes to its programme. Nevertheless, the fourth successive election defeat in 1992 propelled changes both in Party leadership and in ideological position. From that year onward, the Party took solid steps in rendering its rather old-fashioned slogans and in appearing with a highly novel discourse, in particular under the leadership of its new leader, *Tony Blair.*

The implications of *Blair's* leadership for the LP has been such that, firstly the traditional image of Labour within the British society was thoroughly renewed, particularly in terms of economic policy. As stated in the Election Manifesto:

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[82] Padgett, "Social Democracy in Power", 112.
[83] Eric Shaw, "Conflict and Cohesion in the British Labour Party". In *Conflict and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties*, eds. David S. Bell and Eric Shaw, 151-167. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 153.
[84] Ibid., 159.
[85] Kitschelt , *The Transformation, 261.*

> "A new centre and centre-left politics. In each area of policy a new and distinctive approach has been mapped out, one that differs both from the solutions of the old left and those of the Conservatives....The old left would have sought state control of industry. The conservative right is content to leave all to the market. We reject both approaches. Government and industry must work together to achieve key objectives aimed at enhancing the dynamism of the market, not undermining it...In economic management, we accept the global economy as a reality and reject the isolationism and 'go-it-alone' policies of the extremes of right or left." [86]

Second, although Labour persistently emphasised its position as the party of the deprived, it went on to adopt a perennial Conservative theme, the "greatness" of the British nation, and the need for unity.[87]As such, the renewed Labour seemed to employ relatively more pragmatic slogans, and emphasised that "it was not of outdated ideology", and that "what counted was what worked".[88] Third, and associated with the former is the fact that Labour seemed to hold on to key Conservative strategies such as taxation and law and order. In this context, while on the one hand the shadow chancellor *Gordon Brown* promised in early 1997 not to raise income tax rates; on the other hand, the Labour's soft image in terms of law and order was gradually reversed by the shadow home secretary.[89] Labour also adopted a firm stand on critical societal matters such as the "National Health Service (NHS)", education, unemployment, pensions and welfare benefits; and promised improvements in all. Key issues such as environment, transportation and new technologies have been also thoroughly dealt with in the Election Manifesto. Labour's changing image was reflected in the European problematic also; coming up with clearly formulated strategies, the LP seemed more pro-European than the old Labour had been. In this respect, although the Labour policy on the single currency remains dubious, the Party appears as committed to restoring Britain's

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[86] Labour Party. *Election Manifesto.*, 2.
[87] Ibid., 1.
[88] Ibid., 3.
[89]Ewen MacAskill,"Labour". *The Guardian General Election Site.*(May 3, 1997)

declining influence within the European Union (EU).[90] Equally important is the fact that LP's promise in the election campaign on introducing a Parliament for Scotland was realised, as the Scottish people voted in favour of this issue in September 1997.



Figure 5.

Source: -Jacobs, *Western European*, 379.
-The Daily Telegraph. (May 3, 1997).

Unlike Germany and France where social democrats had to compete either with the ecologists or the communists; social democracy in Sweden did not happen to come across a vigorously mobilised left-libertarian electorate. The SAP, thereupon, did not have to pursue a strategy devised to combat either the new-left or the communist challenge, as observed in those polities. As the SAP's hegemonic status in the centre remained intact for several decades; Swedish social democrats were not urged, like the Germans, to respond to the rising new-left and free market issues promptly. Indeed, it has been the Communists in Sweden, to incorporate left-libertarian values into their electoral strategy, as early as 1970. Initiatives

[90] The Economist, "MORI New Government Poll". (March 3, 1997).

towards the rising new agenda within the SAP were observed only after losing government between 1976 and 1982.

Just as the SAP was prompted to shift towards more market values as such, the labour unions' demands for the introduction of wage earners' fund, for the distribution of wealth and gradually socialising industry, jeopardised considerably the social democratic strategy; in that the labour union demand fell into thorough contradiction with the fresh route that the party had embarked on.[91] All in all, the tradition of social democracy required that turning a deaf ear to workers' demands was almost impossible. In that respect, social democrats continued to pursue a strategy based on economic performance and enhancement of welfare measures. It has been only before the 1988 election campaign that SAP strategically focused on ecology, nuclear power and libertarianism towards the adoption of new-left values.[92]

Indeed, the 1978 wage earner scheme adopted by the SAP and the traditional socialist value based program of the British labour Party (1973) had both indicated recoil from the embourgeoisement trend observed in the social democratic milieu of those years. Whilst there has been a moderation of traditional socialist agenda in the 1950s and 1960s, as in Germany; Britain and Sweden slightly diverged from this trend and aimed at a re-radicalisation process in the 1970s.[93] Actually, the very basic tenet of SAP strategy in the long years of government has been the maintenance of secure public finances and the collateral transfer of resources to continuous expansion of welfare measures. In that respect, social democratic effort at the realisation of full employment, the traditional macro-economic tool that lay at the heart of Keynesian policy, remained intact in Sweden so far; while for instance, the British LP overtly

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[91] Malcolm B.Hamilton, *Democratic Socialism in Britain and Sweden.* (London: The MacMillan Press, 1989), 203.
[92] Kitschelt , *The Transformation,* 171-172.
[93] Hamilton, *Democratic Socialism,* 222

renounced in 1976 that "the option of guaranteeing full employment no longer existed".[94] Hence, the struggle against unemployment has been the locus of social democratic strategy in Sweden for more than half a century. The basic means for achieving that end has been the fact that social democracy in Sweden has always managed to be a broad popular based movement since the 1930s. Indeed, the fact that the overwhelming agrarian Swedish society at the turn of the century was successfully transformed into an industrial welfare state, unequivocally owes to the persistent social democratic strategy of commitment to full employment. As held elsewhere in this study, social democracy as the hegemonic power in the centre for decades developed almost as a cultural phenomenon in Sweden; that in turn institutionalised a broadly based popular movement dependant on participation and cooperation with the wider sections of the society through its grass-root organisation.

In the light of the above findings on the strategic positions of the social democratic parties in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden; it becomes clear that strategy is founded on the path that ideology has followed. As shall be elaborated in due course, strategy also goes collateral with the social basis of support targeted by the parties. In this respect, whereas the strategic stances of these parties were directed especially at the working class before the Second World War; the electoral appeal during the post-1945 period was enlarged to cover a wider section of the society. The blueprints of social democratic strategy in the aftermath of the Second World War, therefore, has been the evolutionary procedure towards institutionalisation as mass parties. With this regard, class-politics was largely abandoned during this period.

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[94] Padgett, "Social Democracy in Power ", 112.



Figure 6.

Source: - Jacobs, *Western European*, 622.
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs, "Swedish Election Guide 1998", 21.9.1998

2.5. Organisation: Trade-Unionism and Intra-Party Democracy

The four social democratic parties covered in this study divulge, by and large, firmly institutionalised organisational schemes. All four of them have been in organic relationship with trade unions in their respective countries, hence established well-organised political links with the leaders of the working masses, most significant in Britain and in Sweden. In the latter, grass-root organisation has also been a long established tradition since the turn of the twentieth century. Affiliated and subsidiary organisations such as women and youth branches have been a common phenomenon of these parties. In this context, the German and French social democratic parties reveal a slightly different pattern, in that their organisational structure appear to be more hierarchical when compared to those in Britain and in Sweden. The SPD, for instance, has been a solidly hierarchical organisation till the 1980s, in which a central top-down power in control of the Party mechanism was well established.

In its capacity as the locus of decision-making procedure, the top Party leadership enjoys a high degree of autonomy in Germany. Effective power is centred on the Party elite through "the *Praesidium*", "the Executive" and "the Parliamentary Party leadership. Balance of power in the SPD has always shifted towards the members of Federal and Land governments, literally the Parliamentary Party, which is not always rooted in the Party at large. Though heterogenous in political composition, the Party elite has been able to maintain the support of the powerful *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund:DGB* (German Trade Union) leadership at its disposal. The twenty-two *Bezirk* (district) organisations of the SPD come after the central party elite, as the second power holder. Their role is important, in the sense that they elect delegates to the national party congress and, select candidates for *Bundestag* elections.

In France, at the top of the party apparatus is the leadership comprising of the National Secretariat, the "Directing Committee" and the "Executive Committee", which are elected in the Party congresses held in every two years. Organisationally, the PS seems to be displaying a rather pluralistic character, as various rival attitudes or ideas within the Party has been actively involved in the making of party policies, ever since the Party's creation. The Party was almost badly divided as early as the late 1880s, which continued till the unification of factions in 1905 to form the SFIO and, factionalism continued till 1969, the founding date of the new PS. In this respect, the French Socialist Party reveals slightly different patterns than the SPD in Germany; as no significant factions were observed in the latter, at least till the 1970s. In the post-1969 French Socialist Party, intra-party fights could be handled by the installation of proportional representation in the election of the Party apparatus. Such currents within the Party henceforth, have been able to be represented in the national congresses, in particular through the submission of resolutions by each current's adherents, for the selection of the Party management, on the basis of proportional representation.

These resolutions are published and debated by the Party members before they are voted. Local Party managements are elected on the basis of these resolutions, and candidates for "Directing Committee" membership require a minimum of 5 % of the votes in the elections. The 131 elected members of the Directing Committee, then elect the First Secretary, the Executive Committee (27 members) and the National Secretariat. The National Secretariat is the top power holder in the Party management, which comprises of secretarial posts such as the ones responsible from finance, elections, information and education. The secretarial posts all together are key positions in the Party leadership, after the First Secretary.

Party leadership play key roles also in Britain and in Sweden. In the former, the Party leader and his deputy are chosen by an Electoral College whose members are drawn from trade unions (40 %), from the Parliamentary Party (30 %) and from the constituencies (30 %). Before 1981, the power for leadership elections was vested in the Parliamentary Party alone. The constituencies choose candidates for the Parliament, and when in opposition, the Parliamentary group holds a shadow cabinet election, as a measure of popularity test among the members of the Parliament.[95] As there is no state funding for political parties in Britain, the Party's finance is largely supplied from the affiliated trade unions and from Party membership fees. Nevertheless, the new Party organisation under Tony Blair's leadership seems to imply a considerable tendency towards centralisation. With a view to avoid internal strife within the Party as observed between 1979-1983; the top management introduced tougher disciplinary codes for members.[96]

Emerging as a genuine product of trade unionism, party leadership in Sweden used to reveal a more grassroots character, when compared particularly to Germany and to France. In the

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[95] Jacobs, "*Western European Political Parties*",391.
[96] Ewen MacAskill,"Labour". *The Guardian General Election Site.* The Guardian, (May 3,1997).

earlier years of SAP at the top of the party hierarchy was the executive, comprising of 23 members and a party secretary. Owing to SAP's competent organisation from "bottom to top", the labour communes participated not only in active party politics but in cultural and social activities as well; which won, in turn, a steady enlargement as regards membership to the SAP. Equally important in this connection, were the subsidiary party organs such as youth and women's branches, which had been organised as early as 1892. These subsidiary organs further contributed to mobilising mass support for the SAP; 1911 *Riksdag* election success, has been atttribuited, by and large,to the efficient functioning of the youth groups of the party. [97] With the impacts of the mass media from 1960s onward, party organisation seemed to incline towards professionalisation and bureaucratisation, as the role of the national party leadership was emphasised. Information and investigation capacities of leadership had to be further developed, and the office of leadership was more exposed to wider masses, than before.

Insofar as extra-parliamentary party organisation is concerned, solidarity with local organisations and affiliated branches has always played key roles in four of the social democratic parties covered in this study. That posed, nonetheless, challenges to the cohesion of the party, and at times even the leadership, most prominent in the SPD. In Germany, the two immediate post-war years, indeed, saw no major factionalism in the SPD, mainly due to the dominance of right in the Party and to the conflict managing ability of leadership. The challenge of the left in SPD started in the 1970s through the youth organisations, and gradually penetrated into the Party at large, to become influential by mid-1980s, to which the Party leadership and the right wing initially resisted. The main political platform of the SPD left has been the Party's *Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund:SDS* (auxiliary student

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[97] Iibid.,111.

organisation), among whose members many were sympathetic to the *Frankfurt School*[98]. The Party leadership perceived the SDS as an interference to the centrist image that has been created since the *Bad Godesberg* Programme, as the SDS was known be hostile to the *Bad Godesberg* Programme and to the coalition with the Christian Democrats. SPD strategy in combating the left challenge included the withdrawal of financial support from the SDS and the expulsion of its leaders from the Party.

The rising new left however, posed an other and a more serious question to the SPD leadership, in the sense that new left was already permeating the Party at large, particularly through the youth organisation, *JUSO*. Following a series of conflicts over the Party's ideological affiliation, the *etante* was cooled down with Brandt's intervention in favour of the left, that came rather as a response to the 1968 *Landtag* election defeat. From then on, the new left has been able to reach an increased representation within the SPD, and its representatives were invited by *H. Schmidt* to participate in the preparation of a new Party Programme. The draft came out to be a reform oriented one, and the procedure of integrating the new left leaders to the Party continued in *Schmidt*'s Chancellorship after 1974.

In that respect, the district organisations of the SPD have been dominated by the right wing of the Party till the 1980s. The left was relatively weak in the district organisations, with the exception of cities such as Berlin, *Frankfurt* and *Munich*. The left was also under-represented in the Party congresses and in the Parliament, mainly due to the weak support it received from the districts organisation. The Party right was organised in the Parliament through right wing trade union members known as *Kanalarbeiter*, which had formed an alliance with the *H-J Vogel Circle*, a Parliamentary group comprising of middle-class professionals and academics.

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[98] Frankfurt school

The extra-Parliamentary Party right was also organised, with the name as the *Godesberger Circle.*[99]

Trade union support which has been an indispensable feature of the organisational aspect of the SPD started to weaken by early 1980s, as a response to the breakdown of Keynesian economic policy, and the rising unemployment in Germany, as almost elsewhere in the Continent. Labour movement protests against the 1981 and 1982 Federal Budgets resulted in the break-up of the social-liberal coalition and another dilemma within the SPD started to accelerate; one between the old and new left. The organisational and ideological fluctuations from then on rendered the once disciplined and centralised SPD a socially heterogenous and organisationally pluralistic party, the implication of which was a decline in the Party's traditional working-class membership.[100]

In Britain, The organisation of the extra-Parliamentary Party comprises of three different layers including the national level, the district level and the constituency party. The latter is the core unit of Labour through which the grass-root support for the Party is organised by means of a general committee consisting of delegates from the affiliated organisations. The Labour maintains organic relationship with trade unions and incorporates them in the Party work via the committee, together with the affiliated bodies such as the socialist society, the co-operative party branches and the units providing for individual participation. Two or more constituencies make together the district level organisation.

The LP is organised in Party Conferences at national level, and conferences are held each year to which the delegates are elected at the constituency level. There are delegates for the

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[99] Padgett, "The German Social Democratic Party",12-13.
[100] Ibıt., 14-24.

affiliated bodies and one constituency delegate for each 5000 member. Trade union delegates usually enjoy a weighty position in Labour Conferences. Two-thirds majority is necessary for a resolution to pass at the Party Conference. The Party Conference also elects the National Executive Committee (NEC) comprising of twelve representatives from the trade unions, seven from the constituencies, five from the women's section, one from the socialist societies and one from the youth organisations. The NEC holds a powerful position within the LP, together with the Party leadership.

Insofar as Sweden is concerned, the fundamentals of organisation of social democratic party stretches back to the establishment of SAP's origin in 1881, literally to the local socialist clubs and trade unions. The central party organisation, at that time, served as the central trade union organisation until the creation of *Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO)* in 1889. A remarkable aspect of early Swedish labour movement was that its adherents were drawn from the same people, as both party members and trade unionists.[101] The foundation and development of the SAP, in fact, is firmly anchored in labour movement in Sweden; as the LO and the SAP have been referred to as respectively the "union branch" and the "political branch" of the same endeavour, complying one another. Union-party affiliation, therefore, has been the trademark of Swedish social democracy *ab initio*. That SAP's first leader *Hjalmar Branting* drew attention in 1898 to the "task of making the Swedish labour union movement "one" with Swedish Social Democracy and into a power "that will weigh even more than at present, on the political and social scales of society"[102] appears as characteristic in this context.

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[101] Villy Bergström, "Party Program and Economic Policy: The Social Democrats in Government" in: Misgeld K. et al (ed), 1992, 131.

[102] Gullan Gidlund, "From Popular Movement to Political Party: Developments of the Social Democratic Labor Party Organization" in: Misgeld K. et al (ed), 1992, 106.

Emerging as a genuine product of labour movement, the SAP maintained an unbroken organic relationship with the Landsorganisation:LO (Confederation of Swedish Trade Unions), and remained firmly anchored in trade unionism. Initially, collective affiliation of the LO members to the party was introduced as obligatory, which, by 1908, was transformed into granting the individual members of an affiliated union the reservation to obstain from affiliation to the SAP.[103] The party comprised of *arbetarekommunen* (local labour communes) at the base, whose number reached around 80, at the turn of the century. Extra-parliamentary party activities were held in these labour communes, and the SAP was originally organised into three regional districts, namely Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo. In 1910, the three party districts were enlarged to meet each constituency. The party executive was assisted by these disticts. The district (constituency) organisations were further developed into an extensive network of representatives in rural parishes from 1911 onward. By 1911, the district level organisation was abolished as a result of rapid growth, and the labour communes were re-organised to report directly to the party executive.

The *union branch* and the *political branch* of the Swedish labour movement made together political mobilisation of the masses a success story. While financing comes mainly from membership fees, from the national subsidy to the parties represented in the *Riksdag* (as provided from 1965 onward) and from the social democratic press; SAP has been able to mobilise sizeable funds from the LO for occasional budgetary concerns: 90% of the election campaign in the 1950s has been subsidised by trade unions.[104] Unlike other parties which apply to individual voluntary contributions, therefore, the SAP turn to the trade unions, in times of budgetary difficulties.

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[103] Ibid.,105-107.
[104] Ibid., 108.

Trade union-party solidarity appears, at the same time, as an integral element of the grass-root structure of Swedish social democracy, in the form of work-place organisations. These units, each comprising of a Party representative responsible from 25 workers, contribute not only to political mobilisation of the wider section of the society, but at the same time to long term opinion formation within the party. Work-place organisations report to the union committees which exist in each labour commune and party district. By mid-1980s, there were nearly 100000 Party Representatives within the country. Above work-place organisatons are, Social Democratic Union Clubs, consisting of LO and white-collar union members and the work-place organisations. Number of the politically active union clubs has been recorded as around 450 by 1980s. A network of local information groups is also active, whose responsibility is the follow-up of national and local politics. As of 1998, there are 2700 local Party Associations.[105]

Alongwith the tradition of trade unionism, intra-party democracy has also been a significant feature of Swedish social democrats. The long established tradition of participatory decision making procedure was given a further impetus by the 1960s, through the establishment of a system of consultative surveys. That aimed at engaging party supporters and trade union members in discussions on a broad front about future party policies. Since then, consultative surveys have been extensively used by the party management for several political issues. These surveys comprise of well planned questionnaires distributed to households. Widely circulated for receiving comments from the electorate on current political issues, these surveys contributed to policy-making within the party and to mass mobilisation within the country. While the1967 survey on economic policy covered 25000 party members, the 1969

[105] Swedish Social Democratic Party, "The Sweedish Social Democratic Movement Today", Socialdemokraterna, October 1, 1998.

survey on taxation policy surfaced 40000 participants. The following 1974 survey on energy policy, and the 1978 survey on Wage Earners' Funds incorporated respectively 44000 and 65000 participants nationwide.[106]

The SAP has 240000 members of which, 41 % are women, as of 1998.[107] The "from the bottom to the top" organisation of the SAP is such that, the Party members may become active in terms of participation in decision making, largely through the Local Party Organisations. These associations are independent parts of the Party, and can express their opinions in internal meetings, studies and other grass-root activities. Most Party Associations carry out their activities in a limited geographical area or at a work-place often in cooperation with a trade-union. At the municipal level are the Municipal Party Organisations (Workers Commune) that determine the Party's political program for the municipality. All Social Democratic Associations within a Municipality are members of the Municipal Party Organisation which supports the Associations in their activities and which has the primary responsibility for the planning of different election campaigns in the local community.

At the top of the Municipal Party Organisation is the "County Council" governed by a County Council Meeting that refers to the County Parliament. Members of the County Council are elected in general elections held at the same time with the regular elections to municipal councils and to the Parliament in every four years. Covering the County Area and at regional level is the Party District Organisation to which, Municipal Organisations are members. The District Organisation chooses the candidates for the parliamentary and for the

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[106] Gidlund, "From Popular Movement to Political Party"119-125.
[107] Swedish Social Democratic Party, "Our Organisation", 1.

County Council Lists. The Party District Organisation also elects delegates to the Party Congress.[108]

Depending on the above analysis of the organisational framework of the social democratic parties in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden; the concluding remarks may appear such that grass-roots structure and intra-party democracy are essential features of organisation in these parties. Furthermore, solidarity and organic relations with trade unions is another significant attribute of organisation; a tradition that has its origins in the formative years of the parties covered in this study.

2.6. Main Profile of Western European Social Democracy: Evolution from Revolution

Sketching a lucid profile of Western European social democracy does not emerge as an easy task, nor is it possible to find a tailor-made pattern for individual national experiences of different countries in social democratic politics. Although Western European states are founded on a common historical legacy, the various regional socio-economic and cultural differences inherent within the process of political development have implied some diverse parameters for the emergence of nation-states in Europe. In that respect, whilst the cement binding together the array various polities in Western Europe during industrialisation has been the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law; formation of basic socio-economic cleavages from among which, modern political parties have emerged, revealed some disparities between nations. Nevertheless, the framework of analysis carried out so far reveals that the outgrowth of social democratic parties in Western Europe was prompted within the worker movements of the past century.

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[108] Ibid., 2-4

Consequential with the fundamental societal transformation brought about by the industrialisation process, the number of workers employed in basic industries had reached some millions, by the early twentieth century. The growing urban proletariat especially in the rising manufacturing, mining and construction sectors were continuously propelled to improve their life standards and working conditions. Mass mobilisation of these workers was given impetus particularly by the political socialism of Marx and Engels. Hence, the outset of social democratic parties, by and large, was structured around the "distributional problem" and the representation of the class interests of these groups; as their origins may indicate. The social democratic parties of France, Sweden, Britain and Germany flourished from the worker associations and trade unions in these countries. The French PS, the Swedish SAP, The British LP and the German SPD were founded in 1879, 1889, 1893 and 1869 respectively.

In this respect, it becomes clear that the industrialisation process in Europe has been the main drive behind the emergence of the blue-collar working class and its gradual organisation as a cohesive political force. Having given the impetus for the development of particular social and political cleavages, therefore, the Industrial Revolution seems to be among the decisive factors that set the backdrop of functional cleavages and their incorporation into modern party systems, as the structural analysis suggests. Construction of the industrial society, as such, becomes a key variable in explaining the outgrowth of social democratic parties within the left-right continuum of Western European democratic society, as disserted both by *Moore,* and *Lipset and Rokkan.*

Accordingly, it becomes clear that the sister parties within the framework of this study adopted a Marxist ideology initially. Owing to the institutionalisation of universal suffrage and especially to the legacy of *Bernstein,* socialists in Western Europe gradually shifted towards the non-revolutionary way for the organisation of the society on a socialist basis. During the inter-war period, contribution of *Keynes* to political economy accommodated fresh insights to macro-economic management. Social democratic ideology, since then, emphasised the allocation of resources with regard to the general social interest, in the existing democratic order. With this regard, the desirable virtues of free markets were to be maintained, while the State institutions were to take active roles in the regulation of the economy and in redistribution of resources towards the deprived. The welfare state in Western Europe was institutionalised in the aftermath of the Second World War largely on the leitmotif of *Keynesian* political economy.

Nonetheless, the social democratic parties have experienced notable changes, as further challenges were posed by the seventies and the eighties. On one hand, the traditional core constituency of social democracy, the blue-collar working class has been eroding in number. The extent to which the physical contraction of the blue-collar voters undermined the social basis of support for these parties remains vague. Although support from the founding father of Western European social democracy remained considerably salient, quantitative contraction seems to have adversely affected the social bases of these parties recently.

On the other hand, the distributive and growth oriented conventional tenets of social democracy was being increasingly challenged by the rising *laissez-faire* and left-libertarian cleavage mobilisation Due to the profound societal transformations put forth by the advanced industrialised society and the collateral decrease of manual jobs therein, it became evident

that social democratic parties were no longer in a position to pursue strategies structured on class-politics only. The social democratic response given with regard to these changes was the incorporation of libertarian new left themes into political programs; with lower overtones on state control in the markets. That implied, by and large, formulation of novel strategies directed at broader electoral coalitions. In that respect, the core of the electoral support had to be reinforced with the new-left voters drawn especially from the rising service sectors. Social democrats, accordingly, have been able to recruit sizeable support from the new middle classes.

On that account, the relevance of pure class-analysis on social democratic parties becomes considerably undermined, especially for the period after 1970s. Further insights, instead, has to be accomodated into the framework of analysis for the study of Western European social democracy in the recent period. On the other hand, whilst structural analyses devised on cleavage formation remain intact; they also need to be enhanced with internal explanations based on political actors. As can be observed from the analysis in the Second Chapter, social democratic success has been contingent upon the strategic choices in the new voter distribution brought about by the left-libertarian cleavage mobilisation, as *Kitschelt* has suggested. Furthermore, the intrinsic constraints for choosing between different strategic alternatives must also be borne in mind; such as the particular ideological legacy of a party and the historical voter identification with that party.

In this respect, the analysis in Chapter Two, divulged that the social democratic parties in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden have pursued strategies based on electoral alliances for adaptation to the newly emerging cleavages of advanced capitalism in the eighties and the nineties. Due to the fact that class identity has been a relatively more strong indicator of

voting behaviour, and that conventional views on socialism and liberalism have been dominant ideologies in Britain and Sweden; social democrats in these polities faced more difficulties in incorporating left-libertarian themes to their strategic appeals. In Germany, left-libertarian cleavage mobilisation appeared to be a more propelling force than has been in the former. Forasmuch as the SPD adapted to the rising ecological and libertarian views of society, the electoral challenge posed by the Greens was circumvented. The French socialists, on the other hand, seemed to have pursued a rather volatile strategy with regard to left-libertarianism, as it was largely perceived as the adversary of the hegemonic *etatist* and conventional socialist views in that polity. It became clear thereupon, that internal variables such as the capability for strategic formulation have been successful, to the extent that structural opportunities were favourable.

The organisational capacity for intra-party decision-making constitutes the other decisive internal factor in the analysis of social democracy in Western Europe. Strategic flexibility and timely adaptation to the fresh electoral conjuncture in the recent period, seems to be structured on the fairly institutionalised democratic organisation in four of the parties covered in this research. The generic organisational framework reveals a path in which party members and extra-parliamentary organisations such as youth branches and other affiliated bodies have been resolutely granted a legitimate voice in the decision-making procedure. Although leadership enjoys a more prestigious status in the German SPD and the French LP; the democratic structures of these parties are by no means observed to be impeded by the party administration. Thence, organisational capability for strategic decision-making seems to be functioning as a decisive internal variable, as the framework of analysis suggests.

On the other hand, the study in the Second Chapter has provided that the traditional solidarity with the institutions of the working masses are prevailing. Not unexpectedly, organic relations with trade unions have been an integral part of organisation in these parties since the outset; as these parties were born from labour organisations. Thenceforth, the tradition of trade unionism within social democratic politics in Western Europe has decidedly remained intact, reiterating the relevance of ideological legacy and the importance of voter identification within the existing patterns of party competition, as key external explanations.

All in all, the common profile bears in itself significant convergences with regard to ideology, social basis of support, strategy and organisation; the four main tools of analysis. The common historical legacy can also be incorporated into this framework. If the outline of social democracy in Western Europe were to be devised in one simple phrase "evolution from revolution" would probably fit the task best. The study of German, French, British and Swedish social democratic parties so far, reveals a long process commencing in the revolutionary worker movements of the past century, to culminate in the political position firmly anchored in liberal capitalism in advanced industrial society. Tradition and colloquialism, therefore, protrude as trademarks of the social democratic parties in these countries; within which, the main features of Western social democracy appear.


Post-Second World War Social Democratic Performance in Western Europe (% of Votes)
BR
FR
GER
SW
60
40
20
0
1944
1950
1955
1959
1964
1968
1973
1978
1982
1987
1992
1998

Figure 7

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY

The framework of analysis in the foregoing Chapters has put together a number of key variables to be of particular importance within the study of Western European social democracy. The analysis suggests that while the prevailing socio-economic structures and the dominant ideologies are indispensable external factors in this context; they need to be complemented with internal explanations, as well. Accordingly, it becomes clear that a thorough understanding of social democracy, indeed, has to cover internal variables such as the intrinsic capability of parties for strategic formulation within the organisational scheme. Thence, the analysis becomes enhanced with the incorporation of an actor oriented approach into the existing patterns of party competition and the relevant ideological legacies.

With this regard, the formative phase of the basic cleavages in the Ottoman-Turkish society and the outgrowth of socialist currents shall be dealt with initially, for the evaluation of the prevalent structural conjuncture and the relevant ideologies therein. On the other hand, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP) in the First Turkish Republic and its transformation towards the left of centre during the Second Republic shall be examined in this Chapter. The division of social democrats in the Third Republic is going to be scrutinised as well. In that respect, the relevant economic and political

conjuncture in this periods shall also be highlighted, with a view to offer a structural grounding for the analysis of Turkish social democracy in the following Chapter.

3.1. Structuring of the Main Cleavages

The Ottoman Empire in the "Classical Age (1300-1600)" was a textbook example of absolutist polity, in which the patrimonial authority of the *Sultan* remained intact. The land tenure system required the functioning of military bureaucrats as *Sipahis* (fief holders) who collected the fiefs of the lands sown on which the free peasants lived as tenants. The particular regime of *miri* (state) lands as the property of the Treasury, provided for an economic structure quite dissimilar with the capitalistic development observed in the Western settings.[1] The absolutist regime of the Ottoman sultans, and the tradition of a *strong centre* prevailed as such, until the nineteenth century; during which the gradual dissolution of the land tenure system and the collateral weakening of the centre *vis a vis* the *ayans* (local lords) in the periphery was being observed.[2]

The Classical Age Ottoman society was shaped basically according to a division between a ruling class and a ruled. The former referred to as the *askeri* (military), included groups who held executive duties in the state device. The executives of the Sultan's patrimonial authority comprised of military and civil bureaucrats and the *ulema* (scholars of Islam). The second distinctive class, the *reaya*, comprised of free

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[1] Sina Akşin, "Siyasal Tarih [Political History]". *Osmanlı Devleti 1600-1908, Türkiye Tarihi 3* [The Ottoman Empire 1600-1908, Turkish History 3(3rd ed)], ed. Sina Akşin, 73-187. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992), 80.

[2] Ergun Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Recquilibrations". In *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey,* ed. Ergun Özbudun, 1-58. (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), 28. See also Suat Aksoy, *Tarım Hukuku* [Agricultural Law]. (Ankara: Ankara Basımevi, 1970), 40-41.

peasants, merchants and artisans, and had no saying in governmental affairs. Hence, *"Kalem erbabı olmak veya kılıç kuşanmak"* (becoming either a bureaucrat or a soldier) was a privileged position that overtly implied membership to the ruling classes. A clear dichotomy, accordingly, came into existence between the "ruler" and "the ruled", which was complemented with a gap between the centre and the periphery.

The Turks who settled in urban centres were overwhelmingly drawn from the civil-military bureaucrats or scholars of Islam.[3] The Ottoman centre-periphery divide, hence, did not necessarily reflect cleavages in a geographical conception, in which regional isolation and the accompanying economic underdevelopment constituted the main contrasts within the society only. It referred, abundantly, to the centrality of the state and of the political elites to the rest of the society.[4] *Serif Mardin* has given a comprehensive account of the befitting dimensions of this centre-periphery gap in their historical context.[5]

The often prudential, and at times repressive approach of the state elite towards the residues of the pre-*Ottoman* notables and the inherent religious heterodoxy of the Anatolian periphery, appears as another dimension in that context.[6] Indeed the non-*Sunni Anatolian* sects or cults had always been a dilemma for the central authority since the *Seljukids;* as officialdom both in the latter and in the Ottoman state was

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[3] Kurt Steinhaus, Atatürk Devrimi Sosyolojisi: Sosyo-Ekonomik Yönden Az Gelişmiş Ülkelerde Burjuva Toplumunun Gelişmesi Sorunu Üzerine bir Araştırma [The Sociology of the Atatürkian Revolution: A Research on the Problem of Development of Bourgeois Society in Underdeveloped Countries]. Trans. M. Akkaş, (İstanbul: Sander Yayınları, 1973), 21.

[4] Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government ", 29-30. See also Metin Heper, "Centre and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century". *International Political Science Review.* 1, (1980), 81-105.

[5] Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?". *DEADALUS.* 102:1 (Winter 1973), 169-189., 170.

[6] Mardin, "Centre-Periphery", 171.

devised according to the fundamentals of *Sunni* ideology. Although often employed for military service, the *Turkoman* groups that preserved their pre-Islamic (Shamanistic) values and which resisted the musts of the *Sunni* hegemony since the eleventh century, continued to be sources of rebellions against central authority in the *Seljuk* and the *Ottoman* periods. Therefore, owing to "a system of decentralised accommodation toward ethnic, religious and regional particularisms" established by the *Ottomans*, and to the very fact that no attempts were made for more complete integration of these localisms in the Anatolian heartland, the centre and the periphery became "two very loosely related worlds".[7] Thence, the disunity of these components of the Empire, the highly segmented structure of the society, and finally the conflict between the Sultan and his bureaucracy in later times put together a centre-periphery dichotomy that was to play a key role in Turkish politics.

The salience of a peripheral reality, the tradition of a strong centre and the cultural/social divisions, therefore, constituted the basic political cleavages in the Ottoman society in modern times. On that account, it has been suggested that the basic cleavages in the Ottoman-Turkish society resulted from territorial and cultural oppositions rather than functional ones.[8] Functional cleavages, as conceptualised by *Lipset* and *Rokkan*, are those that cut across territorial units of nation-state and are largely committed to class and collective interests, on which party systems of the West are based. In their typology, functional cleavages usually cut across the territorial units of the nation. [9] At one extreme of this cleavage structure there are

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[7] Ibid., 171.

[8] Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 23-24.

[9] Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction". In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives,* eds. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 1-64. (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

illustrative antagonisms on either short or long term allocations of resources and benefits; such as the conflicts between producers and buyers, workers and employers, tenants and owners and the like. Accordingly, at the other extreme are solidaristic alignments grounded on ideological poles; where contentions are no longer arising from specific benefits but from normative conceptions pertaining to the economic and the social.[10]

Territorial cleavages on the other hand, are confined to cultural and regional issues. While at one extreme of this cleavage formation are peripheral reactions of local, cultural, ethnic or religious particularisms to the centralisation attempts of the secular national elites and their bureaucracies; at the other extreme are intra-elite conflicts either on the control of central power or on the desirable strategies for domestic and foreign politics. The very existence of concrete antagonisms, nevertheless, hardly fall exclusively at the extremes of the territorial and functional cleavage structures; rather they historically emerge to have combined the basic features of both.[11] In that respect, *Ergun Özbudun* has put forth that with increasing industrialisation and social mobilisation, centre-periphery conflicts tend to be replaced by functional cleavages, provided that they are grounded on less enduring ethnic, religious or cultural divisions. Thence, Turkey, being a "relatively homogenous country in terms of language, religion, ethnicity, culture and historical traditions, seems to have a good potential for the development of functional cleavages"[12].

Another decisive factor in the outgrowth of main cleavages in the pre-Republican Turkish politics has been the emergence of a new landed class in the periphery,

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[10] ibid., 10-11.
[11] ibid., 11.
[12] Özbudun, *Social Change*, 55-56.

stemming from the dissolution of the classical land system and from the gradual weakening of central authority.[13] That gave the impetus, by and large, to the protrusion of an additional dimension with regard to the structuring of the cleavage system. The decline of absolutist state tradition in the past century, thoroughly helped the peripheral forces to reinforce their position *vis a vis* the centre. Acquisition by the local notables of some proportion from the *miri* lands, suggested a peripheral challenge that was to enjoy a weighty position in Turkish politics since then. The landed gentry in the countryside, gravitated in time, towards forming alliances with the Muslim traditionalists at the centre.[14]

Thereupon, the formative phase of the party system developed differently from those observed in Western polities. Stemming largely from the reaction towards absolutist state tradition,[15] liberalism has been a remarkable feature of Turkish politics in the nineteenth century. Beyond that, a wide range of worldviews circulated around in this period; each of which was held by its adherents as the *panacea* to the ills of the Empire. In search of a solution for the "salvation of the country"[16], the Turkish intellectuals' affiliations varied from Constitutionalism (*Hürriyetçilik*), secularism and enlightenment, to nationalism and Islamic conservatism.

A variety of political groupings, concurrently, came into existence in the period between the *Tanzimat* Act and the proclamation of "*Kanun-i Esasi*" (The First Constitution) in 1876. The forerunning opponents were drawn overwhelmingly from

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[13] Ergun Özbudun, "State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey." In *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries.* (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Reinner publishers, 1994), 191.

[14] Özbudun, !988, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations". In *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey,* ed. Ergun Özbudun, 1-58. (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988).

[15] Toprak, "İktisat Tarihi", 187

[16] This refers to "*vatanı kurtarmak*" in Turkish.

the civil and military bureaucracy and from the intelligentsia of that period, hence elevating the role of these strata to a predominant status within the opposition tradition in Turkish politics.[17] Indeed, the nineteenth century Ottoman reformers had already, by and large, "succeeded in producing a well-trained, knowledgeable bureaucratic elite guided by a view of the interest of the state".[18] Although the opposition movement penetrated into the military bureaucracy as well, it fell quite short of building a genuine mass base.[19]

One of the main components of the opposition thrust in Turkey, therefore, came from the middle classes with relatively high levels of education. Thence, party politics in Turkey remained as an intra-elite conflict[20], rather than reflecting antagonisms written in terms of relations of production, literally of functional cleavages in the Western sense. The other fundamental element of opposition in Turkish politics was, as touched above, stemming from the Muslim traditionalists at the centre, largely as a reactionary attitude towards the secularist modernising efforts of the bureaucracy. The Islamic conservatism at the centre was to receive support from the landed peripheral forces, and to ally in time, with the latter against the secularist and modernist attempts at the centre.

On the other hand, industrialisation, the key factor within the outgrowth of worker movements and the collateral rise of social democratic parties in Western Europe, was largely retarded in the overwhelmingly agrarian Ottoman-Turkish society. Indeed, it appeared to be a gradual process prompted only after the establishment of

[17] Emre Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı* [The Social Structure of Turkey from the Empire to Day]. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1985), 69.
[18] Mardin, "Centre-Periphery", 180.
[19] Steinhaus, *Atatürk Devrimi*, 49.
[20] Özbudun, "State Elites", 191.

the nation-state in 1923. Production patterns in *Anatolia* still revealed a pre-capitalistic nature by the turn of the century, the implication of which was the lack of a powerful bourgeoisie to give impetus to developmental capitalism. Most significant for the purposes of this study was the existence of a social coalition of small entrepreneurs, merchants and landed gentry, which constituted in turn, the main support behind the Turkish Revolution.

By the early twentieth century, the worker associations of the non-Muslim organisations of ethnic origin based particularly in the *Balkans* and in *Macedonia,* and Muslim guilds remaining from the classical age constituted the main components of the initial organised worker movements in the Empire. Majority of the organised proletariat was affiliated to trade unions founded by either Greeks or Armenians.[21] Accordingly, the size of the Turkish working class has been recorded around 14 thousand only.[22]

In that respect, the Turkish working class was hardly in a position to form a cohesive political force in Turkish politics. Neither the quantity nor the intrinsic feature of worker movements both in the Empire and in Republican Turkey seemed to qualify for the organisation of the working groups into a political party. It has been reported in this context that, the *Reji Tekeli* (Tobacco Monopoly) founded by French capital in 1884, had established factories in cities such as *İzmir, Samsun, İstanbul, Adana, Damascus* and *Haleb;* with 450 and 500 workers employed in the former two. While

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[21] Stefanos Yerasimos, *Azgelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye: Bizans'tan 1971'e* [Turkey in the Phase of Underdevelopment: From Byzantine to 1971]. (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980), 889.

[22] While some other sources referred to the number of urban proletariat in Turkey as around 200000 (cited in: Timur, *Türk Devrimi*, 31), even this figure is negligible when compared to the corresponding figures in Western Europe. In this context, Dimitr Şişmanov held that the number of workers in factories had reached 50000 by 1913. (cited in: Dimitır Şişmanov, *Türkiye İşçi ve Sosyalist Hareketi, Kısa Tarih (1908-1965)* [Turkish Worker and Socialist Movement, A Short History (1908-1965)]. Belge yayınları, 1978. Reprint. (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1990), 35.

no comprehensive data on the social and ethnic composition of these workers are available, it has been estimated that the employees of these factories were permanent urban working class.[23] It was noted that in the early decades of the 1900s, some experiences were gained by workers in these factories to seize their rights; and by those within the mining industry in the *Eregli* region, founded in 1896. (For the latter, the estimate on the number of workers is around 10000.[24]) That did not change, nevertheless, the fact that, of the industrial proletariat, the most qualified and responsible from administrative affairs were foreigners, and that the skilled and semi-skilled workers were overwhelmingly drawn from Ottoman non-Muslims; Turkish workers remaining either as non-skilled or as temporary workers.[25]

Table 6.

Size of the Working Class in Turkey (1965-1995)			
Years	**No of Workers**	**No of Population (million)**	**% of Workers in Total Population**
1965	895802	30	2.9
1970	1315500	35	3.7
1975	1823338	40	4.5
1980	2204807	44	5.0
1985	2607865	50	5.2
1990	3446502	56	6.1
1995	4410774	62	7.1

Source: State Planning Organisation [26]

[23] Alpaslan Işıklı, *Türkiye'de Sendikacılık Hareketleri İçinde Demokrasi Kavramının Gelişimi* [The Development of the Concept of Democracy within the Trade Union Movements in Turkey]. (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994), 61.

[24] Ibid., 66.

[25] Şişmanov, *Türkiye İşçi ve Sosyalist*, 75.

[26] The number of workers have been drawn from: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, *Ekonomik ve Sosyal Göstergeler (1950-1995)* [Economic and Social Indicators (1950-1995)]. (Ankara: DPT, 1996), 166-168. For the population figures; ibid., 163. The percentage of workers in total population have been calculated from the figures in the respective columns.

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[25] Şişmanov, *Türkiye İşçi ve Sosyalist*, 75.

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3.2. Socialist Currents in the pre-Republican Period

3.2.1. The Second Constitutionalist Period

The appearance of socialist endeavours in Ottoman politics was no exception to the phenomenon of "elite-driven opposition for salvation". *Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası: OSF* (Ottoman Socialist Party) founded in *İstanbul* in 1910 was the first organisation in the form of a political party with socialist affiliations. The OSF was not able to gain representation in *Meclis-i Mebusan;* however a group was formed with socialist tendencies at that time, comprising mainly of Armenian and Bulgarian members of the Parliament (MPs). The socialist group had no organic relations with the OSF, and the latter remained as an extra-Parliamentary party. The Party leader *Hüseyin Hilmi* published the periodicals *İştirak* (Participation) and *İnsaniyet* (Humanity), and the newspapers *Medeniyet* (Civilisation) and *Sosyalist* (Socialist); with a view to help dissemination of socialist ideas. The OSF endeavoured to survive via its affiliated branch in Paris under the leadership of *Dr. Refik Nevzad.*[27]

Whereas the ideological formation of the Party Centre in İstanbul lead by *Hüseyin Hilmi* lingered between utopian socialism and liberalism[28], members of the Paris Branch established relations with the Second International, and announced clearly their adoption of the principles of scientific socialism.[29] A close look at the profile of the founding members reveals that the OSF, like other sister parties of its time,

[27] Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952* [Political Parties in Turkey 1859-1952]. (İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, 1952), 452. (The period between 1918-1923, in which The Turkish Republic emerged as a nation state as successor to the Ottoman Empire), 304-306.
[28] Yerasimos, *Azgelişmişlik Sürecinde,* 883.
[29] Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 307.

emerged as an intellectual attempt with almost a negligible mass base.[30] The political conjuncture required the *İstanbul* group to gradually shift its ideological stance to liberalism. The OSF lost blood as its leaders were exiled by the *Jön Türk* government, and it was shut down in 1913. *Hüseyin Hilmi* and group re-established the party under the label of *Türkiye Sosyalist Fırkası: TSF* (Turkish Socialist Party). While there was a short revival between 1920-21, the TSF disintegrated finally in 1922.

The first political party carrying the title of social democrat in Turkey, namely *Sosyal Demokrat Fırkası: SDF* (Social Democratic Party) was founded in *İstanbul,* in January 1918, shortly before the Armistice. Like the TSF, the founders of the SDF were drawn from a certain social stratum, from the educated upper middle-class. Among the founders were *Dr. Hasan Rıza,* the General Director of the Housing Bank[31] *Cemil Arif* and retired civil servant *Habip Bey.* The Party's ideological stance rested on principles such as the re-organisation of the political and economic system on a socialist basis, harmony with international social democratic institutions and establishment of trade-unions and enhancing their solidarity. The SDF did not participate in the 1919 elections and remained outside the Parliament. The Party annulled itself in 1920.[32]

Another socialist Party founded in this period was *Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası:* TİÇSF (Turkish Socialist Workers and Peasants Party). The TİÇSF was

[30] Among the founders of the OSF were four journalists, namely Hüseyin Hilmi, Namık Hasan, Pertev Tevfik and İsmail Faik. For more details see: ibid., 305. See also Suna Kili, *Atatürk Devrimi, Bir Çağdaşlaşma Modeli* [The Atatürkian Revolution, A Model for Modernisation]. (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1981), 65.

[31] Emlak Bankası Genel Müdürü

[32] Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 423.

founded in September 1919 by *Dr. Şefik Hüsnü* and friends (*Ahmed Akif, Ethem Nejad*), and entered the elections the same year, with no electoral gains. The fundamentals of Party ideology rested on the organisation of workers and peasants in Turkey according to the principles of scientific socialism. The TİÇSF established relations with the Third International and adopted a Leninist stand. During the Defence of Rights Period, the Party gave support to the Kemalists, and became active by publishing *Kurtuluş* and *Aydınlık* journals. It annulled itself in 1924.

While remaining uninfluential politically, a remarkable endeavour as regards the history of socialist parties in Turkey was *Osmanlı Mesai Fırkası: OMF* (Ottoman Labour Party) founded in *İstanbul* in 1919. Its originality lies in the fact that blue-collar workers and small civil servants were observed as members, in addition to intellectuals. The Party was founded by a mechanical engineer *H. Memduh* and writer *Avni Ali,* as a counter-act to *Hüseyin Hilmi* and group; in that it reflected another symptom of intra-elite conflict in politics. Most significant in this context was the election of a blue-collar Party candidate, as MP from *İstanbul* in 1919. The Second Constitutionalist period ended as the Parliament in *İstanbul* was annulled on 11 April 1920, following British occupation of the city on 16 March.

3.2.2. *Müdafaa-i Hukuk* Period

Müdafaa-i Hukuk Period, the second phase of political party formation in Turkey commenced on 30 October 1918, with the signing of an armistice between Turkey and the Allies. The consequential Allied and Greek occupation of the Turkish territory, prompted in turn, various resistance movements both in the *Thrace* and in

Anatolia. Such endeavours emerged to organise as local or regional congresses; among which the congress held in *Erzurum* in September 1919 appeared to be of particular significance; in that it overtly declared the ultimate goal of defending the territorial integrity of the Turkish nation as described by *Misak-ı Milli* (National Oath).[33] In addition to signalling the initial phase of the emergence of Republican Turkey as a nation state, this period refers, at the same time, to the formative years of *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, which shall be studied in due course. The present section of this study is limited with the socialist parties of the time.

The first in an array of socialist endeavours in the Defence of Rights Period was *Amele Fırkası: AF* (Workers Party) founded in İstanbul in 1920, which was also an elite drive. *Amele Fırkası* remained an unfinished business and has not been able to institutionalise. A similar attempt was *Müstakil Sosyalist Fırkası: MSF* (Independent Socialist Party), a splinter party founded by some of the previous members of the former TSF. Not much is known about the MSF, but that it was founded by a handful of tram workers in İstanbul in 1922.

More significant within the scope of this study are two different Marxist endeavours, the first of which was *Türkiye Komünist Partisi: TKP* (Turkish Communist Party) founded by a group of MPs in the Ankara Parliament, in May 1920. The group comprised of figures such as *Tevfik Rüşdü (Aras), Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), Mahmut Celal (Bayar), Yunus Nadi (Abalıoğlu), Refik Koraltan and Eyüp Sabri,* who actually acted on directives given by M. Kemal. The Party did not establish any relations with the Third International, and remained loyal to the Parliament and to

[33] *Misak-ı Milli* is a decision of the İstanbul Parliament taken in 28 January 1920, before the British occupation of the city in 16 March 1920. The decision describes the national boundaries of the Turkish territory.

the Revolution; in that it has been accepted as consequential within the policies pursued by Kemalists in the framework of the intimate relations with Leninist Russia.

A contextual approach would be better equipped to help clarification of the thrust behind the legal TKP attempt. Percussion of two factors, literally foreign relations and domestic politics emerged as the fulcrum of policies pursued within this context. As far as foreign relations were concerned, the Government in Ankara had to be considerate of both the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and of the termination of the First World War in Allied victory. The Kemalists seemed to be mindful of the fact that the Allied powers, and particularly Britain who controlled much of the Eastern Mediterranean, intended to isolate the new regime in Russia strategically through the Caucasia, and this way to circumvent Leninism , which they perceived as a political challenge. The Allied strategy covered, at the same time, blocking through the Caucasian countries, of all links between Russia and the Revolutionaries in Anatolia, for the entire surrounding and ultimate division of the latter. At that point, the locus of Kemalist tactic lay in the utilisation of the antagonism between Russia and the Western powers to serve revolutionary purposes, which had to be done, according to the cadre in Ankara, while keeping Leninist Russia *at an arm's length.*[34]

That diplomatic relations were initiated with Moscow in May 1920 immediately after the First National Assembly, stemmed from a historical necessity, which

[34] For a tactical evaluation of the strategic conjuncture of that time, see the cryptogram sent by M.Kemal to the "15th Army Headquarters on 6 May 1920, titled: "Genel Siyasi Durum ve Bolşeviklerle İttifak için Aradaki Ermenistan Engelinin Kaldırılmasına dair Vekiller Heyeti Müzakeresi [Negotiations of the Cabinet on the General Political Conjuncture and Removal of the Armenian Barrier for the Alliance with the Bolsheviks]". In *Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri IV: 1917-1938* [Notifications, Telegramms and Declarations of Atatürk III: 1917-1938. 2nd ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1964), 318-319. See also: "Parliamentary Closed Session Minutes dated: 24.4.1920", in: Sadi Borak, ed., *Gizli Oturumlarda Atatürk'ün Konuşmaları* [Speeches of Atatürk in Closed Sessions]. (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1977), 16-17.

continued with the official recognition by the Soviets of the Government in Ankara in June, and protracted as the Bolshevik Government did not recognise the Treaty of Sévres signed in August. Accordingly, the Turkish army launched an offensive in the Eastern Front in September, and the Armenian question was solved by December 1920. At the same time, the Georgians were discouraged of their territorial demands on Eastern Black-Sea, which implied that the major offensive against the Greeks in the western Front could finally begin. Most significant in this context were the financial and logistic support received from the Soviets in summer 1920, and the Non-Aggression Agreement signed between the parties in March 1921.[35] All in all, relations between the Bolsheviks and Kemalists remained a tactical alliance during the Independence war, and domestic politics towards Marxism appeared as consequential within this conjuncture. *V.I. Lenin*'s own evaluation of the movement in Anatolia was such that:

> "Mustafa Kemal is by no means a socialist; he is, nevertheless, a competent organiser.. A talented leader that conducts a national bourgeoisie revolution...An intelligent and a revolutionary statesman that can evaluate the very pith of our socialist revolution, hence can act positively towards us. He is fighting a battle against the occupants. I personally believe that he will be able to defeat the imperialists and will overthrow the sultan and his collaborates.. we must help him."[36]

As has been noted elsewhere, nationalism, Islamism and Marxism emerged as influential from among the already circulating ideas during the Independence War[37]. Attitude of the Ankara Government towards such currents appeared Machiavellian in

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[35] For a detailed list of the Soviet aid, see: Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914-1990* [The Twentieth Century Political History, 1914-1990]. (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1993), 307-317.

[36] Reported in: S.I. Aralov, *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Hatıraları* [Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat in Turkey]. trans. Hasan Ali Ediz, (İstanbul: Yenigün Basın-Yayıncılık AŞ., 1997), 46-47.

[37] Timur, *Türk Devrimi*, 32.

essence, which required basically, the maintenance of an elusive balance between antagonistic groups. In this context, a handful of bureaucrats, literally the Revolutionary cadre, had to rely on a weird alliance of conflicting interests, and had no chance but to mobilise the support of particularly land owners and Islamists, for their ultimate goal of creating a democratic nation-state based on Western values. While the Turkish Revolution reflected a democratic bourgeoisie character in essence, diplomatic and logistic support from the Soviets remained an imperative, on the other hand. Complying with his Western based bourgeois endeavour, therefore, M. Kemal intended to take under control all Marxist movements by enhancing the foundation of a legal Communist Party lead by his close friends in the Parliament. We read from his cryptogram to *Ali Fuat Paşa,* Commander in Chief of the Western Front on 31 October 1920 that:

> "It is understood that net converging opinion on the applicability of communism has not been established yet in Russia, leave alone our country.. The very fact, however, that this current has been penetrating into the country from either domestic or external origins, and each with various aims, and that it has been perceived not impossible for the peace and union that is much needed by our nation, to be disturbed, unless rational measures are taken. Establishment of a Turkish Communist Party from among our reasonable colleagues, and within the surveillance of the Government, therefore, appeared to me as the most rational and natural measure in this context. This way it may be possible to merge all such factions into one.....I decided that our distinguished Generals *Fevzi, Ali Fuat* and *Kazım,* as well as *Mr. Refet* and *Mr. İsmet* to join secretly. This way, our friends, the heroes of our national goal and the backbone of the country, are going to be present in this organisation, with a view to have an effect upon its activities...." [38]

Insofar as Marxist currents in Turkey in the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk* Period are concerned, the almost narrated movement of *Green Army (Yeşil Ordu)* may also deserve some

[38] See the Cryptogram on: "Komünizmin En Büyük Kumandanların Elinde Kalmasına Dair Şifre [Control of Communism by the Top Commanders of the Army]". dated 31.10.1920. In Türk Tarih Kurumu, *Tamim, Telgraf,* 360-361.

elaboration within the context. While the Green Army remains a much speculated subject, it is generally held that the phenomenon of Green Army is attributed to the militant group lead by *Çerkes Ethem* and his brother. *Çerkes Ethem* was an ex-soldier, who initially appeared as a resistance leader in the *Salihli* region, following the occupation of *İzmir* by the Greeks on 15 May 1919. He became remarkable as he restored domestic revolts in *Biga (*lead by *Anzavur), Düzce, Yozgat* and *Zile*, from February to May 1920; and was accordingly employed in the Western Front of the National Army by August 1920, almost as a national hero. On the other hand, illegal activities of the Green Army were already under way, as of May the same year. Former *İttihat ve Terakki* member and *Denizli* MP *Hakkı Behiç* stood as the secretary general for this secret organisation According to the statement received by the Independence Court in *Ankara (Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi)* from *Tokat* MP *Nazım*, the central administration comprised of 14 MPs, of which 3 held ministerial positions within the government by then. .[39]

Ethem was recorded to have arrived in *Ankara*, and to have established relations with *Hakkı Behiç*, the Marxist member of the Parliament, in 1920. The allegation by *Hakkı Behiç* that "the conventional army remained conservative and incompetent" and that "only the organised forces of *Ethem* could serve socialist interests as the militant arm of the movement in *Anatolia*"[40] appears as significant within the context of *Ethem's* relations with the Marxist movement. The Government in Ankara nevertheless, seemed to be informed of the Green Army's activities. While from the beginning the official attitude of the political elite, and of particularly *İsmet*

[39] Suna Kili, *Atatürk Devrimi, Bir Çağdaşlaşma Modeli* [The Atatürkian Revolution, A Model for Modernisation]. (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1981), 81.
[40] Kenan Esengin, *Milli Mücadelede İç Ayaklanmalar* [Domestic Revolts in the National Liberation War]. (İstanbul: Ağrı Yayınları, 1975), 231.

Paşa, remained prudential towards *Ethem* and brothers, the troubled alliance between the two parties deteriorated in time, due largely to the increasing fame and influence of *Ethem* within the militant resistance groups (*Kuvva-i Seyyare). Ethem's* growing charisma speedily gravitated towards a political challenge to *Ankara* with a view to questioning the legitimacy of the government. Locus of opposition from *Ethem* and *Tevfik* brothers lay in the controversy over the establishment of an orderly army (*Nizami Ordu)* by *İsmet Paşa*, where the former insisted upon the superiority of *Kuvva-i Seyyare*, and upon their own leadership in the Independence War.[41]

Kuvva-i Seyyare was to constitute the militant arm of the Green Army. *Prof. Suna Kili* reported that the Green Army had issued a "32 Article Regulation", and endeavoured to be active by disseminating its views through *"Seyyare-i Yeni Düzen (Star of the New World)"* published in *Eskişehir*. Among the basic tenets of its doctrine was the convergence of Marxism and Islamism, with a view to enhance Islamic brotherhood under Marxist principles; and to merge *"the Red Flag of communism with the Green Flag of Islam"*. Bearing in mind the conservative structure of the Turkish society, the Green Army declared that it remained respectful to family life, and intended to attribute a religious outlook to Marxism. The movement established relations with Moscow and with the Red Army in Russia, and seemed to acquire a pro-Soviet position.[42]

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[41] For further details see: Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk II: 1920-1927* [Speech II: 1920-1927], ed. Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü [Turkish Institute for History of the Revolution]. (İstanbul: Maarif Basımevi, 1960), 467-471.

[42] Kili, *Atatürk Devrimi*, 82-83. For further details on the relations of the Bolsheviks with *Ethem*, see: "Closed Session Minutes dated 29.12.1920. In Sadi Borak, ed., *Gizli Oturumlarda Atatürk'ün Konuşmaları* [Speeches of Atatürk in Closed Sessions]. (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1977), 197-198.

The illegal Communist Party founded outside the Parliament, shortly after the official TKP, in June the same year, thus had entered into organic relations with the *Ethem* group. By December 1920, it was legalised under the title of *Türkiye Halk işţirakiyun Fırkası: THİF* (Turkish Peoples' Participatory Party), to which some some MPs also joined. The Party adopted a *Leninist* stand, and aimed at receiving the support of particularly the peasants. It was shut down in 1921.[43] *Ethem* and brothers ultimately joined the Greek troops in Western *Anatolia* in 1922, and the Marxist movement was subdued. [44]

The main drive behind the outgrowth of the political polarisations at the wake of the nation-state has been the *Revolutionary-Reactionary* divide in the turbulent years of the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk Period.*[45] Rather than a left-right continuum as observed in the parliaments of the Western polities, therefore, the First National Assembly reflected bitter struggles between traditionalists (as represented by the *Second Group)* and the *Kemalists.* Accordingly, hardly any mass mobilisation occurred in the formative years of political parties in Turkey. Political party tradition, hence, was born as an elite attempt, which was to play a key role in the structuring of the party system in Turkey. An array of various socialist endeavours was no exception to that, either. While a number of political parties under labels such as socialist or social democratic were founded from 1908 onward, it becomes clear that they practically held no mass base.

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[43] Yerasimos, *Azgelişmişlik Sürecinde*, 887.
[44] For a more detailed analysis of the Green Army, see: ibid., 885-887.
[45] Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952* [Political Parties in Turkey 1859-1952]. (İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, 1952), 452. (The period between 1918-1923, in which The Turkish Republic emerged as a nation state as successor to the Ottoman Empire).

3.3. CHP in the First Turkish Republic

A crystal clear feature of social democratic politics in contemporary Turkey is factionalism. As *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi :CHP* (Republican Peoples' Party) and its splinters are accredited as the agents of social democratic mission in the Third Turkish Republic, a thorough study of this party becomes an imperative, in order to go to all lengths within the context.

CHP originated from *"Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti: MHC"* (Anatolian and Roumelian Society for Defence of Rights) founded in the Congress held in *Sivas* in September 1919. The announcement of MHC in *Sivas* was, in fact, a "Merger Act" of various local-regional *Müdafaa-i Hukuk: MH* (Defence of Rights) organisations that had flourished in the Empire, in the form of resistance movements against Allied occupation, following the Armistice in October 1918.[46] The ultimate goal of defeating Allied occupation reconciled delegates to the Congress, who actually reflected conflicting interests and sharp divergences as regards social background and political affiliation. The social profile of the local and regional resistance movements, indeed, provide the very clue for the comprehension of the social base of the MHC; hence the future CHP.

[46] Local or regional resistance movements that had emerged before the Sivas Congress were merged into one under the title of "Anatolian and Roumelian Society for Defence of Rights", which refers to *Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti* in Turkish. For a thorough study of all the resistance movements see: Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 478-509. In this context, also see: Bülent Tanör, *Türkiye'de Yerel Kongre İktidarları :1918-1920* [The Reign of Local Congresses in Turkey: 1918-1920]. (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Yayınları, 1997).

The numerous MH movements organising both in the *Thrace* and in *Anatolia*, in essence, appeared to be propelled mostly by the *eşraf*[47], the intelligentsia and the *ulema*; their proportional weight in each organisation varying according to region.[48] These strata represented the middle classes; thence, the national bourgeoisie of the Ottoman-Turkish society at that time. In his comprehensive work titled *Anadolu İhtilali* (The Anatolian Revolution), on the Turkish national movement, *Sabahattin Selek* also pointed to the weighty positions of both the *eşraf* and the intelligentsia, within the *MH* congresses.[49] As regards the former's role in the national movement, however, *Selek* preferred to emphasise the common denominator of the heterogeneous *eşraf*, as the preservation of property, instead necessarily of a patriotic attitude. As such, they either opted to collaborate with the occupants, or decided to fight; the driving motive, nevertheless, remaining similar in both cases. Consequential was the very fact that, those from the *eşraf* in urban centres, and *ağas* (semi-feudal land-lords) in the countryside, most of the times, provided logistic support to the revolutionaries, or even fought in the national resistance movement. It might be of value, to read from *Selek*, in this connection, that

> "Mustafa Kemal, who had been thoroughly mindful of the weighty position of the ağa and the eşraf within the social structure, addressed these local notables immediately after the Erzurum Congress, and invited them to organise national movements in their respective regions, with a view to circumvent counter-revolutionary propagation."[50]

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[47] The term "*eşraf*" refers to the independent merchants, craftsmen and the landed gentry of the region in question; they all together made up the *notable figures in the town*, as such they have been referred to as the "local notables". This stratum had been won for the national cause of the "Defence of Rights Period", and the alliance of these groups with the locomotive of the Revolutionary movement, literally the civil-military bureaucratic cadres lasted till the multi-party period in the First Turkish Republic.

[48] Tanör, *Türkiye'de Yerel*, 54.

[49] Sabahattin Selek, Anadolu İhtilali [The Anatolian Revolution]. (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968), 63-64.

[50] ibid., 64.

The First Grand National Assembly, accordingly, opened on 23 April 1920. Whilst the *Grand Goal* seemed to unite in principle this non-homogenous gathering, an apparent heterogeneity lingered on in the Assembly. Indeed, the locus of main controversies fell on the Republicanism question.[51]

Factionalism in the First Parliament evolved in time to the coming into existence of two major political groupings, literally "the First" and "the Second" groups. The former was represented by the members of the MHC Group which remained secular, *étatist* and revolutionary; and which indeed constituted the basis of the CHP.[52] The declaration issued by the MHC administration on 8 April 1923 stated that the MHC would be re-organised as a political party. The 8 April Declaration, as such, constituted the first party program of the CHP.[53] The MHC group won the 1923 elections, and the second period of the Grand National Assembly started. The MH Group in the Second Parliament discussed the program of the future *"Halk Fırkası: HF"* (Peoples' Party) from 7 August onward, and HF was officially founded with the adoption by the MH Group of the *"Halk Fırkası Nizamnamesi"* (HF Program) on 11 September 1923.[54]

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[51] Mustafa Kemal provided an account of various factions in the First Parliament, in his Speech. In Atatürk, *Nutuk II,* 594. They were as follows: *-Tesanüd Grubu* (Solidarity Group: Conservatives) *-İstiklal Grubu* (Independence Group: Left oriented younger MPs), *-Müdafaa-i Hukuk Zümresi* (Defence of Rights Group), *-Halk Zümresi* (Population Group: Bolsheviks), *-Islahat Grubu* (Reformation Group: Former *İttihat ve Terakki* members and Ottoman reformists)

[52] Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 534.

[53] The Declaration of 9 Principles is the *"Dokuz Umde Beyanname"* in Turkish. For the original full text, see: Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 580-582.

[54] The party was officially founded as *"Halk Fırkası"*. With all its institutions, the MHC was incorporated into HF on 23 October 1923. On 10 November 1924, the Party changed its name to CHF (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası), and finally in the 1935 Congress it took the name of CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi). For more details, see: ibid., 559-560.

The *Revolutionary-Reactionary* continuum that dominated the First Parliament between 1920-23 has provided, by and large, the CHP with the fundamentals of its Program. During the single-party period in the First Turkish Republic, the CHP founded 19 governments and held 8 congresses till 1946.[55] The 1927 Congress was also significant, in that *M. Kemal* delivered his famous *"Nutuk"* (Speech), which has been accepted, by and large, as a comprehensive documentary history of the CHP. In 1931 Congress a more comprehensive and a doctrinaire program for the party was adopted, which was further enlarged and translated into contemporary Turkish in the 1935 Congress.

CHP governed for 27 years from the foundation of the Republic onward. During this period, the party ideology remained intact mostly around the establishment of a nation state from among the residuals of the Empire. CHP, in its capacity as the "State Party" of the young Republic, was perceived as the locomotive of the consolidation of the nation state. Among the main motives behind this endeavour were modernisation, secularisation and establishment of the notion of popular sovereignty. The six fundamentals of the Party Programme were inscribed in the Constitution. The party secretary held, at the same time, the office of the minister for interior affairs, while the local party elites acted as governors in their respective regions. As such, CHP's organic relations with the state was institutionalised. Relatively independent from the masses at large, local party organisation remained a coalition between the *eşraf* and the state-party elite. CHP's support in the Anatolian heartland, accordingly, came from the local notables to a large extent in the pre-1946 period.[56] The alliance of the *"Müdafaa-i Hukuk"* period, as sketched in the previous

[55] Atatürk, *Nutuk II, 495.*

[56] Ayşe Güneş Ayata, *CHP (Örgüt ve İdeoloji)* [CHP: Organisation and Ideology]. (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1992), 74-75.

section, consequently remained unbroken till the emergence of the *Demokrat Parti:DP* (Democratic Party) as a splinter from the CHP in 1945.

Grounding for post-1945 social democracy in Turkey requires, by and large, the analysis of particularly two facts, of which the image of CHP as the state party shall be evaluated first. In this connection, refutation by the state party of the First Turkish Republic of class politics, and location of its strategy midst the formation of a nation state on solidaristic assumptions, protruded as the basic tenets of CHP rule in the pre-1945 period. The CHP elite seemed to reject class politics and relied mostly on the support of its founding father, the bureaucratic cadres that made the party's core constituency in the pre-1945 period. The alliance of the state-party elite with the *eşraf* continued till the outburst of the DP movement. Genuine democracy, according to the CHP discourse, remained firmly anchored in the solidaristic cooperation of different professional groups; which at the same time, ought to act in harmony with the cooperation in wider society.[57]

The state party manipulated, largely through organisational structure, the support of different social groups, as touched above. The introduction by CHP of the Land Reform Bill in 1945, however, signalled the end of the coalition between the local notables and the bureaucratic cadres of the Turkish Revolution.[58] The growing opposition from the landed gentry to the Land Reform, allied in time, with the discontented in the countryside immediately after 1945. Henceforth, the war-time alliance of conflicting interests was broken, giving birth to the DP movement in

[57] Ibid., 69.

[58] Land Reform Bill of 1945 aimed at the nationalisation and eventual distribution of land to the landless peasants. For more details see: -Sevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam (1938-1950) II. Cilt* [The Second Man (1938-1950) 2nd vol.]. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1967), 128-131; and - Suat Aksoy, *Tarim Hukuku*. (Ankara: Ankara Basimevi, 1970), 45-55.

1945. The fundamentals of Turkish politics from 1946 onward, accordingly, were written mostly around the cleavages that had been subdued for the national cause during the national liberation movement.

CHP won 396 seats in 1946, the first multi-party regime elections; in which the newly founded DP acquired 62 seats. From then on to 1950, CHP rule seemed to be confined basically to democratisation and relative liberalisation of the economy. Important for our purposes is the fact that, during this period, a recoil from identification with the state was observed within the party, in that partial power was granted to local CHP organisations and steps were taken towards organisational decentralisation in the party apparatus.[59] CHP finally lost government following 1950 elections, and DP came to power winning 408 seats in the Parliament, with the former falling to 69 seats only.

Whereas hardly any ideological or strategic revision within the party could be observed during the initial years of multi-party politics, it was only after CHP's descent to 31 seats in the 1954 elections that the party elite seemed to be propelled to initialise programmatic renewal within the party. A new party programme, on that account, was drafted shortly before the early elections in 1957, through which some basic principles such as the introduction of the right of strike for unionised workers, granting of organisational independence to universities and abolishing of anti-democratic legislation were adopted.[60] While DP support in 1957 came out to be relatively lower than that of the previous election, decreasing from 490 to 419 seats

[59] Ayata, *CHP Örgüt*, 76.
[60] Ibid., 80.

in the Parliament; CHP fortune seemed to reverse, and the latter increased its seats from 31 to 173 that year.

CHP's programme was further revised in 1958. Including this time an extensive critique of DP economic policy, the 1958 programme recommended that economic development should be planned. Stressing the need for the establishment of social justice and enhancement of supremacy of law; this programme also proposed some constitutional changes such as the establishment of a bicameral parliament and adoption of proportional representation. CHP's programmatic agenda of 1958, by and large, constituted the blue-prints of the constitutional change after the military intervention of 1960 [61], and "by the fall of 1960 the government was virtually in the hands of the CHP once more, although there were military personnel in a number of important positions".

3.4. The Second Turkish Republic: Transformation in the CHP

The military intervention of 1960 can be said to have received widespread support particularly among the civilian bureaucracy and among intellectuals; as the intervention came as a result of increasing dissent with the anti-*Kemalist* policies and with the growing authoritarianism of the DP rule between 1957-60. Discontent particularly within the bureaucracy was evident, as their status, prestige and income had declined considerably during the DP governments; and who, at the same time, felt that their once strong ties with the political elites had loosened.[62] That the DP

[61] ibid: 81

[62] for a more detailed analysis of the tension between political elites with the bureaucracy in the DP period, see: Özbudun, "State Elites".

administration endeavoured to reduce the influence of the civil-military bureaucracy in the state apparatus with a view to consolidate the role of the rising entrepreneurial groups and peripheral land owners, impelled the opposition from *étatist* cadres who had been perceiving themselves as defenders of *Kemalism* since the foundation of the Republic, and who consequentially felt obliged to combat "counter-revolutionary attempts" in their own ways. As such, one of the implications of the intervention was the recruitment of strictly *étatist* CHP sympathisers to the government.

Drafted by the Constituent Assembly[63], the 1961 Constitution reflected to a large extent the basic *étatist* values of pro-CHP bureaucracy. It provided for an "effective system of checks and balances to limit the power of elected assemblies", in that firstly, a Constitutional Court entrusted with the task of supervising over the constitutionality of the legislation passed from the Parliament, was introduced[64]. Second, was the creation of the "National Security Council: NSC" comprising of ministers and top commanders of the Staff, with a capacity to advise[65] the government on national security policy. Third, and quite significant as regards the post-1960 factionalism in the CHP, was the creation of the "State Planning Organisation: SPO", with a view to realise the indicative planning of development. The radical *étatists* in the CHP initially demanded the decisions of the SPO to be

[63] The bicameral Constituent Assembly was composed of the "National Unity Committee: *Milli Birlik Komitesi*" of the military on one hand, and "The House of Representatives" comprising of delegates from the CHP, the judiciary, universities, trade unions, chambers of commerce and industry and from farmers' associations, on the other.

[64] Özbudun, "Perspectives on Democracy", 19.

[65] The "advisory" status of the NSC was retained in the 1982 Constitution, and it played a crucial role in the Third Turkish Republic. The NSC seemed to carry out the duty of guarding the Kemalist principles effectively, by *advising* the RP government on 28 February 1997 to take the necessary measures against Islamic bigotry, which it perceived as a "bigger threat" to the Republic than that posed by the Kurdish separatist movement. The outcome was the fall of RP government, which has been referred to in the Turkish media as a "post-modern intervention".

autonomous from parliamentary control; to which the conservative wing in the CHP responded severely. In conclusion, *İnönü*'s charisma within the CHP intervened to resolve the issue finally in a compromise, and SPO's status was placed under the authority of the government. That implied, by and large, a tension between the reformist/radical and the conservative wings in CHP.

In addition to the introduction of checks and balances as touched briefly above, the 1961 Constitution also provided for some radical changes, in that social rights and civil liberties were expanded, and autonomy was granted to public agencies such as the "Turkish Radio and Television:TRT" and to universities. In that respect, the 1960s have been the years through which leftism rose, both as an intra-party conflict within the CHP, and as extra-parliamentary endeavours within different circles. In this conjuncture the implications of *Türkiye İşçi Partisi: TİP* (Turkish Labour Party) to the transformation in CHP becomes significant

According to its first leader *Mehmet Ali Aybar*, the intrinsic quality of TİP was such that it was the only political party with a grass-root organisation, whose founders were not drawn specifically from the educated elite groups in Turkey, in contrast to those of the similar endeavours observed in the past.[66] In this context, the former TİP leader told *Uğur Mumcu* that while political parties in Turkey had always been founded by the *"bey takımı* (state elites)", the TİP differed in essence, in that it was founded by eleven labour unionists and one driver, all with rural backgrounds. *Aybar* further explained in this context that the *Mesai Fırkası:MF* founded by some workers in 1919 in İstanbul constituted no exception to the rule that Turkish political

[66] Uğur Mumcu, *Aybar ile Söyleşi* [Interview With Aybar]. (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1993), 25.

parties were elite drives, as the MF had been propelled and guided by elites as a counter action to the socialist endeavours of the time.[67]

The TİP was being perceived as a rising electoral challenge by the CHP elites. According to *Suna Kili*, the strategic appeal of that Party was increasingly recruiting support especially from the university students, who used to be among the traditional supporters of CHP. With that regard, CHP leader *İnönü* was becoming more sensitive on the strategy to be directed particularly at the new supporters of the TIP, as his speeches delivered shortly before the elections of 1965 indicated.[68]

TİP entered 1965 elections and gained 15 seats. For the first time in Turkey an overtly Marxist, yet a non-revolutionary party, was being represented in the Parliament. What exhibits relevance to the strategic shift in CHP lies in the contribution by TİP to legitimating the notion of "left" in the rather conservative Turkish society, to the extent that it has been active in the Parliament. In that respect, this Party seemed to influence the confrontation between the reformist and conservative wings in the CHP. However, as TIP has not been able to perform the transformation towards becoming a contemporary social democratic party at the expense of traditional Marxism, that role in Turkey, was to be played by the CHP. Nonetheless, the fact that the discursive challenge of TİP constituted an impetus for the metamorphosis of the State-Party into a social democratic party becomes clear, as shall be elaborated in more detail throughout the analysis in the following Chapter.

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[67] ibid., 32-33.

[68] Suna Kili, 1960-1975 Doneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelismeler [Developments in CHP in the Period between 1960-1975]. (Istanbul: Bogazici Universitesi, 1975), 211-219.

The very fact that elections of 1961 produced no satisfactory results for CHP, and that the party could score 36.7% of the total votes cast, may throw light upon the thrust behind the strategic transformation of CHP in those years. CHP's score in the previous election, however, had been around 40.8%. In its capacity as the majority party with a narrow margin in 1961, CHP founded three coalition governments, and did not participate in the right wing coalition cabinet headed by the *Adalet Partisi: AP* (Justice Party), heir to the outlawed DP. The time-span from 1961 to 1965 has been one during which the concept of "left of centre" was extensively discussed within CHP. Although attempts were initiated for the re-structuring of the economy, particularly via the steering role of the newly founded SPO, CHP did not seem to recover its pre-1945 popularity within the masses, and the 1965 elections resulted in a complete failure for the party. AP came to power with an overwhelming majority in 1965, receiving some 52% of the total votes cast, CHP remaining with 28.7% only. While this election defeat has been attributed by the conservative wing of the CHP to the newly emerging concept of "left of centre"; for the reformists, leftism was not only desirable for the Party, but it was at the same time the basic means for achieving economic growth and social justice in the country.

With this regard, the CHP leader *İnönü* had already announced shortly before 1965 elections that his party's location within the political spectrum was left of centre.[69] All in all, the election defeat of 1965 was attributed by conservative wing of the CHP to this newly emergent concept. For the young reformists, the left of centre movement was perceived as the means for the desired change in the party. Controversies on the implications of "left of centre", with this regard, continued

[69] Milliyet, (July 29, 1965).

from 1965 to 1972, to culminate in the victory of the *Ecevit* faction within party administration. In this context, whilst for the right wing opposition outside the CHP left of centre referred to an equivocal announcement of the party's shift towards communism; for the conservatives in CHP, a centre-left strategy would imply deviations from *Kemalist* principles, which they held as intolerable. The latter also insisted that the centralist-elitist structure of the party should be preserved.

In such a volatile conjuncture, the successive election defeat of CHP in 1969 [70] further impelled the intra-party unease, and conservative reaction proliferated in the interim. A splinter centre-right party (*Güven Partisi-GP*:Confidence Party) had already been founded in 1967 by a former conservative member of the parliament from CHP, namely *Prof. Turhan Feyzioğlu*, who accused the centre-left movement as "excessively socialistic".[71] Later on by 1973, another splinter group from the CHP joined the GP, to form the *Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi: CGP* (Republican Confidence Party). In spite of all the discontent within CHP, *İnönü*'s support for *Ecevit* remained unbroken till the military ultimatum of 1971, which signalled, by and large, the termination of this uneasy collaboration.

Prime Minister, the *AP* leader *Süleyman Demirel* had resigned, and *Nihat Erim*, a conservative CHP member of the Parliament was entrusted the task of forming a technocratic cabinet above party interests. *İnönü*'s intention of support for the *Erim* government received a severe reaction from *Ecevit*, on the grounds that the legitimacy of a cabinet backed by the Army should be questioned. At that point, the party secretary general *Ecevit* strictly refrained from any identification with the

[70] CHP scored 27.4% of the total votes cast, winning 31.8% of the seats in the Parliament in 1969.
[71] Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government", 57.

military, who insisted that CHP's image as such, should be avoided. For the secretary general, the implication of a renewed alliance between CHP and the Army as in 1960, would but be a disaster for the party, as the CHP's shift towards left and refutation of some of the traditional *Kemalist* principles had already "alienated the military from the CHP in general and from *Ecevit* in particular." [72]

Ecevit's final break with *İnönü* came when the former resigned from his post in the party, with a view to seek support from local party organisations, instead of the central administration. Backed by the party base in local provinces, *Ecevit* returned to the party congress of May 1972 with a substantial support that enabled him to be elected the party leader, which led in turn, *İnönü* to resign. From the 1972 Congress onward, CHP ideology was clearly announced as democratic left, and the party was gradually geared to the charisma of its new leader *Bulent Ecevit.*

1973 legislative elections following the interim period of 1971-73 came out to be relatively successful for the renewed CHP, and it appeared for the first time since 1961 as the largest party in the parliament. Before the elections, CHP and AP had collaborated in the Parliament for electing a retired general, namely *Fahri Korutürk* as president. The interim period, thus, had come to an end, and the normalisation of Turkish democracy was once more underway. In October that year, CHP polled % 33.3 of the votes cast, with AP falling to % 29.8. According to the electoral behaviour patterns in 1973, the new CHP appealed particularly to the urban lower classes.[73] Without any governmental majority however, CHP had no chance but to form a coalition cabinet in January 1974, with the Islamic fundamentalists, the then

[72] Ayata, *CHP Örgüt*, 85.
[73] Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government" 21.

Milli Selamet Partisi:MSP (National Salvation Party) that held only 48 seats in the Parliament.

The CHP-MSP government continued almost as a troubled alliance till the autumn of 1974 until its substitution by a right wing coalition headed by *S. Demirel* (The first so-called *Milliyetçi Cephe:* Nationalist Front). Despite all the uneasiness and its relatively short life, however, the coalition government played an important role in Turkish politics. Most notable as regards its performance was firstly the lifting of the ban on cultivation of opium poppy, that had been imposed by the US on the former *Erim* cabinet. Second was pardoning of those who had been sentenced during the interregnum of 1971-73. Third was the historic decision of launching a military operation on *Cyprus* in July 1974, that further contributed to *Ecevit*'s popularity within the masses.[74]

The CHP leader resigned in September 1974, as tension with his coalition partner turned nearly a crisis. Backing widespread popularity especially due to the *Cyprus* issue, he had also hoped to call for an early election. Instead, Turkish politics entered a phase of political impasse, as *Ecevit* was left alone being not able to find any coalition partner to form a cabinet that would go for elections. Some seven months

[74] Turkish intervention was initiated as a result of a series of attempts by the Greek Cypriots at ENOSIS, literally the annexation of the Island to Greece. Terroristic activities of the Greek Cypriots reached peak when a *coup d'état,* driven by the Colonels' Regime in Athens and in collaboration with the terrorist organisation EOKA-B, against the *sui generis* Federal Republic in Cyprus was carried out; with the ultimate goal of ENOSIS. Acting in the exercise of her rights and obligations under the Fourth Article of the Treaty of Guarantee of 16.8.1960, signed between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey; the *Ecevit* government intervened in the Island on 20 July. As talks between the three guaranteeing states produced no solutions, a second military operation was initiated on 14 August; this time controlling the territory that constitutes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus today. That signalled, by and large, the end of the *bi-zonal* Federal Structure of the Island based on the equal political status of the two communities, as had been provided by the London and Zurich Agreements of 1960. Since then, stalemate in talks have been continuing; and a new phase in Turkey's policy on Cyprus is beginning, as triggered by the Greek Cypriot side's accession negotiations to the EU in 1997. After 24 years, *Ecevit,* in his capacity as deputy prime minister, is once more in the government which is to tackle the problem.

had to be awaited before the governmental crisis was solved with the foundation of a right-wing alliance with *Demirel,* the AP leader, as prime minister.

Although CHP increased its votes to % 41.4 in the 1977 elections and became the first party in the Parliament, it was still in short of a clear majority. The minority cabinet founded by *Ecevit* in the aftermath of the elections has not been able to receive vote of confidence from the Parliament, and the CHP leader resigned in turn. The governmental vacuum was once more filled by a right-wing alliance, literally the "Second Nationalist Front", albeit lasting for five months only. In January 1978, *Ecevit*'s notorious "The Elevens Cabinet" was formed, by transferring eleven members of the Parliament from AP to CHP; to each of which a ministerial office was granted. The "Elevens Government" lasted till October 1979, and faced grave problems both socially and economically. While on the one hand political terrorism was exacerbated due to the provocative militantism of the radical groups; on the other hand, economic bottleneck stemming from the oil crisis, was tightening. [75]

3.5. The Third Turkish Republic: Personalised Factionalism

The fortune of social democracy in the post-1980 Turkey has often been identified with that of its prominent leader, *Ecevit.* Having articulated a social democratic discourse for his party in the 1970s, the leader's charisma had thoroughly helped to amalgamate the numerous factions inherent within the CHP. In the aftermath of the 12 September intervention, however, beans were spilled within the party elites:

[75] The structural constraints that the *Ecevit* cabinets in the 1970s have faced, shall be evaluated in the section on the analysis of strategy in the following Chapter.

Personal rivalries and conflicts erupted as *Ecevit* resigned from CHP leadership on 30 October 1980, and continued at full steam during the interregnum of 1980-83.

According to *Engin Ünsal*, a former member of parliament from CHP, *Ecevit* had already decided, by December that year, to found a new party comprising of young and competent people, with a grass-root organisation. In this context, it has been provided in *Ünsal*'s memoirs that: "*Ecevit* thought that his close party aides had alienated him from the Party's base, and from the society at large, and believed that while he had been busy with governmental affairs, those people around him formed cliques, that in turn, constituted enclosure around himself."[76] Ironically enough, *Ünsal* also gave an account of his personal contacts, the very next day, with *Deniz Baykal*; where the latter was reported to have said: " *Ecevit* is definitely to be re-elected CHP leader, provided that he is not banned from political life. However, that would be a disaster both for the CHP and for the country."[77]

Henceforth, the cat was let out of the bag, for social democrats, in the aftermath of the intervention: As the national Security Council (NSC) annulled all political parties on 16 October 1981, personalised factionalism burst out within the former CHP cadres. The following two years came out to be almost chaotic for the party elites; as nobody seemed sure about the future leadership, or even about the future of the party itself: all members of the 1977 Parliament were banned from political life. When the NSC had given the initial signals for the forthcoming elections[78], *Ecevit*

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[76] Engin Ünsal, *Ecevit'ten Ecevit'e (1977-1987 Yılları Arasında Sosyal Demokratların Çöküşünü Belgeleyen Anılar)* [from Ecevit to Ecevit (Memoirs Documenting the Descent of Social Democrats between the Years 1977-1987)]. (İstanbul: İnkilap Kitabevi, 1994), 47.

[77] ibid., 48.

[78] The legal arrangements for transition to multi-party politics were initiated with the introduction of a new Law amending Law No: 298 (Law No. 2812 of 5.4.1983; OJ No: 18011, 7.4.1983). Following this, a new Law on Political Parties was enacted (Law No. 2820 of 22.4.1983; OJ No: 18027, 24.4.1983). Finally, the NSC lifted the ban on political activities, with the Decision No. 76 of 24.4.1983 (OJ No: 18027, 24.4..1983).

had told *Ünsal* in May 1983 that he would not found a party justified by five generals, and that nobody should expect from him to ask for permission from those who had closed down his party and who had insulted him severely.[79] On 20 May 1983, *Halkçı Parti: HP* (Populist Party) was founded by the former undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, namely *Necdet Calp*, and was authorised by the NSC to enter the elections.[80]

An other party on the left of the political spectrum was the *Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi: SODEP* (Social Democratic Party) founded by *Erdal İnönü* and 20 friends. This party, however, was not able to participate in the November 1983 elections, as its founding members were vetoed by the NSC, according to the provisional fourth Article of the Law No. 2820. A different figure, *Cezmi Kartay* was elected SODEP leader in June that year. Although different candidates for founding membership were shown by the Party administration; they were insistently vetoed by the NSC; hence, the newly established social democratic party was practically not able to fulfil the requirement of having minimum 30 founders for entry into the elections.[81] Having polled 30.46 % of the total votes, *Calp's* HP acquired 117 seats and became the second largest party in the Parliament, after *Turgut Özal*'s *Anavatan Partisi: ANAP* (Motherland Party).[82]

As *Ersin Kalaycıoğlu* has drawn attention, the new members of the Parliament in 1983 were "recruited from among the politically ambitious lower echelons of power

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[79] Ünsal, *Ecevit*, 54.

[80] According to the provisional article of the Law No. 2820 (Article 4), the NSC enjoyed a veto right on founders of political parties. Besides, the Decision No. 76 of the NSC had provided that members of the annulled political parties were not allowed to defend themselves or their former parties (Article 2a); nor the newly established parties could either praise, defend or allege against the annulled parties (2b).

[81] Decision No. 99 of 26.7.1983 had stated that parties with less than thirty founding members, as of 24.8.1983, were not going to be allowed to enter the November 1983 elections.

[82] ANAP, the winner of the 1983 elections had won 45.15 %, acquiring 211 seats. (DİE Figures)

in the former political parties", and that "they had no major role in national or parliamentary politics prior to their election to the Parliament".[83] On that account, voters in 1983 had to "choose among parties and leaders who were new to Turkish politics."[84] Hence, the party system in the 1980s revealed quite dissimilar patterns than those observed in the past decades. *Bülent Tanör*'s comments on that phase of politics in Turkey have been such that, the newly founded parties were "like trees without roots", whence the electorate had difficulty in identifying their own parties.[85]

In the aftermath of November 1983 elections, while the former AP supporters tended towards DYP; post-1983 centre-left was observed to be uniting around SHP, to which *Erdal İnönü* was elected leader. Insofar as the formative phase of political cleavages after 1983, the 25 March 1984 local elections have been decisive; in that the essential patterns of opposition to the ANAP government were becoming to crystallise. While ANAP seemed to preserve its support among the electorate with 45 %; the vetoed SODEP of 1983 ironically became the second largest party (22 %), with HP and MDP falling to 8 % and 6.5 %, respectively. The HP leader *Necdet Calp* had to resign in April 1984. In *Tanör*'s view, these developments signalled "a normalisation process" within Turkish politics; as November 1983 elections had been based on a rather unnatural party formation.[86] Thus, the assertion that there had not been much fragmentation on the Turkish left, and that the HP had replaced CHP

[83] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "The Turkish Grand National Assembly: A Brief Inquiry into the Politics of Representation in Turkey". In *Turkey: Political, Social and economic Challenges in the 1990s,* eds., Çiğdem Balım and et al., 42-60. (Leiden/New York/Köln: E.J.Brill, 1995), 55.

[84] Üstün Ergüder "Post-1980 Parties and Politics in Turkey". In *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey,* ed. Ergun Özbudun, 113-146. Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), 126.

[85] Tanör, Bülent, "Siyasal Tarih, 1980-1995" [Political History, 1980-1995]". In Boratav, Korkut, and Akşin, Sina. *Bugünkü Türkiye 1980-1995, Türkiye Tarihi 5* [Turkey Today 1980-1995, Turkish History 5]. 2nd ed. ed. Sina Akşin, 23-158. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1997), 62.

[86] Ibid., 63.

as a social democratic force in 1983[87], does not seem to suffice for complementing the picture of post-1983 centre-left. Though HP received support from sources highly similar to those of the former CHP in 1983, hence appeared to be the successor to pre-1980 social democracy,[88] the centre-left in Turkey came into view as badly split in the following years.

Indeed, cases of both the left and the right in post-1983 Turkey revealed bitter fractures and persistent intra-elite conflicts, complying with the fact that a prominent feature of electoral behaviour in Turkey in the late 1980s and 1990s has been volatility[89]. As for the left, *Aydın Güven Gürkan*, a fresh name within social democracy, was elected HP leader in the party congress of 30 June 1985.[90] *Gürkan*'s leadership has given the impetus for reinforcing the social democratic block that revealed a rather weird dilemma in those years: HP, with its capacity of 117 representations in the Parliament had fallen to an electoral support of 8 % only; while the extra-parliamentary party of the centre-left, SODEP was appearing to be the second largest party with an overall support of 22 %, as of 1984. Owing largely to the reconciliatory attitudes of leaders of the two parties; factionalism was temporarily overcome, and SODEP merged with HP under the title of *Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti:SHP* (Social Democratic Populist Party) on 4 November 1985. Some ten days later, *Demokratik Sol Parti:DSP* (Democratic Left Party) was

[87] Ergüder, "Post-1980 Parties", 116.
[88] ibid.,128.
[89] Üstün Ergüder, "The Turkish Party System and the Future of Turkish Democracy". In *Turkey: Political, Social and economic Challenges in the 1990s*, eds., Çiğdem Balım and et al., 61-73. (Leiden/New York/Köln: E.J.Brill, 1995), 70.
[90] Tanör, "Siyasal Tarih", 63.

founded by *Rahşan Ecevit*.[91] *Erdal İnönü* was elected SHP leader in the party congress of 1 June 1986.[92]

Although *İnönü* protruded as a compromising and a dignified politician, even these qualifications proved incompetent to unite the social democrats into one political party. Thereupon, the centre-left continued to remain badly divided ever since then. While at first sight these fractures appeared to be confined to the division of social democracy between two parties, indeed both parties were inherently occupied with various cliques. On the other hand, though DSP looked more of an organisationally disciplined party, it must be noted that this was rather due to the charisma, thence to the personal hegemony of its leader on the party elites. From its foundation onward, DSP has been continuing almost as a "one man show", within which nearly all intra-party oppositions have been suppressed so far. In the general elections of November 1987, DSP has been able to poll 8.53 % of the votes only, while SHP scored as the second largest party winning 24.74 %, following *Özal*'s ANAP. [93] As for SHP, enduring intra-elite conflicts and allegations on corruption in municipal administrations have undermined to a large extent the party's popularity within the masses, which was further exacerbated on participation in the coalition governments between 1991 and 1995, as shall be elaborated in due course.

SHP came to power as junior partner to the coalition formed following the 1991 general elections. Within the coalition cabinets formed between 1991 and 1995, the SHP (and later on CHP), were granted ministerial positions apart from those

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[91] Bülent Ecevit was not allowed to participate in active politics at that time.
[92] Tanör, "Siyasal Tarih", 65.
[93] ANAP was also in an electoral decline; it polled 36.31 %, when compared to 45 % in 1983. (DİE Figures)

responsible from the management of the economy; in that they officiated in Ministries such as of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Industry and Trade, Tourism, Culture, and Labour and Social Security. Despite having been excluded from key roles within the economic apparatus, the social democrats, in their capacity as the coalition partner, had to carry all the weighty accountability of the coalition from 1991 to 1995; as the period in question was dominated by chronic high inflation and instability. Whilst some considerable progress had been made in Turkey towards the establishment of the fundamentals of markets operating within the framework of an outward oriented economy; inflationary trend and investment difficulties in the industrial sector, by and large, tended to continue. With coming to power of the coalition in 1991, almost no significant progress has been recorded with regard to these prominent problems; on the contrary, Turkish economy gravitated towards a crisis situation by the end of 1993.

Public deficits, from 1991 onward, increased continuously to undermine seriously the macro-economic balance in Turkey. As such, the expansionary trend observed in the fiscal policy caused an instable growth structure relying on domestic demand, with chronic price increases.[94] Increasing fiscal deficit prompted a severe deterioration in foreign balance, in particular from the second half of 1993 onward. As liquidity became uncontrollable, a serious crisis erupted in money, capital and exchange markets, by the beginning of 1994. Highest inflation rate of the entire Republican Period was recorded,[95] with sizeable investment cuts that year. Although

[94] The PSBR/GNP ratio rose to 12:1%, foreign trade deficit to 14.2 billion US Dollars, and current account deficit to 6.4 billion US Dollars in 1993. 1995 Yılı Programı [1995 Annual Program]. (Ankara: DPT, 1996), 2.

[95] DPT, *Ekonomik ve Sosyal Göstergeler (1950-1995)* [Economic and Social Indicators (1950-1995)]. (Ankara: DPT, 1996), 20.

an "Economic Measures Implementation Plan" was put into effect on 5 April 1994, with a view to stabilising the economy rapidly, mainly by reducing public deficits; no significant progress could be achieved either in terms of macro-economic balances or of the declining popularity of the government.

CHAPTER IV

THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The study on the socialist currents in the pre-Republican Period and on CHP so far, has highlighted the fact that the emergence of social democracy in Turkey has followed a different pattern than those observed in the Western settings. Rather, social democracy was to ground on the legacy of the state-party that emerged out of the National Liberation Movement. Although an array of elite attempts at socialist politics came into existence before the Republican Period, it becomes clear that they practically held no mass base.

Social democracy in Turkey emerged in the Second Republic and was structured on the transformation of CHP towards the left of centre. Efforts were put forth in this period for the consolidation of the CHP's identity as a social democratic party, largely through the confrontation of the conservative and reformist wings within the Party. CHP came into government during this period either through coalitions or minority cabinets. Yet, the particular political and economic conjuncture prevailing in the country in the 1970s largely undermined the social democratic governments' performance. In the aftermath of the interregnum of 1980-1983, social democrats were divided as two different parties. The experience in government as coalition partners to the right-wing governments during the Third Republic also appeared to be impeded by structural constraints. The particular external and internal factors that

influenced the fortune of social democracy in Turkey shall be an integral part of the analysis in this Chapter.

4.1. Ideology

The very fact that CHP discourse emanated from the "national cause" of the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk* years, instead of being grounded on theoretical justifications, needs to be reiterated in this context. With that respect, it may also be possible to highlight the rationale behind the "cross-class appeal" of the Turkish Revolution, in that it was not "directed against a particular social class, but against foreign enemies and their Turkish collaborators".[1] As *Maurice Duverger* had stated in his analysis of political parties, generally, praxis preceded theory in single party systems. At times, indeed, hardly any theory seemed to either justify or even to complement the actual being of the single-party, as the pre-1946 Turkish politics indicated. That in fascist Italy and in national socialist Germany theoretical justifications had been articulated for the *de-facto* hegemony of their respective single-parties constituted the two rare exceptions within this phenomenon.[2]

The *"Declaration of 9 Principles (8 April 1923)"* emerged as the first political program of the CHP, in that the fundamentals of party ideology such as republicanism and secularism came forth. Republicanism, as the major impulse behind the *Kemalist* endeavour, has been inscribed in the first principle of the Declaration, as *"Sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation"*. Equally important on commitment to republicanism was the proposition in the second

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[1] Ergun Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime". In Ergun Özbudun Ali Kazancıgil, eds, London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981), 83.

[2] Maurice Duverger, *Siyasi Partiler* [Political Parties]. trans. Ergun özbudun. 4th ed. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993), 336.

principle that the Decision of the First Parliament on the abolition of the Monarchy dated 1.11.1922 was an inalterable norm. The second principle in the Declaration suggested the intention of *Kemalist* cadres to ultimately establish secularism in the new regime, as it stated strategically that the "the Caliphate is empowered by the Grand National Assembly"[3].

For economic and social policy, the 8 April Declaration put forward clearly a commitment to the fundamentals, thus to the liberal spirit of the "First Economic Congress of 1923" held in *İzmir*; and in the final analysis, revealed an unveiled tendency towards a mixed economy,.[4] The CHP elites signalled during the peace negotiations in *Lausenne* their intention to bring Turkey closer to the political and economic system of the Western World. That the *İzmir Congress* took place during the interruption of negotiations in *Lausenne*, was by no means a coincidence, as stated elsewhere.[5] In this connection, the ninth principle in the 8 April document stipulated that, for the rapid re-construction of the war-stricken country, private enterprise would be promoted, in addition to measures to be taken by the state. Enhancing domestic security, improvement of justice affairs, and augmentation of the rights and of the welfare of both the civil and military bureaucrats were also among the essentials of the 8 April Act.

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[3] Caliphate was abolished by the decision of the SGNA on 3 March 1924.Ottoman sultans have been generally accepted to have represented the post of *"Emir ül-müminin"* (leader of the Moslems) since Selim I's return from Cairo in 1518, till *Abdülhamit I's* reign. While no official documents or imperial coins registered the sultans as either the caliph or *emir ül-müminin*; it is of no controversy that the Ottoman throne acquired the position of *"centre of sacredness"* within the Muslim world. From *Selim*'s reign onward, Islamic principles started to gain weight, and the role of the *ulema* (scholars of Islam) increased in the governance of the Empire. (Metin Kunt, "Siyasal Tarih 1300-1600 [Political History 1300-1600]. In Metin Kunt et al., *Osmanlı Devleti 1300-1600,* Türkiye Tarihi 2 [The Ottoman Empire 1300-1600, Turkish History 2 (3rd ed.)]. ed. Sina Akşin, (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992), 113-117.)

[4] "Declaration of 8 April 1923: Preamble", cited in: Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 580.

[5] Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası* [The Turkish Revolution and After], (3rd ed., Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1994), 38-41.

CHP's party program was further enlarged in the 1927 Congress, in which also the historic six-day speech was delivered by *M. Kemal*, the party leader. The six fundamentals of CHP ideology were announced for the first time in the 1931 Party Congresses, and they were incorporated into the Constitution of 1924. These fundamentals were republicanism, nationalism, populism,[6] étatism, secularism, and revolutionism.[7] The years between 1923 and 1935 has been the period during which the CHP's ideological stance, largely stemming from the conjunctural developments of the time, gravitated towards a full commitment to étatism, a concept that shall be elaborated in a more detailed fashion in the following parts. The Party program adopted in the 1935 Congress unequivocally indicated the consolidation of étatist doctrine within the CHP, and the pragmatic impulse behind it.

The concept of *étatism,* as employed by *Robert W. Kerwin* directly from its French original, instead of *statism* as in English, refers to the particular encountering of Turkey in economic policy between the period 1933 to 1950. *Kerwin* delineated the Turkish experience as efficient, powerful and as developmental; while indicating, at the same time, the demarcation between Statism in the broader sense of the meaning and the *sui generis* character of Turkish economic policy in this period.[8]

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[6] The principle of *"halkçılık"* has been referred to as *"populism"*. The latter had *"openly anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist overtones in Kemal's early statements"*, however in later years it gradually meant *"popular sovereignity and equality before the law, as well as a rejection of class conflict"*. (Özbudun, "Kemalist Political Regime", 88).

[7] The essential component of CHP ideology *"devrimcilik"* has been referred to as *revolutionism* in this study. The term *revolutionism* may not, in fact, suffice for clarification of the concept of *devrimcilik,* as the latter refers to a wider spectrum of beliefs and/or attitudes. As E. Özbudun has pointed out; *"This principle (devrimcilik) sometimes meant a committment to specific Kemalist reforms, and sometimes a more general commitment to permanent change and progress, as well as a rejection of gradualism and evolutionism"*. (ibid., 91).

[8] R.W. Kerwin, "Türkiye'de Devletçilik [Étatism in Turkey]. In Nevin Coşar, ed., Türkiye'de Devletçilik [Étatism in Turkey], 97-114. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1995), 97.

On that account, *Korkut Boratav* has shown that there have been, indeed, different periods in the economic policies pursued by the pre-1946 CHP. Thereupon, the time-span between 1923 and 1929 was referred to as the "liberal period" of the party; yet, in a rather narrower sense of the concept. CHP's liberalism in this period was described as an outward oriented promotion of private capital by the state; while in the years from 1930 to 1932, private capital based protectionism and import substitution policies were pursued instead. In this context, the period between 1933-1939 was registered as the *Synthesis of étatism and protectionism*. Comparisons between the economic indicators of the transitionary stages have been interpreted by *Boratav* as the empirical evidence supporting the very fact that the *étatist synthesis* emerged as consequential within the perceived impacts of the policies pursued in these respective periods. [9]

The CHP Program of 1935 clearly aimed at the maintenance of a "mixed economy" with far-reaching state intervention. While it seems possible at first hand, to attribute basic social democratic values to the 1935 Program, an analysis of the subject from different points of view divulges that no ideological orientation in the Western sense has been influential, but that it was rather pragmatism that lead the CHP cadre towards étatist economic policies, as mentioned before. Prime Minister *İsmet İnönü's* words appear noteworthy in this connection, as he was reported to have said in 1923 that: "I know not of that theory or this theory; what I do is to construct a hand-span of railway each day.". [10]

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[9] Korkut Botarav, "Devletçilik ve Kemalist İktisat Politikaları [Étatism and Kemalist Economic Policy]". In Nevin Coşar, ed., Türkiye'de Devletçilik [Étatism in Turkey], 115-142. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1995), 117-118.

[10] Reported in: Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Çankaya*. (İstanbul: Yenigün Basın-Yayıncılık AŞ., 1997), 421.

Equally important within the context was the world economic conjuncture stemming largely from the great depression of 1929, rendering interventionist policies inescapable not only in Turkey but in European countries as well. The *Great Depression of 1929* has been generally accepted to have burst out following a series of crises both in real markets and in monetary markets in the Western world; the implications of which have been serious falls in the levels of production and of employment. Hardly any country on Earth escaped the outcomes of contraction in international trade volume and of the breakdown in financial and monetary structures. Consequential within this conjuncture was the fact that many countries inclined towards protectionism, pursuing inward-oriented economic policies. Prominent features of international trade in this period have been quota applications, bartering and clearing; while self-sufficiency appeared as a requisite for national economies. State intervention in economy rapidly increased, and theoretical discussions on the economic measures to be taken culminated in the late 1930s, as Keynes appeared in political economy. It has been noted in this context that étatism should be evaluated as a dual response of a particular state; which grounded firstly, as a defensive to the Great Depression of 1929. Second was the implication of developments in Turkish economy in the period between 1923 and 1930. [11]

All in all, the pragmatic thrust behind the *étatist synthesis* of 1930s was announced by key figures within the party administration of the period, such as Prime Minister *İsmet İnönü:*

[11] Faruk Birtek, "Devletçiliğin Yükselişi ve Düşüşü [The Rise and Fall of Étatism]. In Nevin Coşar, ed., Türkiye'de Devletçilik [Étatism in Turkey], 143-172. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1995), 144.

"Étatism as an economic policy appeared to me, above everything, as a vehicle for defence. In order to compensate for the negligence of centuries, to re-construct unfair destruction, and to establish a strong state structure capable of resisting the though conditions of contemporary times, the State had to be freed from devastating factors in the economy. We were obliged, therefore, to adopt étatism as a protective agent to pursue a developmental path, and as a reference for, and a fundamental within economics.

....That we regard étatism an abundant and a positive policy for development and for re-structuring, stems not only from a conservative point of view, but also from the anticipation that étatism constitutes the most efficient means for development and growth. Only the naive may hope to establish the required industry and the infrastructure, without the supervision of and direct intervention by the State. Our immediate and challenging duty is to create as soon as possible, through powerful means and possibilities of the state, the national industry and to establish the economic structure of this great nation, which was left underdeveloped and with insufficient means.

....State railways make possible the transportation of certain goods in certain areas with rates below the cost of the coal fired in these trains. Does it ever seem possible for any railway other than those under state ownership?

.....Étatism grounded naturally due to the patriotism and goodwill of the last ten years. [12]

The relevant provisions of the 1935 CHP Program on economic policy also indicate the pragmatic impetus behind the *étatist* strategy. Likewise, in the sphere of social and distributional policies, the respective provisions of the Program were confined to the notions of a "social state" pursuing the welfare and security of its citizens, yet without any ideological motifs lurking behind. With that respect, the social and financial policies of the 1930s may indicate the commitment of the party administration to the establishment social security, and to the preservation of the rights of working people.[13]

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[12] İsmet İnönü "Fırkamızın Devletçilik Vasfı [The Etatist characteristic of our Party]". In Nevin Coşar, ed., Türkiye'de Devletçilik [Étatism in Turkey], 41-44. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1995), 41-43.

[13] For the relevant provisions of 1935 CHP Program, see the Annex to this dissertation.

Thereupon, it becomes clear that the origins of CHP ideology were by no means rooted in Western thought, nor they revealed any evolutionary path from orthodox Marxism to parliamentary socialism, as had been the case in Western European social democratic parties. CHP ideology in the pre-1946 period, instead, indicated policies written in terms of the economic and political conjuncture of the time, and appeared as highly pragmatic. *M. Kemal* had stated once that "if the Party (CHP) had had a doctrine, than the Turkish Revolution would have been frozen."[14] Nevertheless, a thorough reading of the 1935 Programme reveals that it was highly oriented towards basic social democratic values such as egalitarianism, fair distribution of wealth, state intervention in the economy and establishment of social security.

The ideological transformation of the Second Republic, on the other hand, was largely a confrontation between the conservative and reformist wings in the Party, as noted before. Indeed, the 1965 attempt put forth almost no radical deviations from the party's traditional ideology; in that CHP's fundamentals such as republicanism, reformism, democracy, *étatist* economic development and social justice remained intact. It has been argued with this regard that, the concept of left of centre was utilised to present the identity of CHP in terms of the (then) newly fashioned concepts of the post-1960 paradigm.[15] Here, the libertarian spirit of the 1961 Constitution, and the challenge posed by the TİP as a rising star on the left of the political spectrum, has to be reiterated. According to *Ayata*; being on the centre-left referred by no means to any change as regards either ideology or programme; rather,

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[14] Reported in: Ţevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Tek Adam 1922-1938, III.Cilt* [The Only Man 1922-1938, vol.3]. (İstanbul: remzi Kitabevi, 1965), 501.

[15] Ayse Günes Ayata, *CHP (Örgüt ve İdeoloji* [CHP Organisation and Ideology]. (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1992), 82.

the concept seemed to have been employed by the party elites to present the identity of CHP in terms of the newly fashioned concepts of the post-1960 political paradigm.[16]

In *Muzaffer Sencer*'s view, on the other hand, the social democratic party programme was drafted basically through a re-definition of the fundamentals of the CHP ideology, in particular of étatism and populism. Hence, the 1965 Programme was based on the country's realities rather than being propelled by any dogma or theory. Geared to economic development, therefore, étatism would serve as the means for enhancing social justice and security.[17]

Along with weighty étatist values, it was declared in the Programme that the Party was respectful to the private sector, in that the latter was believed to be as beneficial as the former, in serving the goal of national development. Nevertheless, in order to steer the private sector to useful fields and to ensure its operability in harmony with the fundamentals of the national economy, the state was entrusted the task of taking the necessary measures in areas such as foreign trade, customs, taxation and credits policy. In this context, development plans were accredited as the agents of the demarcation between the state and the markets.[18]

CHP's 1965 programme laid emphasis also on the principle of populism, and endeavoured to elucidate the concept with reference to democracy and class harmony. The basic novelty within CHP discourse at that point, was the recognition

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[16] Ibid., 82.
[17] Muzaffer Sencer, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partilerin Sosyal Temelleri* [The Social Origins of Political Parties in Turkey]. (İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1974), 282.
[18] 1965 Programme, cited in: Ayata, *CHP Orgut*, 195.

of the existence of different classes within Turkish society. Class conflict, however, was still refuted; and the locus of CHP's populism appeared to be an according of class interests, instead of the articulation of antagonisms. As long as class harmony was ensured, the Turkish society was a whole, indivisible on class grounds. CHP's basic policy in this context was to preserve the general will from economic and social coercion; by preventing certain individuals or classes to enjoy dominance on the grounds of their social and economic status.

Furthermore, CHP programme envisaged that the working masses should have a voice on matters pertaining to working conditions and to wages. Populism also covered that equality of opportunity in access to education should, at any cost, be provided for the society at large. In the final analysis, therefore, populism as accounted for in the 1965 Programme, attempted to evaluate the problems of Turkish society from a social justice point of view, and endeavoured to take the necessary measures for eliminating regional disparities in access to public services and to developmental enterprises. CHP's basic policy prescriptions within the framework of the distributional question, therefore, lay in harmony with traditional social democratic values; with the concept of "indicative planning" retained as the means to that end.[19]

[19] Ibid., 196.

4.1.1. The Concept of "Left of Centre"

According to *Bülent Ecevit*, CHP had endeavoured to carry out radical transformations and reforms in the past, that had been perceived as a potential threat to the interests of certain groups either in Turkey or outside [20]:

> "Having challenged the interests of big land owners through the Land Reform Bill; having shown a bold front to tax evaders by attempting at tax reforms; having granted the working people their political rights, that in turn defied those who had been addicted to exploitation; and having endeavoured to preserve national independence and the national economy, CHP has unequivocally steeled itself on the left of the centre of other parties in the political spectrum of 1965." [21]

Ecevit also provided an account of the competitive spectrum of multi-party politics in this context. In order to be able to clarify the centre-left's position, the CHP leader elucidated a range of political positions from the extreme right to its counterpart in the left; hence attempted to highlight the social democratic position of the CHP in relation both to the right and to the extreme left. On that account, extreme rightists were those who tried to turn the clock back, literally those that wished to pull the society backwards. Most of them were eager, according to the CHP leader, to keep the masses in the darkness of bigotry, with the ultimate goal of depriving them of their social and economic rights. Hence, in order to be able to exploit the masses for the hegemony of a few, they either attempted to suppress people under right wing dictatorships, or to tranquillise them by means of pseudo-democracies. As such, they boldly put to use the concepts of free enterprise and private property, consequently rendering the means of production and working life subject to monopolistic capital and to big land owners; the law and the state serving as the means for their ends. To

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[20] Bülent Ecevit *Ortanın Solu* [Left of Centre]. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1974), 12.
[21] Ibid., 11.

that end, both fascism and national socialism were among the contemporary versions of the extreme right.

Closer to the centre, the centre-right comprised of those conservatives who were alarmed at any changes within the society. In the CHP leader's view, they opposed all kinds of reformation or transformation, as they desired to preserve the existing order for the sake of their dominant position. In this context, they perceived the concept of social justice both as a retarding agent in front of development, and as an unnecessary burden for the economy. Hence, they held that the state should not be active in economic and social life; but should be subservient to the interests of the dominant groups only. Owing to that, they could accept democracy insofar as it did not pose any threat to their hegemony on the society. In this connection, the CHP leader had identified the position of its rival AP as bearing a range of values from the right of centre to the extreme right.

Differing in some value, the centrists were those who could accept gradual changes within the society; nevertheless, there existed no revolutionaries on the centre of the political spectrum. On the contrary, they opted for small improvements, and refrained from any radical attempts for reformation. Although they favoured democracy, and they recognised the concept of social justice; they were reluctant, as in the case of the centre-right, to state contribution to social justice, except marginal levels. So far as the developmental question was concerned, their sole perspective came out to be grounded on private capital only.

In contrast to the right however, the intrinsic value of the left of centre was the emphasis laid on humanistic issues. The centre-left, in *Ecevit*'s view, ultimately aimed at furnishing each and everyone with the opportunity for individual development. It was populism, in the sense that it placed the interests of the wider society above those of certain groups; hence, populism as adopted by CHP never referred to the flattering of the people with electoral concerns. [22] Following from there was the very fact that, left of centre, according to the CHP leader, was geared to blotting out the existence of all kinds of discrimination and inequality, and to doing away with class differences. Hence, instead of privileging one class at the expense of another, the centre-left aimed at enhancing equality and justice in the distribution of the national income.

On that account, those on the left of centre have adopted social justice and social security as their basic tenets; as they found it unnecessary and unjust to await for gradual societal development by means of investments carried out by particular groups only. The leftists on the centre were also reformist and revolutionary; and were looking forward to change the society as rapidly as possible. Consequential was that the left of centre was étatist not on the grounds that the means of production and economic life in general should all be nationalised, but owing to the fact that the right for free enterprise and private property should be made use of within the framework of social justice and the common good of all. To that end, the centre-left opted for planned development in order not to leave the door open to arbitrariness within social and economic development, which implied that economic activities should be supervised by the state.

[22] CHP's concept of populism refers to "*halkçılık*" in Turkish, instead of "*halk dalkavukluğu*" as the English phrase may imply.

For the CHP leader, the centre-left was immovably committed to the concept of liberty; in that it rejected any limitation on basic rights and freedom; thus aimed at achieving its economic and social ends within libertarian democratic order. For that purpose, the left of centre has adopted social democracy as its fundamental, stemming from the very fact that democracy alone could not serve the common good unless the general will was freed of economic and social coercion by a few, on the wider society. Therefore, not only the formal but also the social dimension of democracy was attributed paramount importance by *Ecevit*. At that point, the basic demarcation between social democracy and the extreme left was elucidated by the CHP leader, according to who, freedom of enterprise and private property was rejected by the latter. It might be of value to note in this connection that, during his political career, *Ecevit* came to be known to have appeared as meticulous in highlighting the essential differences between his party's position and that of the extreme left.

For instance, TİP was attributed to inherently possess positions from the left of that of the CHP to the extreme left; whilst the CHP was intrinsically consistent as regards its position on the left of centre. As such, the extreme left was defined by him as covering a range of positions grounded on dogmas and doctrines; including communism as well. Whilst these might not have overtly refuted democracy; libertarian democratic order was doomed to parish once entire economic life was taken under state ownership, which would imply in turn, that any checks and balances on the state would but be desolated. Hence, the *sine qua non* of Western style social democracy, as adopted also by CHP, was the right for free enterprise, for

private property and for heritance. The position of left of centre as held by *Ecevit*, therefore, was a refutation of state dictatorship, as well as a quest for a democracy grounded on social justice.[23]

So far as class politics was concerned the demarcation between the extreme left and the centre-left was such that, while the former aimed at the hegemony of one class on others; the latter, in contrast, intended to dissolve class differences peacefully in the democratic order, by means of measures to be taken for improving income distribution and for the utilisation of labour value rationally. On that account, the ultimate goal of left of centre was to base the structure of the society on more humanistic and merging grounds, instead of class antagonism. In the final analysis, the centre-left, according to the CHP leader, comprised of a set of values for the establishment of a fair and a humanistic order in which mental and material deprivation end for all; and within which any method or tool incompatible with ethics, liberty and social justice were inexcusable.[24]

4.1.2. Ideological Demarcations after Division

Although social democrats were split into different parties during the Third Republic; hardly any fundamental contradictions can be spotted within the ideological stances. It appears that both the CHP and DSP programs are defending essential social democratic values, yet with some divergences on the management of markets. Despite increasing reaction from its electorate on dividedness, Turkish social democracy has been entering elections as different parties, without any exit

[23] Ibid., 92-95.
[24] Ibid., 292.

option even for electoral alliance. Factionalism and fractures within the social democratic milieu in Turkey seems by and large, to revolve around personal conflicts rather than programmatic differences; hence dividing its electorate, too.

As for CHP, the basic tenets of its economic policy after 1992,[25] is confined to the concepts of "organised market economy" and "strategic planning". When compared to its previous program of 1976, CHP seems to tend towards market mechanism, at the expense of traditional étatist values. The essential target is to provide productivity, rational management and economic efficiency, within the framework of an organised market system based on competition rules. To this end, a genuine market system has been defined as one within which the critical balance between different interests and rights are maintained fairly and defended democratically. Competition, according to CHP, is the libertarian medium grounded on a dynamic understanding of enhancing productivity and efficiency. As for the organisation of the markets, CHP foresees the encouragement of free organisation of labour and of all the other sections of the society, in a socially responsible manner that will take into account the conservation of the environment and the protection of consumers, as well. Equally important is that weighty economic decisions should by no means be dictated by monopolies. The fundamentals of the organised market mechanism as provided by the CHP program requires, at the same time, that protectionism should be limited to those sub-sectors that reveal strategic importance in terms of industrialisation and social development; from whence it appears that protectionist measures as such, should not be allowed to undermine integration with foreign markets.[26]

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[25] New CHP program was adopted on 9.9.1992. CHP and SHP merged into one party in 1995.

[26] CHP, *Yeni Hedefler, Yeni Türkiye: CHP Programı* [New Targets, New Turkey: CHP Program]. (Ankara: CHP, 1995), 113-114.

So far as "strategic planning" is concerned, CHP's policy is such that, macro-economic planning should be utilised as a means for steering the medium and long term economic targets, instead of enjoying a commanding position. Besides, strategic planning should be able to provide for the enhancement of the deficiencies of market mechanism, without interfering in it. To that end, strategic planning is to put forth the strategies for a "high-technology and a "sustainable" industrialisation policy; and for a globally competitive economic structure.[27] As strategic planning shall be confined to long term evaluation of resource allocation, powers of the "State Planning Organisation (SPO) shall be limited to strategy and policy formulation; thus the SPO shall not be allowed to interfere in implementation.[28]

It must be emphasised thereupon that, when compared to DSP, CHP appears to be in a more pro-market position; hence seems to be more influenced from the globalist discourse of the 1990s. Though actually no fundamental divergences can be spotted between the two parties' economic policies, DSP program reveals a more persistent stand on traditional Keynesian strategy. While for instance, an apparent scepticism towards *laissez-fairé* can be traced in the DSP program, CHP policy on macro-economic management lays emphasis on the virtues of market mechanism and on globalisation. Despite commitment to rooted social democratic values such as fairer distribution of resources, comprehensive social security or institutionalised labour

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[27] Ibid., 115.

[28] Ibid., 116. Indeed, contrary to what is generally held, the SPO in Turkey has never been in a position similar to those planning systems that had prevailed in socialist systems. In the latter, the entire public sector used to be planned centrally, with production targets set for each sub-sector; hence such systems used to enjoy a commanding position on the economic apparatus. In Turkey, the planning system has been prevailing, by and large, in the form put forth by the 1995 Program The departments of the SPO responsible from implementation, literally the Departments for "Foreign Investment" and for "Investment Promotion" were detached from the SPO in 1992. In fact, they had been incorporated into the SPO during *Özal* governments.

organisation in both programs, CHP's stand on the role of the state remains more limited, when compared to that of DSP. For the regulation of markets, the former is content with stating that it is against "deranged markets controlled by monopolistic capital within which the weak are restrained by the powerful and the consumers are exploited by monopolies".[29] DSP on the other hand, elaborates in detail the rationale behind the necessity of state intervention in the market mechanism, without which an economic structure subservient to the interests of the powerful is bound to prevail. Utilisation of market rules in harmony with the other components of the economic apparatus, therefore, is to the benefit of the society at large, including the have-nots as well.[30]

Another divergence from the CHP is a prevailing commitment to étatist values. It has been unequivocally stated in the DSP program that "enterprises providing public service and infrastructure shall be owned by the state"; and that "while natural resources shall be operated by the state, the ownership of the defence industry shall remain public". Apart from these, all economic activity shall be open to the private sector.[31] It is stipulated in this context that, in their capacity as national property, natural resources shall not be operated according to personal interests or to short term market rules, but they shall be subordinate to the benefits of the entire nation, bearing in mind the future and the interests of the country.[32] Beyond that, the state shall take the responsibility of founding pioneer enterprises in the less-favoured regions even when they may not prove profitable, whence unattractive for the private sector. The state shall also be assigned the task of establishing the high-technology

[29] CHP, *Yeni Hedefler*, 113-114.
[30] DSP, Demokratik Sol Parti Programı [Party Program]. (Ankara: Sistem Ofset), 64-67.
[31] DSP, *Demokratik Sol*, 63.
[32] ibid., 75.

industries of the future. On that account, the general principles, strategies and targets set forth by the plans shall be borne in mind; production, exports and imports shall be planned. To this end, enslavement of the economic and the social by *laisséz faire* shall be deterred, without prejudice to the essentials of the market rules.[33] In the final analysis, DSP reveals a clear commitment to an enlarged participation of the state in economic activity and to its steering role for the markets; as it has been stated in the program that "In order that the state may carry out the tasks assigned on it, public revenues and expenditures shall be increased."[34]

Deriving from the two key issues of étatism and planning as commented on above, is the divergence from CHP also on the "privatisation" question. While the latter anticipates the rapid privatisation of the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) that fall short of competitiveness and efficiency, or those beyond a limited scope;[35] privatisation for DSP is a means for the re-establishment of the SEEs to operate in harmony with the plan targets and market rules. Having stated that "no ideological approach can be accepted" either for public enterprises or for privatisation, a comprehensive account of the legal and institutional arrangements to be carried out for proper privatisation of the SEEs have been provided in the CHP Program. From that point of view, this party appears to have abandoned its age-old legacy of the "state as the backbone of the industrialisation process". Having dropped import substitution policies in favour of competition and of integration with world markets, CHP seems highly influenced from the 1990s' rhetoric on globalism.

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[33] ibid., 64.
[34] ibid., 78.
[35] CHP, *Yeni Hedefler*, 132-133.

In a nutshell, a comparison of the programs of both parties would unveil the fact that whilst DSP places emphasis on traditional Keynesian macro-economic management, CHP appears to be in a more pro-market position. Although, therefore, an apparent scepticism towards uncontrolled markets and a clear tendency towards planning can be perceived in DSP's position, CHP puts together a more receptive discourse on the market mechanism. In this context, the former is unequivocally committed to an enlarged participation of the state in the economic activity, where the latter's tendency is closer to the establishment of a globally competitive economic structure. In addition to such issues relating to étatism and planning, another divergence is on the privatisation question. Despite that no *a priori* refutation of privatisation can be traced in both programs; DSP explicitly raises the belief that privatisation is acceptable to the extent that it constitutes a means for the re-establishment of the SEEs to operate in harmony with plan targets and market rules. As such, CHP's position on this enigma seems to be closer to that of the centre-right; as rapid privatisation of the SEEs that fall short of competitiveness and efficiency is boldly argued for in the CHP Program. In a nutshell, inasmuch as DSP remains more committed to traditional social democratic values, CHP appears to be highly influenced from the recent rhetoric on globalisation and on the virtues of markets.

4.2. Social Base

The Turkish party system in the 1970s still revealed the bulk of the legacy that had written the politics of the Ottoman State in the last century. As *Ergun Özbudun* has suggested, power struggle in the First Turkish Republic was still confined to an intra-elite conflict in those years. In that respect, attention has been drawn to the fact

that, the social profiles of the two main opposition attempts in the single-party period, literally of both the *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyetçi Fırka:TCF* (Progressive Republican Party: 1924-25), and of the *Serbest Fırka:SF* (Free Party: 1930), were hardly distinguishable from the CHP, in terms of the social backgrounds of their leaders.[36] Had these two attempts lived longer as political parties, they would most probably have tended towards representing peripheral interests,[37] as the case of the DP have verified in due course. The very fact that the locus of CHP lay on the civil-military bureaucrats supported by the *eṭraf* and big land-owners till the multi-party period, highlights the nature of the shifty balance between the partners of this weird coalition, that had emerged out of the necessity of the national cause.

As noted before, support of local notables to CHP continued only till 1945. A scholarly comment, with this regard, has been such that, "the alliance of provincial notables and the national bureaucratic elite was more a marriage of convenience than a manifestation of a genuine integration between the centre and the periphery."[38] Therefore, whilst the CHP prevailed as a vanguard party to carry the *Kemalist* revolution further, efforts at penetration into the masses in the countryside remained limited, which in turn, implied that the Party's popular support within the peasantry was undermined to a considerable extent. That CHP received support from the relatively underdeveloped rural Eastern provinces in the 1950 elections, has been attributed to the influence of the semi-feudal lords still prevailing within the CHP elite[39]; instead of necessarily contradicting the argument above. As such, regional voting patterns did not seem to reveal any major deviations from this tendency in the

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[36] Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) 41; see also Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 174-201.
[37] Özbudun, *Social Change*, 41.
[38] ibid., 45.
[39] ibid., 104.

elections of 1954 and 1957; and the DP continued to receive the support of particularly the more modern peasantry and appeared to be successful in mobilising the urban propertied middle-classes and merchants as well. [40]

A fundamental re-definition of cleavages[41], nonetheless, was commencing by the late sixties in Turkey; to gradually replace the perennial centre-periphery gap with a political polarisation around functional cleavages, instead of cultural and territorial ones. That CHP's support from urban centres started to increase from the 1965 elections onward, and that it tended to lose the support of less modern regions from then on, signalled, by and large, an "ongoing process of voter realignment"; which implied the growing importance of functional cleavages at the expense of the old centre-periphery cleavage.[42] Due to the foregoing was that, the tendency towards CHP among the relatively better-educated electorate in urban centres became more visible in the late sixties. While, for instance, CHP increased its votes from 6% to 7.3% within the middle and upper-middle classes in *Ankara*; the corresponding figures for *İzmir* came out to be 7.4% and 6.7%, from 1965 to 1969.[43]

Collateral was the fact that, not only the predominant party system in Turkish politics came to an end, but also CHP's status as the party of the urban centres within the more developed regions, was registered by the 1973 elections. Increase in CHP votes was 10% in the *Marmara* region, 7.3% in the *Mediterranean* and 7.7% in the *East Central*.[44]

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[40] ibid., 104-109.
[41] Üstün Ergüder, "Post-1980 Parties and Politics in Turkey". In *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Ergun Özbudun, 113-146. (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), 117.
[42] Özbudun, *Social Change*, 116-117.
[43] ibid, 205.
[44] ibid, 215

Accordingly, it has been argued that Turkish party politics between 1950 and 1969 revealed a pattern that fitted the *Sartorian* typology of predominant party.[45] The fundamental requisite of *Sartori*'s predominant party model that predominance is qualified by a system's major party obtaining the absolute majority of seats for at least four consecutive elections[46], justified Turkey's position as having had a predominant party system in the period from 1950 to 1969; on the grounds that the first party (DP-AP) obtained 84 and 56% of the seats in the respective parliaments of 1950 and 1969.[47]

With the aforementioned realignment of political cleavages, and the concurrent volatility observed in voter preferences,[48] however, the AP tended to lose its predominant position from 1973 elections onward; the implication of which has been an apparent inclination of Turkish party system towards fragmentation and polarisation,.[49] Thereupon, an "extreme and polarised pluralism", as typified by *Sartori,* came into existence within Turkish politics, in that period.

The essence of the polarised pluralism observed in Turkish politics between 1973-1980 lay firstly in the very existence of "anti-system" parties, thence, of the "centrifugal drives" over centripetal forces; with the centre weakening in turn.[50] Inherently challenging the legitimacy of the regime it functioned within, the case of particularly the MSP seemed to fit, by and large, the framework of "anti-system" set

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[45] Ergüder, "Post-1980 Parties", 122.
[46] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems, A Framework for Analysis. Vol.1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976) 196
[47] Ibid., 198.
[48] Index of political volatility between 1948-1977, as suggested by Mogens N.Peterson (cited in: Ergüder Ü, 1988: 117), was 19.3% for Turkey; while the Western European average was observed to be 8.1% only.
[49] Ergüder, "Post-1980 Parties", 1221-122.
[50] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems,* 134-135.

forth by *Sartori*.[51] Extremist parties such as MSP and MHP participated in coalitions, and played key roles in the formulation of governmental policies in this period Second was the fact that while the opposition parties during the coalitions of that period (CHP-MSP coalition from January to September 1974, and the following MC governments) seemed to be closer to the governing parties than to one another (AP to CHP, in the sense that both were located in the centre); the opposition apparently could not easily join forces to form alternative governments; appearing in turn, as a "bilateral opposition" instead of a unilateral one.[52] Polarised pluralism in Turkish politics continued until it culminated in the intervention of the Army in September 1980.

Insofar as the Third Republic is concerned, it becomes evident that the centre-left in Turkey has absolutely lost support during the period between 1989 and 1994. Support for centre-left fell from 29.7 % in 1991 to 23.7 % in 1994 among registered voters. (Respective figures for valid votes were 37.7 % and 27 %). In this context, 81 % of former DSP supporters and 50 % of former SHP supporters voted for the right; while some 25 % of these opted for the radical right, between 1989 and 1994.[53]

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[51] Ibid.,132-133.

[52] Ibid., 133.

[53] Türkiye Sosyal, Ekonomik, Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı (TÜSES) [Foundation of Turkish Social, Economic, Political Research]. *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Tabanı* [Electorate of the Political Parties in Turkey and the Social Base of Social Democracy]. (Ankara: TÜSES, 1995), 13.

Table 7.

Support for Centre-Left in Turkey According to Occupational Category (December 1993)

Occupation	% in the Sample	SHP	DSP
Blue collar	15.2	0.95	1.55
White collar	5.9	1.16	0.91
Civil servant[54]	7.4	1.74	0.90
Tradesmen/artisan/small farmer	14.1	0.96	0.86
Self-employed	1.0	0.74	0.90
Employer	1.3	1.29	0.94
Retired	5.2	0.96	1.72
Unemployed	6.4	0.67	1.43
Housewife	40.8	0.91	0.76
Student	2.6	1.29	0.36
Others	0.1	-	2.09
TOTAL	**100.0**	-	-

Source: TÜSES, 1995: 43

Other significant findings within the scope of the study have been such that, while the locus of SHP supporters fell on white collar jobs and on civil servants, students and employers; the supporters of DSP were centred mostly on the blue collar jobs, as well as the retired and the unemployed. In this context, blue collar support for DSP was 63 % higher than for SHP; the latter's support appearing as highest among civil servants.[55] On the other hand, the rate of blue-collar support for both parties remained stable between 1989 and 1994; while the rate of civil servants increased. As for DSP, the increase of civil servants by 45.5 % has been remarkable. Both parties have lost support from employers in the same period. So far as the unemployed were concerned, SHP lost 30.8 % of its support, while DSP's share remained intact within this group.[56]

[54] White collar category includes clerical jobs in the private sector, and professional categories such as medical doctors, lawyers, engineers, technicians that work in salaried jobs; as well as salaried administrative posts.

[55] Ibid., 44.

[56] Ibid., 52.

Another notable finding has been the very fact that, when compared to the right, centre-left support appeared to be higher among those with relatively better levels of education, as the table below may indicate:

Table 8.

Left-Right Support According to Educational Level as of December 1993 (%)

Educational Level	% in the sample	SHP	DSP	ANAP	DYP	RP
No diploma	10.0	0.81	0.93	0.87	1.43	0.99
Primary school diploma	54.6	0.88	1.06	1.05	1.07	1.17
Secondary school diploma	10.3	1.02	1.11	1.18	1.00	0.84
High school diploma	17.4	1.19	0.84	0.94	0.75	0.80
University diploma	7.6	1.65	0.89	0.69	0.52	0.42
TOTAL	100.0	-	-	-	-	-

Source: TÜSES, 1995: 59

Depending on three different surveys carried out between 1990-94, *Yılmaz Esmer*'s conclusions also confirmed the above. According to *Esmer*, level of education, as measured by the highest diploma received, displayed a consistent and a significant relationship with the SHP vote. In that respect, the relationship between education and support for social democracy, as has been confirmed elsewhere, has been suggested to be "probably rooted in the traditional ties between the former CHP and intellectuals, teachers and bureaucrats; in general, the well educated".[57] It has also been noted in this context that, the figures left no doubt about the nature of the

[57] Yılmaz Esmer, "Parties and the Electorate: A Comparative Analysis of Voter Profiles of Turkish Political Parties". In *Turkey: Political, Social and economic Challenges in the 1990s*, eds., Çiğdem Balım and et al., 74-89. (Leiden/New York/Köln: E.J.Brill, 1995),79-80.

relationship between support for the left and education; while for the centre-right and the religious right, a reverse relationship existed.[58]

TÜSES findings threw light upon another crucial phenomenon within electoral behaviour in Turkey, which is the increasing volatility observed in the same period. While electoral stability remained around 76.7 % in 1991, the respective figure for 1994 has fallen to 59.9%. It is also interesting to note that radical right has proved to be the locus of attraction to the right; with an increase of some 3.5 million votes. Nonetheless, these basic patterns inherent within Turkish politics between 1991-94 appeared to have changed by December 1995. Most significant feature of the 1995 general election was firstly an absolute rise in the rate of abstentions and invalid votes of a protesting character. Inasmuch as protest votes increased from 3.7 million in 1994 to 6 million in 1995; former left votes came out to be the main source of the protest block of votes.[59] Second, was the continuing absolute decline in the centre-left.[60] Despite the fact that there has been an apparent increase in DSP votes, the declining tendency in the total left votes speeded up in 1995, when compared to the period between 1991 and 1994.[61] As such, centre-left lost blood in urban centres, diminished in shanty towns and became totally extinct in the less favoured regions such as South-Eastern Anatolia, in favour of the radical right. [62]

It appears, thereupon, that while there is still an electoral fluency between the two parties of the centre-left, DSP's social base is becoming more distinct from that of

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[58] Ibid., 81.
[59] Aydın Köymen, Necat Erder, and Ahmet Kardam."TÜSES Araştırması, Seçim Sonuçları ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Krizi Üzerine [On TÜSES Research, Election Results and the Crisis of Social democracy]". *Sosyal Demokrat Değişim.* (March-April 1996). 7.
[60] Ibid., 9.
[61] Ibid., 11.
[62] Ibid., 12.

the CHP. Forasmuch as the former is becoming affiliated to class left, mass left protrudes forward to define the electoral support of the latter.[63] Worthy to note here is also that, as of summer 1998, 17 % of DSP electorate favours a state based on Islamic Law. Furthermore, while 4.7 % of this party's electorate place themselves in the centre, 3.4 % declare that they are on the right.[64]

One may also note the perceivably higher rates of support for left in provinces where the *Alevi* population is dominant. The relationship between social democratic parties and *Alevi* votes becomes significant particularly in two provinces; in *Tunceli* and *Hatay*. In the former, the social democrats have been winning landslide victories since the 1960s. HP votes were 63.6 % in 1983 general elections. SHP won 54.8 % and 57.9 % in the 1987 and 1991 elections, with DSP 19 % and 1.6 %; from whence, the total social democratic votes figured up as 73.8 % and 59.5 % respectively. Despite the absolute erosion of the left votes throughout the country in 1995, CHP was still the first party in *Tunceli* with 23.4 %; the total centre-left as 27.2 % (DSP: 3.8 %).[65] Similarly, the social democratic bloc became the winner of the general elections in *Hatay* in the Third Republic. HP votes in 1983 was 36.4 %. SHP won 32.7 % and 32 % of the votes in 1987 and 1991 elections, in which DSP votes were 6.7 % and 6.2 %; the total centre-left votes amounting up to 39.4 % and 38.2 %. The corresponding figure in 1995 was 29.6 %; with CHP 21.9 % and DSP 7.7 %.[66] In *Amasya* and *Adana*, HP scored as the second party after ANAP in 1983 (with 37.2 %

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[63] The concepts of class-left and mass-left have been operationalised on the basis of the respondents' answers in the TÜSES research. In this context, the centre-left electorate have been classified according to the weight of the "class-based answers" in the questionnaires.

[64] PİAR-GALLUP Survey conducted among 1434 respondants in 16 provinces. Reported in Cumhuriyet, (August 4, 1998)

[65] DİE,*Milletvekili Genel Seçimi Sonuçları (İl ve İlçe Sonuçları) 06.11.1983, 29.11.1987, 20.10.1991, 24.12.1995* [Results of General Election of Representatives (Results by Province and District) 06.11.1983, 29.11.1987, 20.10.1991, 24.12.1995]. (Ankara: DİE, 1998)DİE, Results of the General Election of Representatives (Results by Province and District), 288.

[66] Ibid., 140.

and 36.9 % respectively) and the total centre-left continued to be the winner of elections in 1987, 1991 and 1995.[67]

Therefrom, emerges the question on the extent that parties of the social democratic front receive genuinely left votes in Turkey. So far, contentions on that issue have been revolving around firstly the historical link between *Atatürkism* and CHP; in that it still remains dubious whether or not, support for CHP is centred on *Kemalist* values, instead of being left. Second in this context is DSP's situation, as the question if the locus of its electoral support lies on the personal credit of *Ecevit* or on left affiliated voters; remains open so far. Put it differently, the present dilemma is whether or not CHP survives as "*Atatürk*'s Party" and DSP as "*Ecevit* Fan Club"; instead of necessarily being social democratic.[68]

4.3. Strategy

Stretching the account of social democratic strategy in Turkey to the pre-1965 period may well appear fallacious enough to propel the question whether any social democracy, in the real sense of the word, existed at that time. Not undeniable, Turkish social democracy comes into view as newly born, when the legacy of its associates in Western Europe are borne in mind. It has to be re-emphasised however, that the strategy of CHP during the single-party years was in fact, confined to the maintenance of balanced budgets within the industrialisation process.

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[67] Ibid., 20,2. In Amasya, the centre-left polled 35.3 %, 32.2 % and 27.6 % in 1987, 1991 and 1995 respectively. In Adana, the corresponding figures were 36.9 %, 33.7 % and 26.7 %.

[68] Haluk Ülman, "Solda Birlik, CHP ve DSP Üzerine [On Unity in the Left, CHP and DSP]". *Sosyal Demokrat Değişim.* (May-June 1997), 30-32.

On the other hand, efforts had to be directed at the modernisation of the autocratic structure inherited from the Ottoman Empire. As such, the *State Party* of the period endeavoured to institutionalise within the masses the CHP ideology largely through the establishment of *Halk Evleri* (Peoples' Houses) in towns and *Halk Odaları* (Peoples' Lounges). These social clubs, with the younger generation of *Republican* teachers at their top, were entrusted basically with the task of disseminating the Republican discourse to wider masses.

The single-party rule of CHP in the pre-1946 period, in *Duverger*'s view, aimed ultimately at replacing the traditional aristocracy with new elites to be recruited from the society, in that it endeavoured to modernise the old autocratic structure.[69] There was the respect, according to *Duverger,* that made the Turkish case the sole example of a procedure towards a genuine democratic structure, via bringing up independent political elites, within the framework of a single-party system.[70] With that regard, the national democratic revolution had to be brought forward; with the new elites entrusted the task of agency. To that end, the prevailing structures appear to be relevant for the comprehension of the strategy pursued during the single-party years.

Insofar as the strategy during the Second Republic is concerned, the "actor oriented" transformation of CHP towards the left of centre appears as the key for the analysis. As disserted in the relevant sections of the preceding Chapter, the strategic shift in 1965 was propelled largely by the confrontation between the reformist and conservative wings in the Party. The main thrust behind the outset of the reformist initiative was the party's charismatic figure *Bulent Ecevit.* Indeed, CHP's divergence

[69] Duverger, *Siyasi Partiler*, 362-363.
[70] ibid., 364.

from its traditional values was grounded, by and large, on the adoption by the *Ecevit* faction, a rather different view of the concept of populism than that of the 1930s. Whereas the traditional CHP populism refuted class politics, the centre-left wing frankly accepted the reality of different classes within Turkish society, albeit appearing averse to the notion of class struggle, as elaborated in detail in the section on ideological analysis. In that respect, the *Ecevit* initiative seemed to resort to reformist measures rather than radicalism, and has been able to recruit the support of especially the local party organisations.

Accordingly, efforts of the reformists were directed particularly at the Party members in local administrations. The capacity for the mobilisation of these groups was structured on the serious and competent group work and the organisational capability that the *Ecevit* faction had displayed during the Party Congress in 1996, in the views of *Suna Kili.* The left of centre group displayed a genuine success during this critical Congress, to have elected *Ecevit* as Party Secretary, and his group to the Party Administration. Eventually, the reformists were successful in defying even *Inonu*'s charisma and elevating *Ecevit* to Party leadership in 1972.[71]

The electoral decline that has been continuing in the multi-party regime was stemming from the Party's alienation from the masses, in the reformists' eyes. According to *Ecevit* and his group, the Party had largely deviated from the revolutionary thrust of the *Kemalist* years; and had compromised for electoral concerns at the expense of CHP's basic principles such as secularism, etatism, reformism and populism. As such, the Party's mission as the agent of the

[71] Suna Kili, *1960-1975 Doneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelismeler* [Developments in CHP in the 1960-1975 Period]. (Istanbul: Bogazici Universitesi, 1975), 231-257.

independent nation state and the creation of independent citizens therein, was being continuously eroded. That was due to the contradictory attitudes within the different intra-party factions and the Party members at large. Besides, the approach of the Party elites towards the basic problems of the country thoroughly lacked the impetus that had been given by genuine *Kemalist* strategy.[72] This self-critism directed at the Party, was a bold attempt at the expense of the Party's dominant leader *Inonu* According to the reformists, this self-critism should have been publicised overtly to both the electorate and the Party management.

On the other hand, the reformist intra-party movement was endeavouring to adapt strategically, to the relatively successful articulation by TİP of a fresh discourse on the left of the political spectrum. As TİP's appeal was most promising particularly on issues on which CHP and the other established parties had proved incompetent; it was perceived within the reformists of the CHP as a potential challenge to the Party's support among the lower and middle classes, as well as the intellectual milieu.[73] All in all, the palpable transformation within the CHP towards a Western style social democratic discourse was institutionalised largely on the personal charisma and the successful mobilisation of the local party organisations by the reformist action within the Party.

With regard to strategy in government, it may be suggested that economic policies pursued in Turkey in the 1970s used to be based on the populist concerns of electorally weak governments. As the social democratic CHP came to government either through coalitions or minority cabinets, its governmental strategy was

[72] Ibid., 227.
[73] Akdere and Karadeniz, *Türkiye Solu*, 262.

considerably undermined, due to structural constraints. CHP formed a coalition with the Islamist MSP in 1974, during which oil prices had doubled, stemming from the emergence of the OPEC Oil cartel that year. Attempting to restrain the prices of basic commodities through state subsidies, Turkey's budgetary balance in those years revealed a genuine crisis.

Likewise, the minority cabinet of 1978 faced a similar situation. Although at first sight the essentials of the economic conjuncture during the 1970s may well appear to be of secondary importance within the framework of this study; a closer look at the particulars that have written the fortune of social democrats at that decade is believed to be of paramount value, for a better understanding of the structural constraints that the CHP's strategy in government came across.

An inward oriented import substitution policy had been relatively successfully implemented in Turkey in the 1960s; with the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) performing as the backbone of industrial development within the framework drawn by the development plans. In 1970, Turkish Lira had to be devaluated by % 66.7, due largely to the growing gap in the balance of payments.[74] That proved to be a rational strategic choice at that time; as foreign currency reserves improved considerably in the following few years.[75] By 1973, however, a global crisis stemming from the emergence of the OPEC oil cartel, and the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system was approaching: Similar to the Great depression of 1929, no economy in the world escaped the outcomes of the tripled oil prices in 1974; to which the industrialised

[74] Memduh Aslan Akçay, *Para Politikası Araçları: Türkiye ve Çeşitli Ülkelerdeki Uygulamalar* [Monetary Policy Instruments and Applications in Different Countries]. (Ankara: DPT, 1997), 96.

[75] Balance of payments has been a critical issues in Turkey in the course of economic growth; as Turkey used to pay some ninety percent of her export revenues to for importation of oil. (See Tables 19 and 20).

countries in Western Europe responded with strict fiscal controls with sizeable cuts in public expenditure.

For Turkey however, the response given to the oil syndrome appeared to be grounded on electoral concerns rather than being effective policy instruments to combat the consequences of this crisis on macro-economic balances. Hence, instead of responding to the tripling oil costs with the necessary measures as was the case in the West, Turkey opted to finance her balance of payments gap largely through short term foreign loans; with a view not to reflect the increasing costs to prices, at the wake of the elections. Furthermore, agricultural support prices were announced to be higher than even the world prices in 1974,[76] bitterly providing a text-book example of populist policies at times of general elections. In addition, high costs of the Cyprus intervention exacerbated the already salient budget deficit [77]

With a view to restrain inevitable price rises, efforts had been launched by the right-wing governments in 1975 for the channelling of the remittances of workers in Germany; which contributed, to some extent, to the balance of payments, for a while. As such, the inescapable adjustment of prices that should have been carried out earlier on time, could be suppressed only until 1978. Accordingly, the right-wing coalition government had to respond with adjustment measures such as devaluation, increased interest rates and contraction in Central Bank loans, with a view to

[76] Türkiye Ticaret Odaları, Sanayi Odaları ve Ticaret Borsaları Birliği (TOBB) [Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchange]. *Iktisadi Rapor.* (Ankara: TOBB, 1975), 501.

[77] DPT, *V. Beş Yıllık Plan Destek Çalışmaları 1, V. Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı Öncesinde Gelişmeler 1972-1983 (Ekonomik ve Sosyal Gelişmeler)* [Grounding Studies for the Fifth Five Year Development Plan 1, Developments before the Fifth Five year development Plan 1972-1983 (Economic and Social Developments)]. (Ankara: DPT, 1985), 102.

encounter the observable impasse. By 1979, however, whereas no considerable increases in the volume exports could be achieved; short term foreign and domestic debt stock was climbing, to prepare the grounds for a genuine fiscal bottleneck, The crisis was further impelled by the re-doubling of world oil prices that year. As a result, the imports of investment goods and basic intermediate goods were reduced considerably, with industrial capacity utilisation and production falling in turn. During this period, excess state subsidies pumped liquidity expansion, appearing as a heavy inflationist pressure; thus undermining, in turn, working-life peace and impelling social unrest.[78]

The minority cabinet of the social democrats in 1978, therefore, inherited a legacy with a scarcity of basic commodities, and political impasse. Crude-oil imports had already been cut down in the year 1979, thus were unable to meet the growing demand. Similarly, the imports of iron and steel, the basic intermediate goods for industrial production, were also seized in 1978-79, due to the difficulties in the balance of payments.[79]

Along with that, anarchy and domestic terror was climbing. On 22 December 1978, *Kahramanmaraţ* witnessed a provocation that resulted in 109 people dead and some 500 premises ruined. While that was generally held to be a confrontation between radical left and the right; for some, it was a fight between *Sunni* and *Shaia* sects.[80] All in all, street battles between contending militant groups gravitated towards a

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[78] For an extensive discussion on the subject, see: Akçay, *Para Politikası*, 96-97.

[79] DPT, *V. Beş Yıllık Plan Destek Çalışmaları 1, V. Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı Öncesinde Gelişmeler 1972-1983 (Ekonomik ve Sosyal Gelişmeler)* [Grounding Studies for the Fifth Five Year Development Plan 1, Developments before the Fifth Five year development Plan 1972-1983 (Economic and Social Developments)]. (Ankara: DPT, 1985), 78

[80] Sina Akşin, *Ana Çizgileriyle Türkiye'nin Yakın Tarihi, 1789-1980* [Recent Turkish History, 1789-1980]. (İstanbul: Yenigün Basın ve Yayıncılık AŞ., 1997), 149.

hegemonic nature; and even persons who were known to be politically neutral were executed, their murderers remaining unidentified most of the times. *Ecevit* resigned in that conjuncture, on losing the by-elections of October 1979.

With regard to the Third Republic, *Balkanisation* would perhaps serve best to sketch the profile of social democratic strategy in Turkey. Inasmuch as the former CHP leader's charisma had thoroughly helped to amalgamate the numerous factions inherent within the party, social democrats were torn into pieces following the 1980 intervention. While no repetition of the already disserted facts in this context shall be attempted here, attention must be drawn to the fact that divisions within social democracy revolved around personal conflicts, rather than major ideological divergences. Despite that *Ecevit* persistently argued for the contrary, a clear demarcation between the ideological orientations of the two parties, indeed, appears dubious, as provided before in the section on ideology.

A major divergence, nevertheless, appears in the question on secularism. As can be expected, the contention on secularism and Islamism has always been a dilemma in Turkish politics that remain salient at the wake of 2000, as well. Having been excluded from politics in Western Europe nearly a century before, the religious cleavage has been functioning at full steam in Turkey. As any thorough discussion on the grounds of that cleavage is limited within the scope of this research, attention shall be drawn merely to the fact that secularism has been among the basic tenets of CHP discourse since foundation. That Party, so far, did not appear to compromise from the secular stand both in rhetoric and in practice. Post-1980 social democracy however, ran into conflicts on that issue; stemming from the attitude of the DSP

leader. Owing to the apparent fact that *Ecevit* has recently been observed to adopt a populist strategy towards Islamists, CHP remains as the sole political party in a strictly secular front, at present. As shall appear in due course, Islamist values and beliefs appear to constitute a significant dimension within the electoral fluency observed between these parties.

Not undeniable, the DSP leader seems to be increasingly opting for a populist strategy on the question of role of Islam in public life. With this respect, *Ecevit*'s sympathy towards the leader of a popular Muslim sub-sect[81] has already become a publicised issue. A meeting held by this sub-sect in *Abant* in 16-19 July 1998, on that account, was declared to be of "importance", by the DSP leader.[82] Indeed, one of the chief aides of the DSP leader, *Mümtaz Soysal* alleged on resignation from the Party on 31 July 1998 that, "a personal liaison has been established between *Fethullah Gülen* and *Ecevit*, that unequivocally bind the Party as well."[83] In fact, deriving from populist concerns is the fact that sympathy shown towards Islamists by DSP stems also from the electoral fight between this party and radical left groups in shanty-towns. Due to the fact that Islamic values are overwhelmingly prevalent within the marginalised shanty-town electorate, and that these constituencies remain to be of critical importance in electoral terms; a strategic competition between social democrats and the radical left seem to be continuing particularly in the shanty-towns of larger metropolitan regions, as *İstanbul, İzmir* or *Ankara.* On the other hand, CHP, the other key political force on the social democratic front, is alleged to have hardly pursued a proficient strategy to cover the wider masses in these regions.[84]

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[81] *Fethullah Gülen*
[82] Cumhuriyet (August 1, 1998).
[83] Mümtaz Soysal, Cumhuriyet (July 31, 1998).
[84] Sinan Dirlik, Milliyet (August 31, 1997).

In *Deniz Baykal's* view, (CHP leader), *Ecevit* has fallen quite short of pursuing a proficient strategy for merging the pre-1980 CHP cadres into one party, in the aftermath of the intervention. While the main impetus behind that might have been stemming from a desire for a fresh start that to do away with the eroded legacy of the pre-1980 CHP; *Ecevit's* uncompromising attitude towards the union of two social democratic parties, nonetheless, proved fallacious.[85] Indeed, the pre-1980 centre-left was by no means a social democratic movement, in *Algan Hacaloğlu*'s view; who argued that the former CHP was but a populist catch-all party that endeavoured to articulate the expectations of wider masses in slogans in the 1970s. Hence, the genuine transformation towards social democracy is being gradually architected only at the present.[86]

Union of social democrats has become a stalemate since the restoration of civilian rule in 1983. For *Ecevit,* the merger of CHP and DSP would by no means solve the social democratic problem in Turkey. In his view, those who insist on merger are refuting the ideological inconsistency of CHP. In case of union, absolute left votes would decline, on the grounds that the DSP electorate would never vote for CHP. Besides, CHP has disillusioned its voters in both municipal and governmental administration, due largely to increasing intra-party corruption.[87] The unfortunate pattern of the 1991-95 coalition was further undermined by the reactionary upheaval in *Sivas,* in July 1993, which resulted in 37 dead. The Deputy Prime Minister, SHP leader *Erdal İnönü,* in particular, was to lose credit on the allegations that he had not intervened timely and effectively in the provocative incidents in *Sivas*[88].

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[85] Deniz Baykal, Milliyet (October 22, 1996)
[86] Algan Hacaloğlu, Milliyet (October 16, 1996).
[87] Bülent Ecevit, Milliyet (October 23, 1996).
[88] The *Sivas* case is presently in the Supreme Court (*Yargıtay*). The Court insists on 33 executions and imprisonments varying from 20 to 5 years. Cumhuriyet, (July 24,1998).

Equally important, according to the DSP leader, is the twofold fact that not only income distribution has deteriorated at the expense of the social democratic electorate, but also social security institutions have become bankrupt; thereupon undermining the basic tenets of social democratic claims. CHP in government, as such, had no less responsibility than that of the centre-right, in *Ecevit*'s view.[89] True, that though CHP (former SHP) in government as junior coalition partner between 1991-95, was not granted any saying in the management of the economy; the weighty responsibility of the incompetent performance of the coalition fell on social democrats, too. As given in the preceding Chapter, the highest inflation rate of the entire Republican Period was recorded in 1994, when a grave crisis in money, capital and exchange markets erupted. Furthermore to help legitimise the DSP leader's allegations in this context is that clientalism and corruption have become a practice in SHP/CHP municipal administrations since 1989.[90]

Indeed, even in areas that they were granted Ministerial positions, social democrats remained subservient to the centre-right master during the coalition 1991-95. Social democratic strategy in government hardly went beyond that of an inferior political partner. While for instance, the Prime Minister Mrs. *Tansu Çiller* was utilising the issue of European Union (EU) affairs for her personal prestige; her social democratic deputy[91] hardly saw any reason for not remaining silent. Though firm commitment to Turkey's European vocation has supposedly been one of the most prestigious tenets of CHP strategy, performance in government proved thoroughly incapable on this subject. Just the thing, that establishment of a customs union in 1995 has been

[89] Ecevit, Milliyet (October 23, 1996).
[90] Milliyet, (October 20, 1996)
[91] *Mr. Murat Karayalçın*, Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time.

marketed by Mrs *Çiller* as if Turkey were accepted into the Union, seemed to be hardly of any concern to the social democratic wing of the cabinet, may help to throw light upon the incompetent strategy pursued even in subjects that the latter claimed proficiency.[92]

Following from the above is the undeniable fact that the DSP wing of the present coalition[93] in Turkey seems to be performing more skilfully, at least in foreign relations. Having been excluded from the enlargement process leading to the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries to the EU at the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997; the Turkish government, in turn, suspended political dialogue with the EU side; yet without prejudice to the economic relations under way in the framework of the customs union between the parties. The suspension of political dialogue covered in particular, issues such as Cyprus, relations with Greece, human rights and minorities. Some diplomatic grounding to that critical decision was also made, by enhancing relations with the US government. The present coalition also resists against any *faits accomplis in Cyprus* that may lead to a political *Enosis* on pressure from the EU side.[94] In a nutshell, despite the fact that there have also been some considerable achievements as regards the functioning of the customs union, the DSP side of the coalition did not attempt to utilise the EU issue with electoral concerns as its predecessor had done. To that end, *Ecevit* and his

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[92] The realisation of a customs union as of end of the transitionary period (31.12.1995) of the Association between Turkey and the EC had been foreseen in the Ankara Agreement of 1963; wherefrom the final stage of the Association that may lead to full membership to the Comminty has begun in accordance with the normal procedure. However, this issue was presented by the government as a "victory" that Turkey has attained within the framework of her European vocation.

[93] ANAP/DSP coalition founded in July 1997.

[94] Ecevit and his Minister of Foreign Affairs seemed to be mindful of the fact that, accession negotiations with Southern Cyprus, as declared by the EU, may well imply a practical annexation of the Island to Greece.

Foreign Minister[95] can be said to have performed as the relevant conjuncture required, insofar as delicate matters in foreign policy are concerned. It is also interesting to observe here that the particular historicity within which social democratic strategy has evinced from 1974 to 1998, begins with and culminates in *Ecevit.*

Table 9.

Electoral Performance of the Centre-Left in the Third Turkish Republic (Parliamentary Elections) [96]						
	DSP			SHP/CHP		
Years	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats
1983	-	-	-	5285804	29	117
1987	2044576	8	-	5931000	24.1	99
1991	2624301	10.6	7	5066571	20.1	88
1995	4118025	14.6	76	3011076	10.7	49

Source: DİE [State Institute of Statistics]

4.4. Organisation: Leadership hegemony

As of autumn 1998, DSP's fortune appears to be of a dual nature. On the one side is the party's image as the partner to a coalition, which can be said to have taken some concrete steps in critical areas such as education and tax reform.[97] On the other hand, however, is the DSP leader's uncompromising attitude towards union or even electoral alliance within the social democratic front, at the wake of the forthcoming elections in spring 1999. There have been a number of resignations from the Party on

[95] Minister of Foreign Affairs at present is Mr. *İsmail Cem.*

[96] For 1983, HP votes are given for SHP/CHP; as HP and SODEP merged with SHP in 1985; and SHP with CHP in 1995. The percentages of the votes won by the parties have been calculated on the basis of the ratio of the total votes cast by each party to the number of actual voters provided from the DİE.

[97] Compulsory elementary level education was raised from 5 to 8 years; and a comprehensive tax reform was adopted.

the grounds that DSP is becoming a leader party instead of a genuinely democratic one. Most notable among the party members who abandoned DSP was *Mümtaz Soysal,* a key figure in Turkish social democracy. Resigning from DSP on 29.7.1998, *Soysal* declared that the party was being perceived as the property of the *Ecevit* family, instead of having been organised as a legal personality. Severely criticising the organisational framework in particular; *Mümtaz* alleged that the party leadership enjoyed absolute authority over members and MPs, as well as the local branches; and that the administrative boards of the latter were being changed arbitrarily on personal demand from the leadership.[98]

Another weighty protest stemming from organisational deficiency in social democracy came from CHP. Having resigned from his party on 15 July 1997, *Aydın Güven Gürkan*'s accusations towards his party have been of a similar nature. In fact, the motive behind the relinquishment of these two key politicians converged in essence; both alleged that there existed a leadership dictatorship in their parties, wherefrom they declared that left politics ought not function that way. *Gürkan* and *Soysal* both forcefully claimed that ways and means for intra-party democracy were entirely obstructed.[99] In spite of all that, both the DSP and CHP leaders have turned deaf ears to these key politicians. *Ecevit* even declared on the day of *Soysal*'s resignation that the latter's attempt was but an unimportant incident.[100]

Sencer Ayata had observed with this respect that the organisational structure and leadership have had significant implications for the crisis of social democracy in Turkey. Actually, both the left and the right of centre have been suffering, since

[98] Mümtaz Soysal , Cumhuriyet, (July 30, 1998).
[99] Mustafa Balbay , "Gündem" (The Agenda), Cumhuriyet, (July 31, 1998).
[100] Cumhuriyet, (July 29, 1998)

long, from the rhetoric on "party for the leader". Thereupon, in Ayata's view, the hegemonic discourse on absolute obedience to the leader has given way to the phenomenon of raising party members, whose political activities are confined to serving their leader only; indeed to keep the leader in that position. In the final analysis, the party members are alienated from the electorate and become unreceptive of fresh insights.[101] Serving the interests of limited groups, therefore, party politics in Turkey has continuously been losing prestige, within which, clientelism has become a common practice.[102] *Ercan Karakaţ,* a credible figure within the social democratic milieu, has also claimed that the intra-party law and CHP regulation have been overtly violated in the past; to which, party leaders remained silent in order to preserve their hegemonic status.[103]

Actually, the dilemma of organisational deficiency is not a new phenomenon to social democracy in Turkey; which, has to be viewed from a wider perspective than can be attributed to the centre-left only. Instead, the general features of the organisational framework of political parties in Turkey are closely related to 1) the parties' origins, 2) their developmental processes and 3) their status within the political system.[104] A fourth dimension stems from the fact that clientelism has been functional for the development and expansion of party politics in Turkey.[105] Last but not least is the implication of the provisions in the Law on Political Parties.[106] Therefrom and with regard to the first aspect, *Maurice Duverger*'s thesis that

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[101] Sencer Ayata, Milliyet, (October 20, 1998)
[102] Gürsel S, Milliyet, (October 20, 1998)
[103] Ercan Karakaţ, *Sosyal Demokrasinin Şansı* [The Chance for Social Democracy]. (İstanbul: SODEV Yayınları, 1996).
[104] Arsev Bektaţ, *Demokratikleţme Sürecinde Liderler Oligarţisi, CHP ve AP (1961-1980)* [Leadership Oligarchy within the Process of Democratisation, CHP and AP (1961-1980)]. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1993),39.
[105] Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist",1981
[106] Ergun Özbudun , "Siyasi Partiler ve Demokrasi". In Siyasi Partiler ve Demokrasi [Political Parties and Democracy], ed.TESAV, 1-26, (Hürriyet Gazetecilik A.Ţ., Ankara:1995).

political parties carry the legacy of their roots in foundation[107], must also be reiterated in this context.

In that respect, it appears that leadership has always been the backbone of party organisation in Turkey. The 1923 Party Regulation of CHP had provided that in his capacity as the chairman of the Congress, the Party Council, the Parliamentary Group and the General Administrative Board (*Umumi İdare Heyeti*), the Party Leader enjoys the right to speak for the Party, unless stated otherwise by the leader.[108] Party Regulations from 1927 to 1935 contained similar provisions. Hierarchical power from top to down was further reinforced in the supra-normal Congress of 1938 held immediately following *Atatürk*'s death. In the 1938 Congress, Party regulation was amended such that *İsmet İnönü* was the unalterable leader of CHP, and that *Mustafa Kemal* was the spiritual leader.[109] The provision on unalterable leadership was abolished on the Second supra-normal Congress of May 1946; shortly before the first multi-party elections in October that year.[110] *Aydemir*'s view on the initial organisational framework of CHP in the single party period was such that;

> "CHP has never been a parliamentary body founded within a multi-party democracy. It was not a party of members recruited from the masses, and one remaining with them; and continued as such till transition to multi-party regime. Indeed, CHP was the political cadre of an authoritarian state order; it was a leader party, a state party."[111]

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[107] Maurice Duverger, "Siyasi Partiler [Political Parties]" 15.
[108] Party Regulation of 11.9.1923, Art.18; cited in: Kabasakal M, 1991, Türkiye'de Siyasal Parti Örgütlenmesi :1908-1960, (Political Party Organisation in Turkey: 1908-1960); (Tekin yayınları, İstanbul), 138.
[109] Tunaya, "*Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*", 572-573.
[110] Ibid., 574-575.
[111] Aydemir," İkinci Adam (The Second Man)", Vol:3,132.

With regard to the second dimension mentioned above, hegemonic status of leadership continued during the developmental process of the Party in the multi-party regime. Attention must be drawn, in this respect, to the though discipline on the parliamentary party group; stemming from the leader's authority to nomination for candidacy. Indeed, that owes to the legacy of the CHP in the single-party period; candidates for the parliament used to be nominated by *Atatürk* between 1930 and 1946. Although party organisations, from the 1947 Congress onward were granted this right[112], authority of the party leaders remained salient in the organisational framework of the CHP. Despite the fact that the local organisational scheme of the party appeared to be significantly democratic, they remained limited in number and in scope to influence party politics; due largely to the tight control on them by the leadership. Local organisations were established in districts, villages, towns and cities, whose administrative devices used to be appointed by the party leadership in the single-party period.[113] Thereupon, *Aydemir* has reported that "*İsmet İnönü* did not have a party ready for political competition that is prepared to meet the demands of the masses" in transition to multi-party regime; as this party was "neither founded nor brought up for that purpose". In that sense, CHP was indeed, "not a party or a mass organisation that parliamentary system required", in *Aydemir*'s view.[114]

Insofar as the aforementioned third aspect on the status of parties within the political system, it has to be emphasised that the formation of central and local party organisations remained largely under the hegemony of the *etraf* and the elites since

[112] Kabasakal, "Political Parti Organisation", 143-145.
[113] Organisation of political parties in villages and districts stretch back to the "*İttihat ve Terakki*" period. Indeed, this organisational scheme was adopted also by the "*Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*", yet it remained limited in scope stemming largely from the war-time conjuncture in Anatolia. Since foundation as a political party, CHP adopted this tradition as well. (Ibid., 225.)
[114] Aydemir ," İkinci Adam (The Second Man)", Vol:3,85-86.

the outgrowth of the *Jön Türk* Movement. The social background of founders and members of "*İttihat ve Terakki*" reveal that the Party cadres were comprised of *mektepliler* (the erudite), the bureaucratic elite and the middle classes; to which the *eṭraf* and the land-owners were incorporated following the expansion of the Party organisation in the Anatolian heartland.[115] Despite the fact that newly emerging social groups were gradually being incorporated into political participation since 1940s, members of elite families continued to enjoy dominance on party administrations.[116] Thence, the political groupings in the Ottoman politics of the past century largely survived to have significant implications for the party system in the Republican Period; and "the role of the *İttihat ve Terakki* as the centralising, secularising and nationalistic element was now played by the CHP".[117] CHP's *de facto* status as the "State Party" was legitimised in the 1935 Congress, such that whereas the Minister for Interior Affairs was elected Party Secretary and member of the General Administrative Board; Governors (*vali*) were granted local Party leadership in their respective provinces.[118] While participation of members into the formation of party politics remained limited; local party organisations, as such, acted almost as a coalition of "*eṭraf* and party/state elites" that remained aloof from the masses at large.[119]

Transition to multi-party politics and the election defeat in 1950 constituted the main thrust behind the efforts at the establishment of intra-party democracy in CHP. In 1951, the Party Congress was granted the right of electing the party leader, the secretary general and the General Administrative Board. Besides, local organisations

[115] Ibid., 69-70.
[116] Bektaṭ, "*Liderler Oligarṭisi*", 39.
[117] Özbudun, "*Social Change*", 41.
[118] Tunaya, "*Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*", 572.
[119] Ayata, "*CHP Örgüt ve İdeoloji* [CHP Organisation and Ideology]", 74-75.

were granted the right to nominate candidates for the Parliament. With the local organisations gradually acquiring more powers, some progress towards institutionalisation of a grass-root organisation at the expense of an elite cadre was observed in the 1950s and the following years. During 1960s, whilst the Party Leader *İnönü* was backed by the Parliamentary Party; Secretary General *Ecevit* has been able to recruit support largely from the provincial organisations. As such, the provincial branches of CHP played a significant role in mobilising support for the reformist group at that period. With this regard, *Ecevit* had promised to institutionalise a stronger branch system within which, intra-party democracy would enhance greater responsiveness of the Party Administration to the demands of the local branches. The democratisation of the party organisation gained momentum particularly after the ideological shift of CHP under *Ecevit*'s leadership from 1972 onward; which implied, by and large, not only a social democratic movement but also an organisational change that was "operative in transforming the party structure".[120]

However, the Law on Political Parties adopted in 1965 (as inspired by the 1961 Constitution) had abolished village/district organisations. Since then, local organisational scheme of political parties in Turkey has been limited to provincial and town level.[121] As propelled by the social democratic impetus given to the party in the 1970s; the 1974 Congress aimed at the transformation of the organisational scheme along with the fundamentals of that of the Swedish SAP. "Party Membership Registration System" (*Parti Genel Kütüğü*) was introduced in December 1978;

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[120] Ayţe Güneţ Ayata, "Class and Clientelism in the Republican People's Party". In *Turkish State, Turkish Society*, eds., Andrew Finkel and Nükhet Sırman, 159-184. (London: Rouledge Books, 1990), 160.

[121] Provincial and town level: *İl ve İlçe Teşkilatları.* Village/District Organisations: *Ocak-Bucak Teşkilatları*

which implied, by and large, a serious attempt at the transformation of CHP towards becoming a mass party.[122] With this regard, CHP also endeavoured to establish relations with trade unions, in particular with DİSK[123]

Nevertheless, whereas subsidiary and affiliated organs such as youth and women branches existed, a genuine and an effective coordination among these and the party members at large could not be achieved. Party activities peaked only during election campaigns or Congresses; a tendency that may well be attributed to Turkish party politics in general. For CHP, it was still a cadre party whose local organisations were dependent on committees of comprising of local notables in their respective regions; except those of the larger metropolitan cities. [124] As *Duverger* has put it, a significant feature of cadre parties is that usually elites are recruited for carrying out party activities such as election campaigns or contacts with candidates. Quite the contrary, mass parties require the party members to actively participate in party activities at all times.[125]

With this regard, the social democratic CHP's efforts towards transformation into a mass party in the 1970s remained partial; in that despite the establishment of Party Membership Registration System by the beginning of 1979, institutionalisation of this scheme was interrupted as the CHP was banned in 1980. Thence, regular membership registration and membership fees to contribute to the finances of the party, the two crucial aspects of mass parties as defined by *Duverger,* could not be consummated in the case of the CHP. It may be suggested therefrom that the CHP

[122] Bektaş, "*Liderler Oligarşisi*", 46-49.
[123] DİSK *(Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları)* is a trade union with centre-left affiliations.
[124] Bektaş, "*Liderler Oligarşisi*", 50.
[125] Duverger, "Siyasi Partiler [Political Parties]" 107.

was still a cadre party when criteria for membership was borne in mind; and that existence of sympathisers that vote for the party at times of elections do not necessarily fulfil the conditions for being a mass party.[126]

In this framework is also the implication of clientelistic relations within party politics in Turkey. For a deeper understanding of clientelism in Turkish politics, a number of historic facts already analysed in the relevant sections of this study, have to briefly reiterated in this context. Among these is firstly the fact that despite the established tradition of party politics in Turkey, and incorporation of political parties into the Parliament in the Second Constitutionalist Period;[127] wider masses, nevertheless, remained largely excluded from political parties. Second, is that the centre-periphery gap, in the form of a cultural/socio-economic polarity remained intact in Turkey until recently. Concurrent has been the rise of "factional leaders" from high status notable families; each with dominance over alliances based on kinship, ethnic, religious or communitarian oppositions.[128] Third, and due to the prolongation of agricultural economy is that peasant problem prevailed in Turkish politics even in the Republican Period.

One of the significant features of the structural conjuncture briefly sketched above was the dominance of "rural elites" in the form of local semi-feudal lords (ağa), land-owners, *sheiks* or tribal lords (*aşiret reisleri*) over the peasantry in the countryside. Due to the low degree of state and market penetration, these rural elites

[126] Ibid., 106-107, Bektaş, "*Liderler Oligarşisi*", 51.

[127] While a number of political movements/organisations came into existence in the Ottoman Empire since 1859; *T. Z. Tunaya*, in his classical work on political parties in Turkey, holds the year 1908 as the reference for emergence of modern political parties.

[128] Sabri Sayarı, "Some Notes on the Beginnings of Mass Political Participation in Turkey". In *Political Participation in Turkey*, eds. E. Akarlı, and G.Ben-Dor, 121-133. (İstanbul. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1975), 123.

used to enjoy a near monopoly over local power sources; wherefrom patron-client relations acquired political dimensions as electoral competition was prompted during the multi-party period. Most outstanding implication of political party competition has thus become recruitment of local patrons and followers into the party ranks. Along with such traditional notables was the ascent of a new group of professionals such as lawyers, doctors or businessmen with sizeable clientele, most of which were won by party organisations in the urban centres. All in all, incorporation of both rural and urban patrons and clients into party politics gradually became a strategic instrument, at a time of rapid mass mobilisation. As parties focused more on securing support from faction leaders and these local patrons, "vertical networks of loyalties" gravitated towards hegemony in party politics in Turkey.[129] Although clientelism remained dominant form of participation more in right-wing parties, it went on to undermine social democracy as well; as studies on CHP's organisational framework may indicate.[130]

At a time of rapid political mobilisation and mass urban migration, the locus of electoral competition in Turkey, therefore, lay on non-ideological issues, rather than class based interests. Despite the fact that cultural/territorial type of cleavages were gradually being replaced by functional cleavages in the Second Republic;[131] nonetheless, "vertical networks of personal followings" that were heterogenous and non-ideological in nature used to prevail, rather than "horizontal type of mobilisation" comprising of people with similar status or class.[132] It may be suggested thereupon that vertical solidarities driven essentially by patronage

[129] Ibid., 124-125.
[130] Ayţe G. Ayata, 1990, "Class and Clientelism in the Republican People's Party", in: Finkel A. and Sirman N.(eds), Turkish State, Turkish Society; Ayata, "CHP Örgüt"
[131] Özbudun, "*Social Change*", 116-117.
[132] Sayarı, " Beginnings of Mass Political Participation", 126-133.

distribution continue to undermine Turkish politics; within which social democratic parties may hardly constitute any exception.

Last but not least in the organisational framework of party politics in Turkey is the relevance of the Law on Political Parties.[133] It has been suggested that the Law not only contains many detailed provisions that may normally have been left to individual party regulations; but that it also imposes a "single-type model" of organisation to political parties.[134] Furthermore in this context is the very fact that, as establishment of organic relations with trade unions is banned; institutionalisation of an organisational framework similar to those observed in Western European social democratic parties becomes impossible in Turkey.[135] The most significant implication of the provisions inherent in Law No. 2820, therefore, is firstly that a genuine model of interlocking layers of subsidiary branches, within which, a regional level representing a few provincial branches to serve as a bridge between the Party centre and the individual province does not exist in Turkey. Second, is the lack of village/district (*ocak-bucak*) and workplace organisations that constitute the most outstanding dissimilarity with the Western European type of social democratic organisation. Last but not least in this context is that pre-election of candidates is not compulsory according to the Law. Political parties, thence, may nominate candidates either through the central organisation or may opt for election when they deem it necessary; that inescapably gives vent to oligarchic practices within the party.[136]

[133] Law No. 2820 dated: April 22, 1983 (OJ No. 18027; April 24, 1983)
[134] Özbudun , "Siyasi Partiler ve Demokrasi", 1-7.
[135] ibid.,8.
[136] ibid: 13-14

Any achievement as regards the functioning of intra-party democracy appears to be almost infinitesimal so far. While passing the Law on the 1999 Elections, The Parliament of 1998 did not opt to adopt the proposal on the amendment that would render the pre-elections of candidates compulsory. *Seyfi Oktay,* Chairman of the Constitutional Commission of the Parliament[137] resigned in turn, and declared that:

> "Politics in Turkey has become a device functioning under the hegemony of a certain group. It turned into oligarchy; into a hierarchical structure that is administered from top to the bottom. This situation stems from the anti-democratic provisions still inherent within the Law on Elections."[138]



Figure 8.

4.5. Main Profile of Social Democracy in Turkey: Elite Driven Oligarchy

The outgrowth of main political cleavages and the emergence of socialist currents in the Ottoman-Turkish society were structured on the legacy of a particular land tenure system that social organisation of production was devised upon. Whilst the civil/military bureaucratic elite constituted the locus of the functioning of that

[137] Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Anayasa Komisyonu Başkanı. *Seyfi Oktay* is a member of the Parliament from CHP.
[138] Cumhuriyet, (August 1, 1998)

distinctive socio-political order, rest of the society remained largely aloof from the affairs of the body politic. In this framework, an apparent centre-periphery gap carved the rationale of political development of the Ottoman Empire in centuries. The unchallenged absolute authority of the Sultan complemented the strong state tradition of the Ottomans.

On the other hand, an overwhelmingly agrarian economy remained intact in the Turkish land until recently. Accordingly, the Ottoman economy still revealed pre-capitalistic characteristics, by the time the Industrial Revolution in Europe had already been materialised. One of the notable implications of this circumstance has been the development of cleavages on the basis of cultural/territorial antagonisms, rather than conflicts stemming from the distribution of resources and benefits in the economy. Indeed, the politics of both the "distributional problem" and of the "grand affairs of the state" remained alien to the masses. The administrative apparatus has been functioning such that the state elites were placed at the heart of the politics of the Empire; whereas wider masses were excluded from that process. On the other hand, the minute mass of workers in the Empire was by no means in a position to form a cohesive political force, either.

The formative phase of modern Turkish politics was inaugurated with the emergence of the opposition thrust against the absolute authority of the Sultan in the nineteenth century. Political attempts especially within the state elites and the intelligentsia were increasingly getting organised for the institutionalisation of the Empire as a Constitutional Monarchy. Ottoman socialist thought emerged in such a conjuncture, among a surge of different political currents. Yet, similar to other political

movements of that time, socialist thought remained as an "elite business" confined to the intellectual practices of a limited number of the "enlightened"; hence excluded mass participation in the society at large. An array of different attempts at socialism throughout the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk* period also lacked a genuine mass base.

The origins of contemporary social democratic politics, on the other hand,can be traced in the State Party tradition that initially emerged as a resistance movement in *Anatolia* against Allied occupation. Establishment of the nation-state on a modern basis in the aftermath of the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk* Period was consummated on the revolutionary impetus given to the national movement by the military/civil bureaucratic elites. The latter not only constituted the core of the CHP, but also continued to form the basis of its social support in Republican Turkey. The outgrowth of modern social democratic efforts in Turkish politics was framed on the basis of the ideological and strategic transformation of CHP towards the left of centre during the Second Republic. The reformist group that attempted at the transformation had directed its effors at the revival of the revolutionary thrust of the *Kemalist* principles.and argued for the incorporation of fresh insights into them. The development of social democratic politics thenceforward, appeared to be located in the interplay of basic social democratic values and *Kemalist* themes. Thereupon, the relevant structural conjuncture and the prevalent ideological contentions during the emergence of social democracy in Turkey have become clear.

In terms of ideology, the chronicle of socialism in Turkey can be stretched back to the Second Constitutionalist Period. The relevant ideologies were founded on the principles of utopian socialism rather than those of revolutionary political socialism;

and to some extent on the basic tenets of liberal thought. They also tended to preserve basic Muslim motifs within their ideological stances. Indeed, the adjacent socialist currents that emerged during the National Liberation Movement in *Anatolia* followed a similar ideological path in terms of their fundamentals such as emphasis on economic deprivation, social injustice and exploitation by capital owners; as well as claims for a fairer distributional policy and preservation of Islamist values. Yet, as these currents lacked a genuine mass base, they did not appear to be of significance within the emergence of social democracy in the Second Republic. Rather, social democracy in Turkey was to be framed on the legacy of the CHP.

Fundamentals of CHP ideology in the single-party years were put forth as republicanism, étatism, nationalism, secularism, populism and revolutionism. In the aftermath of the transformation towards the centre-left, CHP refuted any identification with Marxist origins and largely discredited class politics. Instead, basic motifs within CHP ideology have been the preservation of *Kemalist* values, enhancement of social justice, fairer distribution of wealth and supervision of economic activity by the state. Although the division of the social democratic front from 1980 onwards did not tend to imply fundamental contentions on ideology; a demarcation between the programs of the two parties of the centre-left, nevertheless, can be drawn with regard to the role of markets. Whereas a more prudential attitude towards *laissez-fairé* prevails in the DSP program; CHP seems to placing emphasis on the markets and on globalisation of the economy. As for commitment to secularism and other *Kemalist* values, the approach of both parties, by and large, tend to converge. Thereupon, the essentials of the competition between these two

social democratic parties of the Third Republic fall on personal conflicts, instead of fundamental ideological divergences.

The strategy of social democratic politics accompanied to a large extent the process in which it developed. Before the ideological transformation towards the centre-left, CHP strategy in the single-party period was devised upon the structural conditions prevalent in the young Republic. Therefrom, rapid industrialisation of the agrarian Turkish economy, the creation of a sizeable public sector in most of the economic activities, maintenance of balanced budgets remained as one of the essentials of CHP strategy in this context. For social strategy, CHP attempted to disseminate *Kemalist* ideology within the masses, as became clear throughout the analysis.

Insofar as the critical transformation towards the left of centre is concerned, the analysis reveals that it has been a strategic choice directed at the institutionalisation of CHP as a mass party on social democratic motifs. In this context, the actor-oriented approach seems to be useful for the explanation of the transformation towards social democracy, as the strategic shift for transformation was devised on the organisational capability for the mobilisation of the intra-party reformist faction. However, it becomes evident on the other hand, that the fortune of social democratic governments was largely undermined on structural constraints stemming from the unfavourable domestic and foreign conditions at that period.

Most notable aspects of social democratic strategy in the Third Republic have been personal conflicts on one hand and the divergence on the question of secularism, on the other. With respect to the former issue, whilst the personal charisma of the pre-

1980 CHP leader had been instrumental in holding the contending intra-party factions; the social democratic front was divided into fractures in the aftermath of the interregnum in 1980. For secularism, as Islamist discourse tended to rise in the politics of the Third Republic, the social democratic front ran into conflicts on the extent of the compromise given with regard to the secular basis of the state device. Whereas CHP seems to have adopted an unreconciled attitude on this issue; the lower overtones of the DSP strategy towards the Islamists are, by and large, prone to criticism by those in the secular milieu. As shall be reiterated below, this strategic divergence on this issue tends to imply some elaborate shifts within the social basis of the support for these parties.

With regard to the social basis of support, it has to be re-emphasised here that the cleavage system which gave the impetus for the outgrowth of the social basis of support for political parties in Turkey was founded on the prolongation of an elite-mass gap, rather than functional conflicts. The social composition of support for CHP in the single-party years used to be the bureaucratic elite, the *eṭraf* and the big land-owners; founded on the legacy of the particular circumstance of the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk* years. As that alliance was broken in the multi-party period; the state elites continued to constitute the core of CHP support until the electoral re-alignments observed during the Second Republic. Collateral was the fact that CHP support from the urban centres in the more developed regions became distinguishable during this period.

Social basis of support underwent some considerable changes in the Third Republic. Foremost among these is the evident fact that the centre-left has absolutely lost

support from 1989 onwards. Another notable aspect of the social base is such that whereas the SHP/CHP support is centred more on white-collar jobs, civil servants, students and employers; electoral basis of DSP seems higher among blue-collar workers. Accordingly, whilst the support of blue-collar electorate for both parties tend to remain stable, that of the civil servants are observed to be increasing. Furthermore, centre-left support appears to be higher among those with better education; when compared especially to the support given to the right. In this respect, SHP votes in particular are observed to be correlated to higher levels of education. Last but not least is the increasing volatility and the descent of centre-left votes in urban centres in the 1990s. In this context, the crucial uncertainty whether CHP support owes to the legacy of *Kemalism*, and that of DSP to the personal charisma of its leader, remains unsettled so far.

Organisational structure is the final key to the completion of the main framework of Turkish social democracy. Indeed, while writing for more than eighty years ago on political parties, *Robert Michels* might well have been elaborating on how political parties functioned in Turkey in the 1990s. *Michels* was arguing in 1911 that the intrinsic deficiencies of modern democracy, especially domination by the leadership over the masses, was not necessarily stemming from underdevelopment, lower levels of education or capitalistic power control on society at large; but rather from the oligarchic tendencies inherent within any complex system. Oligarchy, the control of a society or an organisation by those at the top, was characteristic of a bureaucratic or a large-scale social organisation at any given time or place. Endeavouring to illustrate, in essence, the incompatibilities of representative democracy with the notion of "general will"; *Michels* went on to demonstrate the ironically oligarchic

structures of the trade unions and socialist parties of his time that had been fighting for the consolidation of democratic order since long. [139]

What exhibits relevance for Turkey in *Michel*'s work is particularly the argument put forth with regard to the "stability of leadership" and "identification of the party with the leader". Insofar as the former is concerned, it has been emphasised that attachment to tradition and personal considerations, in particular, are likely to preserve long tenure of office; that in turn, impedes logical application of democratic principles, thence involving dangers for democracy.[140] It becomes possible, therefore, that the re-election of leaders is taken as a matter of course, and that even a certain pressure is exercised in order to secure their re-election; although in theory, every elector is free to vote. Thereupon, the certain rights enjoyed by the leadership usually grants them a privilege of an essentially oligarchic in nature; depriving the individuals within a political party of their fundamental liberty for action. Another oligarchic practice, in this framework, stems from the habit of nepotism. As nomination of candidates depends upon cliques of local leaders and their aides that usually suggest suitable names to the rank and file; the constituency, many times, comes to be regarded as a "family property".[141] As stated by *Michels*:

> "It is in this manner that the leaders of an eminently democratic party, nominated by indirect suffrage, prolong throughout their lives the powers with which they have once been invested. The re-election demanded by the rules becomes a pure formality. The temporary commission becomes a permanent one, and the tenure of office an established right. The democratic leaders are firmly established in their seats than ever were the leaders of an aristocratic body...."[142]

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[139] Robert Michels, "*Political Parties, A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*", trans. Eden and Cedar Paul. The Crowell-Collier Publishing Company, 1962. Reprint. New York: The Free Press, 1968.
[140] Michels, "*Oligarchical Tendencies*", 120-121.
[141] Ibid., 127-128.
[142] Ibid., 122.

Collateral with the above, it has been suggested for the "identification of the party with the leader" that the hegemony of the leaders do not necessarily stem from a severe greed for power or from unrestrained egoism, but is often the consequence of an actual persuasion of their own eminence and of the services which they have rendered to their party. As such, all objective criticism of the party is taken by the leader as a personal attack; and personal criticism as aimed at the party as a whole.

Bearing in mind the fundamentals of the organisational framework of Turkish social democracy in the Third Republic, it may be suggested that the case of Turkey is a telling example in many ways. As stated in the foregoing analysis on organisation; the rhetoric on "party for the leader" has been functioning at full steam in Turkish politics. In the aftermath of the single-party period within which, the leaders held nearly a monopolistic status, hegemony of leadership remained salient in the multi-party regime as well; paving the way for the institutionalisation of almost unconditional obedience to the leader, instead of democratic practices within the party. On that account, and due largely to the prevailing clientelism in Turkish politics, the development of mass mobilisation driven essentially by horizontal solidarities, and enhancement of intra-party democracy could not have been consummated so far.

Mass political participation in Turkey, beyond any doubt, is a new phenomenon to Turkish politics, due in large part to the prolongation of the elite-mass gap for centuries. As mass mobilisation was prompted with transition to multi-party regime, the wider sections of the society, especially the peasantry that had remained outside the political game, was abruptly incorporated into competitive politics from 1946 onward. That indeed, stood in sharp contrast with Western Europe in which the

institutionalisation of mass political participation has been a gradual process with the active participation of especially the social democratic forces. Besides, the peasant question had all but been eliminated from national politics of many countries in Europe, before mass political enfranchisement. That implied, in essence, the introgression of new actors in national politics of Turkey; most of which were drawn from clientelist networks of alliances; rather than functional solidarities as in Europe. As put forth by *Sabri Sayarı:*

> "The division of many rural communities into two political groups, each supporting one of the two major parties, proved to be highly significant in the formation of national-local links and the crystallisation of voter alignments. Factional oppositions and alliances based on kinship, ethnic, religious or community-oriented cleavages reflected the segmentary aspect of the social structure at the local level."[143]

Thence, political competition in Turkey have been revolving, in large part, either around personalistic considerations or benefit allocations of a clientelist nature; rather than ideological or pragrammatic demarcations as in the West. Despite the fact that patronage distribution remained relatively limited within CHP during the single-party period, due largely to the elitist and bureaucratic approach that it inherited from its "state-party" years;[144]nevertheless, vertical alliances within a clientelist structure remains intact in Turkish politics. Therefrom, protrudes the fact that whereas social democratic politics ought to be a horizontal mass movement, as seems to be the case in Western Europe; in Turkey, it developed as an elite-driven bureaucratic endeavour, practised and supported by loyalties of vertical type.

In the final analysis, it becomes clear that social democracy in Turkey did not develop on functional cleavages confined to conflicts over the question of resource

[143] Sayarı, " Beginnings of Mass Political Participation", 123.
[144] Ibid., 131.

allocation, as observed in the Western settings. As Turkey's transition to industrialisation was retarded for almost a century, there came into existence no substantially organised worker movements that in turn, were to organise into a cohesive political force to give impetus to the emergence of social democracy in that polity. Building upon that is also the deficiency of social democracy in Turkey in terms of solidarity with the working classes and its institutions; unlike the Western European tradition that rests on organic links with trade-unions. Thence, rather than stemming from class concerns and their projection into ideological movements; Turkish social democracy grounded on non-functional issues such as cultural or peripheral controversies.

Traditionally, left politics in Turkey remained largely confined to the intelligentsia and failed to evolve into a mass movement with a sound social base. Autocratic and clientelistic practices also impeded the outgrowth of a social democratic politics as observed in Europe. Instead, the apparently social democratic values adopted by the CHP during the *Kemalist* period seem to have been pursued on purely pragmatic grounds, rather than an ideological orientation. Nonetheless, the historic ties between the former CHP and the intellectuals seem to be prevailing in Turkish politics, when the observed relationship between support for social democratic parties and the level of education is borne in mind. Yet, social democrats so far, largely failed to develop a fresh discourse that is prepared to meet the challenges of the decade. Instead, they still seem to be depending either on personal charisma or on the prevailing credit of *Kemalist* values in Turkish society. In that respect, the ideological bankruptcy of the social democratic front tends to further undermine its support among the electorate, which, already appears as highly volatile for the time being.

CHAPTER V

THE COMPARATIVE SETTING

Inasmuch as human beings carry the traces of childhood all their lives long, similarly, political parties are deeply affected from their roots, says *Maurice Duverger* in his analysis on political parties[1]. Not unexpectedly, development of political parties has been, in large part, inseparable from the historical process leading to the extension of political franchise and to the widening of the powers of the parliament; thereupon to democratic development in general. As Lipset and Rokkan have also shown, "historicity of the party alternatives is of crucial importance not only in the study of differences and similarities across nations but also within nations".[2] Though bulk of political parties in Continental Europe originated from intra-parliamentary groups from 1789 onward, the coming into existence of many parties somehow revealed divergences from this tendency; in that the latter were observed to be born outside parliaments. Owing to that, while left and right parties were already formed within the 1848 Constituent Assemblies in France and in Germany; a number of socialist parties were born from trade unions, to constitute in turn, the political branches of the former in national parliaments, as in

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[1] Maurice Duverger, *Siyasi Partiler* [Political Parties]. trans. Ergun Özbudun.4th ed. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993),15.

[2] Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction". In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives,* eds. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 1-64.(New York: The Free Press, 1967),53.

Britain. The extra-parliamentary organisations that historically impelled party formation in Europe were trade unions, intellectual clubs, churches, various leagues, industrial or commercial interest groups such as banks and large entrepreneurs, cartels, and at times, illegal movements. Whatever their roots had been, the political parties that emerged outside the parliaments revealed entirely different patterns than those born from intra-parliamentary groups.[3]

As shown in Chapter Three, CHP in the First Turkish Republic was born from a national resistance movement. Emerging as a legitimate, yet an illegal movement organised by Ottoman Army officers, the MHC (*Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*) became a political group in the First National Parliament of 1920-23. Therefore, the very roots of one of the contemporary social democratic parties in Turkey differed sharply from those in Western Europe; in view of the developmental patterns accounted for before in the same Chapter. Besides, a number of historical circumstances in Turkey have helped social democracy to ground on an entirely dissimilar conjuncture when compared to Europe, as elaborated in detail in the preceding sections.

The structural anlyses carried out in this dissertation reveal that the Industrial Revolution, one of the key factors that contributed to the formation of modern political cleavages in Europe, did not take place in the Ottoman/Turkish polity. The Ottoman economy still revealed pre-capitalistic features by the time the two industrial revolutions had already taken place in the Western World. The Turks, therefore, remained as later-comers in terms of industrialisation. Implications of this economic delay have been paramount, both socially and politically. The cleavage

[3] Duverger, *"Siyasi Partiler"*, 17-28.

system that shaped Turkish politics grounded on cultural and territorial oppositions rather than functional cleavages committed to class and collective interests as in the Western settings. Rather, structuration of the cleavage system in the Ottoman-Turkish polity owes largely to the legacy of absolutist state tradition, in addition to the particular land tenure system that the relations of production was framed on. Thereupon was the emergence of a cultural-territorial cleavage in the Turkish society, which was by no means comparable to the functional cleavage between the urban pre-bourgeoisie and the feudal landowners in the West.

Whereas socio-economic development within European capitalism was materialised so as to place the bourgeoisie into the upper hand in the social organisation of production and in politics; the prevalence of a provisionist[4] economic structure in the Ottoman Empire implied that the wider masses remained largely aloof from politics. Divided between a ruling class (*askeri*) and a ruled (*reaya*), the locus of basic antagonisms in the Ottoman society fell on the dichotomy between the "centre" and the "periphery". This fundamental cleavage remained intact to carve the rationale of Turkish politics till the dissolution of the classical land tenure system and the corresponding weakening of the centre in the nineteenth century.

Quite dissimilar in Western Europe at that time, the fundamental shifts in production patterns and the accompanying societal changes propelled by the steam revolution were further accelerated throughout the Second Industrial Revolution. The collateral increase of capital and the continuous increase in the number of wage labourers resulted in conflicts between the landed interests and the rising class of entrepreneurs

[4] Commodity production and money transactions remain limited in provisionist economies, in contrast to mercantilism.

in Europe. The procedure was complemented with the cleavage between owners and employers on the one side; and tenants, labourers and workers on the other. As such, functional cleavages in the form of "conflicts over short or long term allocation of resources, products and benefits in the economy"[5], have been functioning forcefully in the industrialised countries in the late 1800s. Political implications of these contentions have been such that they were projected into ideological movements, on which the European left/right continuum was devised.

Without any comparable framework, fundamental controversies in Turkish politics of that time were revolving around the dichotomy between the secularisation attempts of a modernising bureaucracy and the reaction of the periphery to that. The peripheral forces were to ally, in turn, with the Islamists in the centre. In that respect, the cleavage structure in the Turkish society seemed to fit in the conception of territorial-cultural type set forth in the structural analysis suggested by Lipset and Rokkan. They have conceptualised such type of cleavage structure as "local oppositions to encroachments of centralising, standardising and rationalising machinery of the nation state", or as "direct struggles among competing elites for central power".[6] The Turkish case also seemed to comply with their suggestion that "central nation builders and peripheral resistance will invariably be opposed, never in any joint alliance"; and that the "nation builders has to decide" on an alliance either with the religious or the economic forces in that country. In Turkey at the wake of nation state building, the alternative has been the latter; literally the *etraf*

[5] Lipset and Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments", 10.
[6] Ibid.,10.

and the landowners that "controlled a substantial share of the total primary production of the national territory."[7]

In the light of the structural analysis, therefore, it becomes possible to conclude firstly that social democracy in Western Europe originated from functional cleavages based on the relations of particular social strata *vis-a-vis* the means of economic production. In other words, whilst Western European social democracy has been the outcome of the industrial revolution and the collateral horizontal political mobilisation of the working class; its counterpart in Turkey had to ground on an entirely different soil. It must be reiterated that, seeking to improve their lot, the wage labourers in a wide range of industrial activity in Europe steadily grew in number and organised in trade unions. They were at the same time, politically mobilised by the dominant communitarian views of society and in particular by political socialism of *Marx* and *Engels*.

Second, and stemming from the delay in industrialisation in Turkey is the evident fact that the working classes of Europe and Turkey were as comparable as Colossus is to a Lilliputian. By the time the millions of European workers had already formed a potential for a cohesive political force, the total number of workers in Turkey remained around some 14 thousand only. Even the sole fact that the size of workers in Germany, Britain, France and Sweden had reached approximately to 10, 9, 4 and a half million respectively by the turn of the twentieth century, may suffice to throw light upon the apparent disparity between the two cases. In that respect, a parallelism can also be drawn in Western Europe, when founding dates of socialist parties in

[7] Ibid., 36-37.

these countries are taken into account. SPD was founded in 1869, which was followed by PS in 1879, SAP in 1889 and LP in 1893. As noted elsewhere in this study, though a socialist party was also founded in Turkey in 1910, it remained as an elite attempt without a social base, rather than evolving into a mass party.

Third, and associated with the above is that socialist politics in Turkey emerged as an elite-drive, in contrast to the West, where the working class became the founding father of social democracy. The main thrust behind the opposition tradition in the Ottoman Empire came from intellectuals of an often middle-class origin, and the actuality of "elite-drive", by and large, tended to remain salient throughout the formative years of modern Turkish politics. The emergence of socialist politics has been no exception to that. Having been largely excluded from political participation, the wider masses in Turkey remained outside the "game of socialist politics" that was inaugurated by the *İstanbul* elites. Accordingly, an array of political parties founded both during the Second Constitutionalist Period and the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk* years emerged to be socialist or social democratic parties without a "social base". The erudite also formed the basis of the Turkish Revolution and its political wing MHC/CHP. As such, while rise of socialism in Western Europe has been an integral part of political development and democratisation process during and after industrialisation, left-wing politics remained confined to the intellectual practices of a handful of "enlightened" in Turkey. In the final analysis, it may be concluded that inasmuch as Western social democrats have become both contributors to and participants of democratic development, that role in Turkey had to be played by the enlightened state elites at least until transition to multi-party politics in 1945.

5.1. Ideological Divergences and Strategy

The dominant political paradigm of the post-1945 Europe was based on the competition between Christian democracy on the centre-right and social democracy on the left of centre, which owes to a tradition of more than a century. Although the outset of social democracy in Western Europe had been the revolutionary political socialism of the past century; an evolutionary procedure from orthodox *Marxism* to *Keynesianism*, nevertheless, was successfully materialised so as to elevate social democracy to a prestigious status in the post-war liberal political order in Western Europe.

In the political socialism of *Marx* and *Engels*, historical class conflicts were placed at the heart of ideology; wherefrom the ultimate goal emerged to be the forceful overthrow of capitalism by the proletariat. Radically critical of the existing oppression of wage labourers within bourgeoisie society, Marxism held that all means of exploitation were to be done away with, once private property and its device (the state) was abolished through revolutionary action; and once all forces of production were taken under collective ownership. Nonetheless, as political enfranchisement in Europe was gradually being extended, the dilemma facing the Marxists came out to be "whether or not" to participate in the electoral game. Divisions on the desirability of a reformist strategy instead of necessarily a revolutionary one, therefore, erupted within the socialist milieu of the late nineteenth century. All in all, by the virtue of the fact that socio-economic development in Europe was not being materialised in the way that *Marx* had predicted, the reformists won over orthodox Marxists, in the inter-war period in Europe. During the same

period, the British economist *John Maynard Keynes* provided the reformist socialists with the theoretical tools for the "social democratic management" of the economy. Thereupon, contemporary social democracy was firmly anchored in the industrialised/monetised capitalist state; yet with egalitarian and distributive insights within that system.

The ideological path of Turkish social democracy did not develop within such an evolutionary process as above. In Turkey, the emergence of socialist politics had been collateral with the penetration of Western thought into the Ottoman/Turkish society during modernisation. Whilst the wide range of working masses in Europe were effectively incorporated into class politics as propelled by the scientific socialism of *Marx* and *Engels*; an array of socialist attempts in Ottoman politics at that time remained within the intellectual milieu in *İstanbul*, without any solid mass base. These currents were given further impetus by the ideological impact of the *Bolshevik* Revolution, and tended to continue in *Anatolia*. Relations between the Revolutionary government in Ankara and *Leninist* Russia have also been influential for development of these movements throughout the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk* Period. The ideological stand of such efforts appeared to be an interaction between utopian and scientific socialism, Islamist values or to some extent, liberal ideas.

In the First Turkish Republic, CHP ideology remained confined to the consolidation of the nation-state on a modern, secular basis. In the early Republican period, efforts were put forth for the absorption of Western values by the Turkish society, and for the institutionalisation of Western codes and norms within the state device. Furthermore, the creation of a sizeable public sector became an imperative for the

rapid industrialisation of the agrarian Turkish economy. In this framework, establishment of a comprehensive social security system, and fairer distribution of wealth appeared as the locus of CHP strategy in this period; which, came out to be highly oriented towards basic social democratic values. Nonetheless, the main thrust behind this strategy has been pragmatism stemming from the necessities of the young Republic; rather than ideological concerns.

In the Second Republic, efforts were put forth by CHP elites for the institutionalisation of a centre-left ideological stance on the basis of *Kemalist* values. On the other hand, indeed, have been both the confrontation between the conservative and reformist wings of "*Atatürk's* Party", and the rise of *Türkiye İşçi Partisi: TİP* that posed an electoral challenge to CHP. In a highly volatile political conjuncture as such, establishment of a "Turkish social democracy" was realised through the strategic transformation of the "*Kemalist* State Party" towards the left of centre. Nevertheless, the CHP leader *Ecevit* meticulously refuted any identification with TİP or Marxist roots, taking into account the conservative nature of the Turkish electorate. All in all, it becomes evident that the outgrowth of social democracy in Turkey was framed on the prevailing socio-political conjuncture of the Second Republic. Thence, both the existing pattern of party competition and the relevant ideological legacy become explanatory factors in the analysis of the outset of Turkish social democracy.

Insofar as strategy is concerned, analysis of Western European social democratic parties suggests that strategic formulation is among the key factors that contibuted to the performance of these parties. Timely adaptation to the ever-arising conjunctural

challenges has been a prominent virtue of social democratic parties in the West. In this respect, novel strategies based on electoral alliances necessiated by the rise of *laissez-faire* and left-libertarian cleavage mobilisation in the eighties and ninetees was largely substantiated through the organisational capacity for strategic decision-making. Nevertheless, the intra-party capability for devising of new strategies was contingent upon the extent that structural opportunities have been favourable. The dominant ideologies prevailing in each country have shaped the strategy of parties in that respect. The social democratic parties in Britain, Sweden and France have faced more difficulties in the incorporation of new-left themes into their strategic appeals when compred to Germany; as left-libertarian cleavage mobilisation has been a more decisive factor in the latter. In France, for instance, the new-left was largely viewed as the adversary of the dominant *etatist* and traditional socialist ideologies in that polity. On the other hand, as class used to be a more propelling factor, and as traditional socialist and liberal ideologies have been more prevalent; strategic adaptation to new-left values were observed later in Sweden and in Britain.

In Turkey, social democratic strategy was confined to the transformation of CHP's image into a party on the left of centre. This strategic shift, indeed, was structured on the intra-party capability for the mobilisation of reformist movement during the seventies. However, consolidation of this strategic turn was notably circumvented by structural constraints such as the unfavourable economic conjuncture, rising radicalism, electoral volatility and the impacts of the military interventions.

Social democrats came to power for the first time in the troubled coalition with *Milli Selamet Partisi: MSP* (The National Salvation Party) from January to September

1974. Not unexpectedly, the uneasy alliance of the social democratic CHP and the Islamist MSP could not survive much. Indeed, 1974 was the year of a global crisis propelled by trans-national oil cartels following the collapse of the *Bretton Woods* system in 1971. It was, at the same time, the beginning of social democratic decline in North-Western Europe, stemming largely from the inappropriateness of Keynesian macro-economic management to the emerging deadlock in world markets. Building upon that, burst out the second oil crisis in 1979, to duly undermine in turn, the maintenance of high public expenditures throughout Western Europe. The second social democratic experience in government in Turkey was realised in such a conjuncture, by transferring eleven members of the Parliament from the centre-right AP to CHP. The minority cabinet continued from January 1978 to October 1979, with many allegations on corruption and incompetent performance; thence with an eroded legacy of CHP, lurking behind.

As stated above, whereas Western European social democracy was successfully reactivated through ideological and strategic adaptation to new left themes and fresh dynamics of the 1990s, Turkish social democrats remained highly fractionalised during the Third Republic. Indeed, hardly any left-libertarian cleavage mobilisation is being observed in Turkish politics. Rather, dividedness seems to prevail especially around personal conflicts instead of any ideological divergences. That appears to have prompted the electoral volatility among the social democratic bloc further. Allegations on corruption in SHP municipal administrations, and the coalition with the centre-right from 1991 to 1995 exacerbated the support of social democrats among the electorate; as the highest inflation rate of the entire Republican period was recorded in 1994. Despite the fact that the economic apparatus was run

by the right wing of the coalition cabinets in that period; the growing unpopularity of social democrats was registered in 1995 general elections. In July 1997, the DSP wing of the social democrats came to government as junior partner to the centre-right ANAP, following the fall of the right bloc coalition founded by the radical Islamists and the other centre-right. Throughout this period, personalised factionalism continued to remain salient within the social democratic front in Turkey.

5.2. Social Base and Organisation

The social democratic parties in Western Europe and Turkey reveal significant divergences with regard to their social bases of support. As explored extensively throughout the analysis, working class has traditionally formed the core constituency of social democracy in Europe. Historically, the number of workers voting for the left gradually evolved from 1900 onward, in correspondence with the increase in the size of the blue-collar electorate. Congruent with the extension of political enfranchisement since early 1900s, workers were progressively integrated into the social democratic electorate until the seventies. While some considerable and rather elaborate shifts have been observed within the consistency of the electoral support for social democracy in the 1980s and the 1990s; workers tended to preserve their status, by and large, as the traditional supporters of social democracy in Europe. Besides, although class voting throughout Europe has been declining since the eighties, social democrats have been able to recruit support from the middle-classes as well; due largely to the strategic adaptation to the rising new cleavage mobilisation, rather than a solely class based appeal to the electorate.

As becomes clear in this study, political alignments in the Ottoman/Turkish polity developed on an elite-mass gap rather than on class base. Due largely to the particular circumstances of the National Revolution and after, CHP used to be supported by the national bureaucratic elite, *etraf* and the big landowners until the 1940s. This framework underwent some considerable changes during the multi-party regime. Whereas CHP support among the *etraf* and the landowners eroded significantly, it tended to remain intact within the civil-military bureaucracy. On the other hand, the peasantry's affiliation to the state-party has not been firmly grounded, as the penetration of the *Kemalist* discourse into the masses in the countryside remained limited. With the gradual process of electoral re-alignment and the collateral replacement of the elite-mass gap with functional cleavages during the Second Republic, CHP support started to increase in urban centres. Tendency towards this party became more visible among the better-educated electorate within the middle and upper middle classes, especially from 1965 onward. Status of the "centre-left CHP" as the party of the urban centres in developed regions, was almost registered by 1973 elections.

However, division of the social democrats in the Third Republic largely undermined the cohesion of the centre-left electorate observed the seventies. It appears that at present, not only an electoral fluency between the two parties of the social democratic front is prevailing; but that DSP's social base is gradually becoming more distinct from that of the SHP/CHP. In this respect, whereas the latter tends to preserve its status among the bureaucratic elite and the relatively better educated strata with middle class origin; support for the former seems to be centred more on blue collar workers, the retired and the unemployed. As has been shown in the

Fourth Chapter, the relationship between education and SHP/CHP support seems to be grounded on the traditional ties between the former CHP and intellectuals, teachers, bureaucrats; in general, the erudite.[8] It becomes clear therefore, that the social basis of support for social democratic parties in Turkey is considerably different than those in the West. In this connection, the question whether or not CHP's support owes to the legacy of *Kemalism*; and that of the DSP to the personal credit of *Ecevit*, remains open so far.

Findings of the foregoing Chapter also reveal significant divergences between the organisational structures of Turkish and Western European social democratic parties. The four social democratic parties covered in this study divulge, by and large, firmly institutionalised organisational schemes. Traditionally, the social democratic parties of Western Europe have been in organic relationship with trade unions in their respective countries, hence established well-organised political links with the leaders of the working masses. In Britain and in Sweden, grass-root organisation has particularly been a long established tradition since the turn of the twentieth century. Affiliated and subsidiary organisations such as women and youth branches have been a common phenomenon of these parties. Whilst the German and French social democratic parties reveal a slightly more hierarchical organisational structure when compared to those in Britain and in Sweden; nonetheless, intra-party democracy and proper functioning of affiliated branches have been entrenched as the integral parts of the party mechanism in these polities.

[8] Yılmaz Esmer, "Parties and the Electorate: A Comparative Analysis of Voter Profiles of Turkish Political Parties". In *Turkey: Political, Social and economic Challenges in the 1990s,* eds., Çiğdem Balım and et al., 74-89. (Leiden/New York/Köln: E.J.Brill, 1995), 79-80.

In Turkey, social democrats have not been able to institutionalise their party structures within such a framework, due largely to the already disserted structural divergences in the origins. Foremost in this context is the fact that a genuine tradition of solidarity with the working class and its institutions has never developed in Turkey. Hence, any organic relationship with trade unions, as it has been the case in the West, has not been observed for Turkish social democracy. Furthermore is the apparent organisational deficiency. Indeed, the organisational scheme of the pre-1980 CHP appeared to be notably more democratic, in the form of institutionalisation from districts, to villages, towns and cities. There was the respect that directed the organisational capability of CHP at the intra-party mobilisation in favour of the reformist group in the seventies. The personal charisma of the reformist leader has also contributed to this strategic shift, as the other decisive factor. On the other hand, however, the leadership used to hold a monopolistic status in party politics since foundation. Especially in the Third Republic, the very fact that the organisational scheme in both social democratic parties remain subservient to the absolute hegemony of leadership, remains salient. With this regard, local party branches and subsidiary bodies such as women and youth organisations do not seem to have much saying within the intra-party decision making procedure.

Rather, it has traditionally been clientelist practices that seem to have dominated party politics in Turkey. This is observed to be stemming largely from the fact that at a time of rapid mass mobilisation, party politics in Turkey was institutionalised on vertical solidarities driven mostly by patron-client relations, rather than horizontal alliances based on socio-economic status. Thence, a prominent feature of party organisation in Turkey has become the recruitment of local notables and allies into the party. In that

respect, party membership does not seem to function in the way that it does in Western European social democratic parties.

Besides, party administration and candidates to the Parliament in Turkey are not elected but appointed by the party leader in practice. In Western Europe however, the procedure of nomination candidates takes place, by and large, within the institutionalised democratic structure of the party apparatus; yet with some differences stemming from organisational structures and election systems. In Turkey on the other hand, the relevant legislative framework adopted in the Third Republic does not seem to provide for any enhancement as regards democratic functioning of political parties. In the final analysis, so far, a veiled oligarchy seems to be functioning at full steam within the organisational framework of the social democratic front in Turkey.

In the final analysis, it becomes evident that the emergence, development and functioning of social democracy in Turkey reveal significant divergences when Western Europe is borne in mind. Due largely to the structural dissimilitude in the origins, the outset of Turkish social democracy grounded on the ideological and strategic movement from *Kemalism* towards the left of centre in the Second Turkish Republic. By the virtue of the fact that social democracy in Turkey did not develop on class base as in Europe, some elaborate shifts in its social basis of support manifested itself throughout the Second and Third Republics. Collateral has been the transformation of bureaucratic elitism into mass appeal. However, due to the prevailing factionalism, oligarchic practices and clientelism; efforts at the institutionalisation of a Turkish social democratic *volkspartei* similar to the sister parties in Western Europe, appear to be considerably undermined at present.

CONCLUSION

The main objective of this dissertation was to study social democracy in Turkey, while retaining the Western European case as the reference point. In order to achieve that end, this study has undertaken a systematic comparative approach for indicating the convergences and divergences between the two cases. In the light of the analysis carried throughout the dissertation, it has become possible to draw several conclusions pertaining to the origins, development and functioning of Turkish social democracy, as well as its essential features. These findings are hoped to be of interest to researchers of Turkish politics, the social democratic intelligentsia, political elites and the electorate in Turkey. Besides, a systematic study of Turkish social democracy has significance especially when the electoral volatility in Turkey and the revival of social democracy in Western Europe are borne in mind.

Despite the fact that " the end of ideology" was declared final in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc, predictions over the future of left-wing politics in Europe largely failed to come true. It became clear in late 1990s that the left in Western Europe was "alive and kicking". Of the fifteen member states of the EU, social democrats are in government with the exception of Spain and Ireland, as of autumn 1998. In Germany, France, Britain and Sweden, social democrats have successfully adapted themselves to the fresh dynamics of the 1990s. They came to power in these polities largely by the incorporation of much of the libertarian values

of the decade into their programs, and by tactical appeal to the wider masses, in addition to their core constituencies. Whether the re-activation of social democracy shall constitute a durable alternative to the centre-right remains dubious so far; yet the left comes to view as the viable option for the electorate in Western Europe, at least for the time being.

The picture seems to be quite the reverse for Turkey. The apparent fractures, personalised factionalism and ideological draining in the centre-left have duly undermined the credit of social democratic politics in Turkey so far. Rather, ascent of Islamism at the expense of social democracy is being perceived within the present electoral volatility in Turkish politics. Whether radicalism shall grow to fill the vacuum as the anti-thesis to the hegemony of the centre-right remains highly speculative. Yet, one thing is plain that the uncompromising attitude of social democrats on alliance with the "other centre-left" is likely to further undermine the status of social democracy as a viable option in the political centre. With this regard, the findings of this study are expected to be of value in the present political conjuncture.

This research has yielded the key features of social democratic politics in Turkey to be considerably divergent from those of Western Europe. The framework of analysis devised in the First Chapter has been illustrative not only for the dissimilarities between the two cases, but also for the reasons behind them. Foremost is the fact that structural reasons have come to surface as the most significant thrust behind the divergence of Western European and Turkish experience in social democracy. Equally important is the dissimilitude between Turkey and Western

Europe, which was observed to be correlating to each of the analytical tools employed in the research. Hence, inasmuch as the case of Western Europe is held as the reference, notable dissipations in terms of ideology, strategy, social base and organisation have been connoted in this dissertation.

In this respect, findings of the Second Chapter clearly indicated that social democracy in Western Europe has been the outcome of the worker movements prompted by the Industrial Revolution. It became evident, therefore, that the political mobilisation of the working masses and the side-by-side rise of social democracy in Western Europe were devised upon class politics. In this context, it has also been possible to observe horizontal type of political solidarities comprising of people with similar socio-economic status. Thereupon, it is shown in the research that cleavages of functional type as conceptualised by *Lipset* and *Rokkan* constituted the main thrust behind the emergence and evolution of social democratic politics in Western Europe.

These external factors have helped to elucidate the structural dissimilarities between the chronicles of Western European and Turkish social democracies. As indicated throughout Chapter Three, industrialisation that was consummated in the past century in Europe, has been a gradual process in Turkey propelled after the Proclamation of the Republic. Due to the prolongation of an overwhelmingly agrarian economy and to the apparent delay in industrialisation, the minute mass of workers in Turkey was by no means in a position to become a cohesive political force; by the time workers in Europe were already organising into trade unions and political parties. Therefrom, whilst a mass mobilisation of the working people into class-based politics was commencing in Europe in mid 1800s; an elite-mass division

has been prevailing in the Ottoman/Turkish society; without the means for the institutionalisation of mass political participation in that polity, until transition to multi-party regime in 1946. Rather, political participation in the formative years of modern Turkish politics remained confined to the intelligentsia, often with middle-class or bureaucratic origins. Inasmuch as social democracy has its origins in the working-class movements of the Industrial Revolution in Europe therefore, it has been an elite-driven endeavour within the modernisation process in Turkey; on the grounds that the centre-periphery gap had persisted for many centuries in the Ottoman society.

On that account, it can be suggested that class-based political mobilisation hardly occurred to the masses in Turkey; at least until the realignment of the traditional cleavage structures during the Second Republic. Instead, basic polarisation in the Turkish society has been revolving around conflicts of a cultural/territorial nature, rather than ideological contentions based on cleavages of functional type. Findings of the Chapters Three and Four have shown these to be correlated with the aforementioned centre-periphery division inherent within the particular land tenure system of the absolutist Ottoman polity. Furthermore is the phenomenon of vertical networks of alliances that were observed to be heterogenous and non-ideological in essence. As typified by *Sabri Sayarı*, these solidarities were forged among people drawn from differing social strata, that in turn prepared the grounds for the institutionalisation of clientelist practices in Turkish politics.

Due largely to these structural divergences, it became possible to confirm the first hypothesis deriving from the typification of *Lipset* and *Rokkan*. "Forasmuch as

social democratic movement in Western Europe was built upon functional cleavages in the form of conflicts over short or long term allocation of resources, products and benefits in the economy, along with their projection into ideological movements; social democracy in Turkey was to develop on the residues of territorial/cultural cleavages still prevalent in the aftermath of the National Revolution". Furthermore is the phenomenon of "vertical networks of alliances" in Turkey that are heterogenous and non-ideological in nature; whereas "horizontal type of political solidarities" comprising of people with similar social status or class-base have been functioning to carve the rationale of the "Left-Right" continuum in Western Europe.

Ascribable to the above, the main features of social democracy in Turkey appeared to be notably divergent from those in the Western settings. Stemming from the essential dissimilitude in the origins, ideological formation and the concomitant strategic development of Turkish social democracy were cast in a different mould in that polity. Ideologically, insofar as the case of Western Europe divulged an evolution from *Marxism* to left-libertarianism; Turkish social democracy was unveiled to be a transformation from *Kemalism* to the left of centre, without any identification with Marxist roots. Strategically, social democrats in Western Europe pursued a progressive stand from a class-based appeal towards becoming mass parties, and they successfully allied with Greens in the 1990s. Turkish social democrats, on the other hand, had to rely on the means for transformation from bureaucratic elitism towards mass appeal during the Second Republic and onwards. Although highly fragmented, there appears hardly any possibility of alliance even within the social democratic front itself.

For social base, whilst the working class has traditionally formed the core constituency of social democracy in Europe; this role had to be played by the national bureaucratic elite in Turkey. As voter re-alignments were commencing in both Western Europe and in Turkey during the 1970s, their implications also diverged in the two cases. Forasmuch as the former managed to recruit mass support from the rising new middle-classes, the better-educated urban electorate often with middle and upper-class origins constituted the basis of social democratic support in the latter. Thereupon, it became clear that social democratic support in Turkey reveals a notable relevance with educational status, which might be ascribed to the traditional ties between *Kemalist* values and the intelligentsia". In this context, it can also be suggested that non-functional issues such as the conflict between *Kemalism* and *Islamism* are still prevalent in Turkey, rather than a left/right continuum as in the Western settings.

With regard to the organisational framework, contrasts speak for themselves. Whereas fundamentals of social democratic organisation in the West lay open as grass-root structure, highly institutionalised intra-party democracy and established relations with trade unions; leadership hegemony and clientelism come to the surface in its counterpart in Turkey. In the final analysis therefore, it becomes evident that social democratic politics in Turkey, which followed hardly any similar evolutionary path as in the West, has been functioning in an entirely different setting. Thence, the second and the core hypothesis of this research becomes entrenched as well. "Social democracy in Turkey seems to represent a dissimilar trajectory insofar as Western Europe is held as the reference".

The main objective of this dissertation has been to study social democracy in Turkey, with reference to Western Europe. Structural explanations have been complementary to the systematic study carried out with regard to the main tools of analysis employed in this reserach. This study, to the best knowledge of its author, is foremost the only attempt so far, to study social democracy in Turkey within the framework devised in this work. Nevertheless, it is of no controversy that further analyses shall be complementary to it.

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ANNEX

EXTRACTS FROM THE 1935 CHP PROGRAM

Preamble:

d-Etatism:

Art. 7: Our étatism stems from the commitment to raise the life standard of our nation to contemporary level, and to develop rapidly the national economy as a whole.

We deem it necessary to increase the efficiency of national activities by equipping each branch of the economy with high technology; and to enhance the utilisation of national capital in useful fields.

Art. 8: With a view to attain the goals above, and to serve public interests in national economy, while purveying at the same time, public services and national defence, the State is entrusted with the task of directly enterprising in areas that it deems necessary.

These areas comprise of large-scale undertakings such as mining, power generation, heavy industry, defence industry and civil works, and of public services such as transportation, communication and postal services.

Art 9: Our party acknowledges the importance of private enterprises, and supports their promotion by the State.

With a view to comply with national requirements and to enhance full security in the activities carried out by the private sector, our party presumes it necessary that the State indicates, via plans and programs, the extent, location and timing of these activities.

The State may directly undertake in areas where the private sector can not, or does not wish to enterprise.

Section VI: Financial Policy:

Art 77: We shall improve the taxation system according to progressive rates on real incomes, and with a view to purveying social justice and efficiency.

Art 78: We intend to decrease indirect taxes on basic vital commodities, as a measure to protect the citizens with low level incomes; and endeavour to maintain the balance between direct and indirect taxes.

VII. **Social Policy:**

Art. 84: Labour (emek) is the essential component within the national product, which is to be preserved and to be dependent on.

Our party regards it essential to preserve the right to, and freedom of work; to safeguard physical and mental labour from being exploited, while reserving, on the other hand, the rights of employers; and to improve the legislation on labour according to democratic legal principles.

Art 87: We shall provide for the necessary precautions against accidents in work-places, improve the health conditions of work-places, protect child workers, and conserve the rights of female workers in the case of motherhood.

Art 89: With a view to safeguarding the right of the working people to be protected in cases of accident, illness, professional diseases, disability, old age, labor, motherhood and death, our Party adopts the development of social security system as a duty.

Art 94: Protection of orphans and of socially deprived children by the State is among the fundamentals of our social policy.

We deem it among our essential duties to establish the institutions for the purpose stated above.

IX. **Section: Health Policy**

Art. 111: Our Party treats the right for health as among basic human rights, and assigns the State the task of preserving and improving its citizens' health. We, therefore, deem it necessary to raise the life standards of our citizens in cities, towns and villages to prosperity levels; to disseminate information on the preservation of health, to extend and improve preventive medical services, to prevent child death and finally to enhance bringing up healthy children, while combating, at the same time, all kinds of contagious and fatal diseases.

Art 112: We shall increase the number of hospitals and health stations, and shall improve the existing ones, with a view to meet the growing demand. We shall increase also the number of expert hospitals on gynaecology and obstetrics (*doğumevleri*). We aim at providing our economically deprived citizens with the right for child birth at no cost, and at establishing a health-security system.

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